The New Infrastructures of Artificial Intelligence

An investigation into our everyday reality, and how we learn to recognise manipulation and propaganda in an AI-mediated era

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It is conceivable that the most sophisticated technology hitherto devised may be utilised to reinstate power structures that were formerly presumed to have been deconstructed. The argument is posited that the AI era is not so much a crisis of opinion as a crisis of infrastructure. The hypothesis that attention, data and computing power have become the hidden institutions of legitimacy is hereby proposed.[2]

This infrastructural shift is particularly evident in business domains. One such example is public procurement, which is increasingly characterised by the utilisation of ranking, search, and summarisation layers. It has been demonstrated that AI platforms have the capacity to illustrate the potential of AI-mediated selection to influence market access. The objective is accomplished through the implementation of a systematic approach encompassing the filtration and structuring of tender information, with a focus on the specific requirements of enterprises of all seizes.[3]

In the contemporary moment, public discourse advances at a velocity that frequently surpasses the capacity for reflective judgement. The capture of attention has become a more effective strategy than patient analysis, and the performance of opinion increasingly substitutes for the labour of understanding. The decisive transformations of our era therefore occur not in the visible theatre of controversy, but in the less conspicuous domains where technical infrastructures, algorithmic selection, and economic and geopolitical dependencies quietly determine what is possible. While such details may appear inconsequential, they play a pivotal role in shaping contemporary life in its political and existential dimensions. It is through these processes that the boundaries between that which is visible or invisible, sayable or excluded, plausible or unthinkable are established. As public conflict oscillates between polemic and populism, the deeper foundations of power, knowledge, and freedom are being reconfigured, and with them the conditions under which democratic legitimacy can be sustained.

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[2] In this article, the term 'AI' is used to denote artificial intelligence, which is defined as the capacity of computational systems to learn from data in order to support prediction, decision-making, or autonomous action.
[3] See https://www.ready-tender.de/.

The following article addresses these hidden layers of digital modernity. The objective of this discourse is not to explore the rhetoric of innovation, but rather to examine the logic of systems that structure perception, action, and decision-making. The study will examine the architecture of attention, the economy of data, and the interlocking of artificial intelligence, platform economies, and democratic order under conditions of material scarcity, strategic resource politics, and global bloc formation.

Germany is a particularly pertinent case study due to its pivotal position within the European Union and its considerable industrial and research capabilities.[4] If the objective is to establish a leadership position in the field of AI, it is imperative to transcend the conventional governance model that primarily allocates responsibility for AI research and innovation along traditional faculty lines and formal disciplinary jurisdictions. Instead, an interdisciplinary institutional approach should be adopted. This paradigm shift is imperative due to the fact that substantial progressions in domains such as data science, evaluation, law, ethics, domain expertise, and translational deployment frequently emerge from external sources. In the absence of such a reorientation of institutional frameworks, the likelihood of Germany sustaining its position as a leader in the field of AI is low. The process of capability-building also occurs at a level that is below the level of "grand strategy". In this particular context, the term 'practical systems' pertains to those that serve to reduce search costs, improve access, and translate regulatory complexity into usable workflows. The emphasis placed on the provision of business applications by AI platforms such as Ready Tender represents a modest yet tangible illustration of the development of operational capacity within the German context.[5]

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[4] See chapter Thirteen: Germany and the Politics of Denial.
[5] See https://www.ready-tender.de/.

„ {...} learn history — and be honest about it. Without honesty, there can be no trust. Without trust, there can be no security. {...}"[6]

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[6] See page 18 (No. 12).

Analytical Roadmap*

*It should be noted that due to the subsequent addition of original PDF attachments (see Appendix B/C), the PDF page numbers differ from the original. To facilitate navigation, readers are advised to use the table of contents links.

Artificial Intelligence is like teenage sex: everyone talks about it, nobody really knows how to do it, everyone thinks everyone else is doing it, so everyone claims they are doing it…

Preface

The discourse surrounding artificial intelligence frequently assumes a unifying perspective, conceptualising it as a singular entity, a "machine". This assertion is demonstrably false. Indeed, contemporary AI bears a resemblance to a layered stack. Each stratum is meticulously engineered to address a distinct problem, with the subsequent layers contingent upon the preceding layers. The focus of observation and discussion is on the higher layers. Thy hype about AI is done here. The lower layers have been shown to play a pivotal role in the establishment of power, dependency, and governance.

The foundational element of this paradigm is constituted by physical infrastructure. The development of AI is contingent upon the availability of several key components, including chips, servers, data centres, electricity, cooling systems, and high-speed networks. This layer can be regarded as the foundation upon which the entire edifice is constructed. In the absence of adequate computational capacity or reliance on foreign suppliers for advanced chips and cloud infrastructure, a society may engage in discussions regarding digital sovereignty without the capacity to execute it. In such a scenario, sovereignty is elevated to a mere statement, rather than being understood as a practical capability.

The data layer is situated above the infrastructure. Machine learning is predicated on data, which may take various forms, including texts, images, logs and behavioural traces. However, it is important to recognise that data is never simply "there". The collection of data occurs within specific contexts, influenced by particular interests and driven by specific incentives. The process of measurement is instrumental in identifying areas for enhancement, while the absence of measurement leads to the invisibility of these areas. In this sense, data can be considered a form of pre-interpretation. It establishes the limits of what models are able to learn and what they will systematically fail to represent.

The subsequent layer pertains to models and algorithms. In this instance, the system transforms data into statistical representations. The architectural choices made in this field are of significance, insofar as they pertain to the manner in which the model pays attention to its environment, the manner in which it compresses information, and the manner in which it generalises. In the context of transformer-based systems, a pivotal transition is observed wherein language and other symbolic forms become computationally viable on a large scale. This phenomenon may be perceived as analogous to "understanding", however, it is nevertheless constrained by the quality of the data and the limits of computation. It is therefore the case that the model layer is not purely mathematical in nature; rather, it constitutes a design space in which technical and implicit normative decisions are embedded.

Training and control mechanisms form another layer. It is imperative to acknowledge that training encompasses more than merely the input of data into a model. This process of optimization exerts a significant influence on behaviour. It is evident that methodologies such as reinforcement learning, evaluation pipelines and alignment techniques have the capacity to translate social expectations into technical constraints. This is the layer in which the system is directed towards that which is considered acceptable, safe, or useful. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that this layer does not generate intelligence ex nihilo. The process of tuning and disciplining capacities occurs through the interaction between data and architecture, resulting in the emergence of these capacities.

It is evident that, in addition to the aforementioned foundations, a range of capabilities emerges, including the ability to summarise, translate, generate text, and classify information. In certain instances, these capacities encompass multi-step reasoning procedures. It is a common misconception that these competencies are synonymous with autonomy. However, a more nuanced interpretation posits that these phenomena are better understood as emergent effects of the stack. The manifestation of "cognition" is attributable to the coherence of underlying layers, rather than to an intrinsic agent.

In the subsequent section, the following aspects are to be considered: applications and interfaces, which are the layer that renders AI socially visible. The integration of chat interfaces, APIs, copilots, recommendation systems and workflow tools facilitates the translation of abstract capabilities into practical routines. This is the point at which AI becomes a constituent of organisations and everyday life. The phenomenon of dependency is also evident in this context, manifesting in the manner of reliance on specific providers, the entrenchment of workflows within designated ecosystems, and the erosion of internal institutional competence in the face of the perceived convenience and affordability of external tools.

Finally, the layers of economy, platforms, and governance must be considered. Business models, cloud monopolies, network effects and platform strategies have been shown to integrate and control entire stacks. The upper level is typically the focus of regulation, ethical principles and public debate, as it is both visible and politically addressable. However, the constraints that prove most significant are often found at a lower level: The following elements must be computed: access, data ownership, model architecture and training pipelines. This structural mismatch is a consequence of the aforementioned factors. The prevailing tendency in governance is for operations to be conducted at the top, whilst power is exercised across the entire stack, frequently from the bottom upward.

A layered perspective is therefore required to clarify the issues at stake in contemporary debates about sovereignty and responsibility. The claims of "ethical AI" and "digital sovereignty" cannot be substantiated by norms alone. It is imperative that capacity is in place across the following layers: infrastructure, data, model expertise, training competence and institutional integration. In the absence of regulatory oversight, the concept of sovereignty remains a reactive one, and the term itself becomes a mere rhetorical device. In the current era of artificial intelligence, the question of regulatory oversight is not merely limited to the determination of outcomes; it also encompasses the identification of the entities responsible for governing the systems that yield these outcomes. This control is not merely technical; it is also economic and epistemic in nature, insofar as it determines the manner in which value is produced, the criteria by which knowledge is ascribed, and the means by which it disseminates.

The contemporary transformation of capitalism through AI extends beyond mere technological advancement. The concept may also be interpreted as a reorganisation of economic and epistemic power. By this is meant the capacity to determine what counts as knowledge and how it circulates. The advent of platform capitalism, a form of capitalism organised around digital platforms, has given rise to a sociotechnical order in which computation becomes a primary mode of coordination and algorithms function as instruments of governance, mediation and accumulation. It is evident that twenty-first-century digital infrastructures are not neutral technologies; rather, they embody particular logics of valuation, attention, and control. These infrastructures increasingly shape both the political economy of information and the architecture of the public sphere.

In accordance with Srnicek's (2016) assertion, the prevailing organisational form within the context of contemporary capitalism can be regarded as the platform economy. Platforms function in a tripartite capacity as market actors, infrastructures, and ecosystems, extracting value from the interactions they enable. The business models of these entities are contingent upon multi-sided dynamics, whereby participation leads to an augmentation in the volume of data that can be captured, processed, and monetised. Network effects have been demonstrated to engender winner-takes-all tendencies and quasi-monopolistic concentrations of power. In contradistinction to antecedent forms of industrial capital, platform capital is informational and behavioural in nature. The raw material employed is not labour time or physical commodities, but traces of everyday life.

In Zuboff's (2019) seminal work on the subject, the notion that human experience itself has become a resource to be extracted, predicted and re-engineered is posited. The extraction of behavioural surplus enables platforms to anticipate and shape future action, thereby converting prediction into profit. Participation in this configuration can be interpreted as a novel form of uncompensated digital labour (Terranova 2000).

This development reconfigures the classical triad of production factors – labour, land, and capital – into data, infrastructure, and attention. It is important to note that platforms do not merely facilitate exchange; they constitute the institutional grammar of digital capitalism. The code in question establishes the conditions under which social relations occur, and its interfaces mediate the visibility of discourse, goods, and persons alike.

The impact of generative AI on these dynamics is significant, with the technology being defined as systems that produce new content, such as text, images, or audio, rather than merely classifying or optimising existing inputs. Historically, machine learning and deep neural networks were primarily associated with classification and optimisation. However, contemporary applications now encompass the generation of text, images, and concepts. A seminal advancement was the conception of the transformer architecture (Vaswani et al., 2017), which instigated a self-attention mechanism and empowered models to comprehend contextual relationships across extensive corpora of language data.

Large language models (LLMs) operationalise language as probability, whereby each word becomes a token within a vast matrix of statistical dependencies, rendering meaning calculable. The incorporation of human preference into the training loop through reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF; Ouyang et al., 2022) aims to align model outputs with normative expectations. Concurrently, it has the capacity to instil corporate, cultural, and geopolitical asymmetries, insofar as the aggregation of feedback serves to delineate the parameters of desirable conduct. The central question guiding this study is therefore: which languages, values, and norms are encoded into model weights?

The magnitude of this development is considerable, given its industrial-scale. The training of frontier models such as GPT-X or Gemini typically necessitates data volumes on the order of petabytes and carries a significant energy footprint. The material infrastructures, data centres, cooling systems, and rare-earth supply chains that underpin the apparent immaterial domain of AI are intricately linked to global extractive economies (Crawford, 2021). The result is a new division of cognitive labour, in which computation substitutes not only for work but also for interpretation.

It is important to note that machines do not merely store knowledge; they also produce it, albeit through proprietary algorithms.

The geopolitical landscape of AI development is characterised by distinct strategies of power. Western firms such as OpenAI are often portrayed in policy and industry discourse as prioritising ethical alignment through comparatively stringent control standards, human oversight, and legal constraint, emphasising safety, compliance, and normative legitimacy. In contrast, other actors, including firms such as DeepSeek and Baidu's ERNIE, are occasionally portrayed as pursuing strategies that prioritise efficiency. The strategies under discussion include efforts to reduce reliance on direct human feedback and to enhance efficiency through architectural and optimisation choices. Such choices may include mixture of experts designs and compression techniques. The objective of these strategies is to achieve scalability and deployment speed.

However, this contrast is misleading if read as a principled opposition between "ethics" and "efficiency". In practice, both orientations have a tendency to remain compatible with, and often subordinate to, commercial imperatives. A more analytically useful distinction concerns differences in cost structures, liability exposure, regulatory environments, market access strategies, and the management of reputational risk. The phenomenon of normative divergence can thus be interpreted as a manifestation of variation in the manner in which firms optimise within the constraints imposed on them, while concurrently consolidating their advantage among those who exercise control over data, its distribution, and the execution of computations. In both cases, the concentration of power is observed to be focused on the ownership of these infrastructures. The resultant concentration of cognitive capital becomes a driver of global inequality, increasingly displacing earlier forms of industrial dependency.

The increasing disparity between states that possess the capacity to develop frontier models and those that lack this capability signals a computational geopolitics that reproduces the North-South divide in digital form.

A further step in this evolution is retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), which couples generative models with dynamic knowledge bases. Rather than relying solely on static, pretrained parameters, RAG systems retrieve external documents in real-time, incorporate their content, and generate responses grounded in updated information. From a technical standpoint, the design under consideration establishes a linkage between language models and retrieval processes reminiscent of search algorithms. From a political perspective, it signifies a heightened degree of integration between the infrastructures of knowledge and communication. In applied settings, the pivotal issue is frequently not the distinction between "generation" and "retrieval" per se, but rather the governance of retrieval. This is to say, the determination of which documents are to be retrieved, the establishment of their respective priorities, and the production of summaries under time constraints. Procurement workflows offer a pertinent illustration of this phenomenon, wherein tender documents are often voluminous, heterogeneous, and operationally binding.[7]

In contradistinction to earlier media institutions, such as the press, academia, and public broadcasting, which mediated information through editorial judgement, RAG locates epistemic authority within computational pipelines. The effect of this phenomenon is to privatise truth production, whereby knowledge becomes a service accessed through API calls and owned, governed, and priced by private entities. In such a regime, epistemology becomes infrastructure. This does not result in the elimination of public epistemic institutions; rather, it can shift everyday epistemic dependence towards privately governed interfaces, even when public institutions remain formally intact.

Contemporary social media platforms are demonstrative of this emergent order. As posited by Gillespie (2018) and van Dijck et al. (2018), these entities function as privately governed publics that establish the rules of visibility and engagement. Algorithms are not designed to prioritise deliberative criteria or journalistic standards; they are primarily optimised for engagement-related metrics. Consequently, content that provokes strong reactions and controversy is often amplified, while nuance and introspection are structurally disincentivised.

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[7] Ready Tender is an illustrative example of an applied instance of AI/LLM-based structuring and summarisation within the business domain.

In Habermasian terms, the communicative space is reconfigured: visibility is governed less by rational critical discourse than by computational selection. The consequences for democratic institutions are considerable. It is evident that the phenomenon of misinformation, polarisation, and microtargeted propaganda[8] does not manifest as aberrations, but rather as the logical outcomes of the economic design of these platforms. Attention is monetised; outrage becomes capital. The employment of generative AI has the capacity to amplify these risks. The generation of synthetic text, imagery and audio at negligible marginal cost has the potential to saturate discourse and erode distinctions between authentic and artificial communication. The capacity to simulate consensus or to emulate opposition introduces a form of symbolic manipulation that exceeds conventional propaganda in both scale and subtlety.

Within this landscape, the European Union occupies an ambivalent position. The concept of digital sovereignty, founded on ethical principles, privacy, and human rights, is contingent on external infrastructures. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act establish comprehensive normative frameworks. Nevertheless, these frameworks do not address the absence of competitive platform corporations. In essence, Europe implements a regulatory framework that governs its importation of goods and services. This phenomenon can be interpreted through the lens of Mishra's (2014, 2017) conceptualisation of the exhaustion of Western universalism, which is characterised by the absence of ethical discourse that is accompanied by the corresponding material capability. The phenomenon under discussion can be termed a regulatory paradox, whereby ethical language may serve as a substitute for strategic investment. In the absence of domestic platforms of a comparable scale, there is a risk that the compliance burden may shift data protection from the role of a safeguard to that of a structural constraint, thereby indirectly entrenching technological dependency.

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[8] For a comprehensive exposition of the systematic application of propaganda in the AI era, refer to Appendix A and Appendix C of this article.

Morozov (2022) discusses the techno-feudalism thesis as a diagnosis of emerging infrastructure-based power: a political economic formation in which control over digital infrastructure substitutes for territorial power. In contradistinction to classical feudalism, subjects of this order are not serfs bound to land, but rather users bound to ecosystems of software and devices. The transfer of ownership of code supplants the transfer of ownership of land, and the adoption of a subscription model supplants the imposition of taxation. The erosion of democracy is not brought about by coups d'état; rather, it occurs through cumulative reconfiguration. This process entails the replacement of transparency with algorithmic opacity, participation with data extraction, and accountability with proprietary governance. The concept of citizenship is redefined as userhood, while public deliberation is integrated into engagement loops that are optimised for profit. The democratic ideal of self-determination is thus rendered a statistical parameter within corporate systems of prediction. In order to preserve democratic sovereignty in such conditions, it is not sufficient to rely solely on ethical commitments or regulatory architectures; rather, it is essential to possess the technological capability to construct, comprehend, and regulate the infrastructures through which collective life is organised. In the digital age, sovereignty is not only political but also epistemic: it resides in the capacity to design and interpret the systems that shape perception and decision-making.

The challenge, therefore, is twofold. In the first instance, it is of the utmost importance that democracies rebuild their institutional capacity with a view to governing their technological foundations. Secondly, it is imperative that they articulate a political philosophy of autonomy that is compatible with computational modernity. Responsible AI and media literacy are necessary conditions, but they address symptoms rather than structures. It is imperative to establish a robust linkage between ethics and capability, regulation and production, acknowledging that the absence of material capacity in the pursuit of moral authority can lead to its devaluation. It is imperative that technological literacy is integrated into the core of democratic governance to ensure that societies do not become subject to ethical oversight while strategic infrastructures are designed and controlled elsewhere.

The fundamental question is not whether AI will transform democracy; it has already done so to a considerable extent, insofar as key conditions of visibility, participation, and persuasion are increasingly shaped by computational systems. The question, therefore, is whether democracy can transform itself to survive the epistemic order it has helped to create.

As previously stated, the ensuing discourse will address the broader institutional and political ramifications of the technical innovation that has been delineated. The technical underpinnings of this transformation can be traced to a seminal innovation: the transformer architecture introduced by Vaswani et al. (2017) in *Attention Is All You Need*. Consequently, language assumes a dual role as both medium and material in economic production. LLMs (Large Language Models) built on the Transformer framework convert communicative potential into computational output. The contemporary world is no longer merely described; it is increasingly synthesised. Within this process, generative AI emerges as a cognitive engine of the platform economy, capable of transforming the informational substrate of society into a monetisable structure.

In this sense, the contribution of Vaswani et al. is of seminal importance not only in the field of computer science but also in the broader history of AI. The transformer paradigm constitutes the technical substratum of a new epistemic order in which human capacities for understanding, creativity, and reasoning become, in a technically specific sense, programmable. The ability to create large-scale models of language corresponds to a phase that can be characterised as cognitive capitalism, in which discourse itself functions as a productive force. When considered from this perspective, *Attention Is All You Need* can be regarded as both a title and a prognosis: a concise description of the architecture that increasingly organises the political economy of perception. The same principle that enables machines to attend to words also illuminates how platforms attend to users, how markets attend to data, and how democracies struggle to regain attention within an ocean of algorithmic mediation.

The transformer is thus not merely a model of language, but also a metaphor for the age: an architecture of attention that has become a grammar of power. Any critical theory of AI must recognise this origin, because the transformation of democracy cannot be understood without the transformation of cognition itself. Familiarity with Vaswani et al. (2017) clarifies the technical premise on which several subsequent distinctions in this article depend.

Despite their shared classification as artificial intelligence, generative AI and LLMs represent distinctly different technological and epistemological paradigms. Conventional AI systems were chiefly analytical in nature, engineered to detect patterns, categorise inputs, and optimise decisions.

In contrast, generative architectures such as the transformer have been demonstrated to engender novel symbolic structures; that is to say, they generate text, images, and concepts rather than merely interpreting them. Consequently, it is feasible to interpret generative AI not solely as a mechanism for automation, but also as a framework for meaning.

Sources for Preface

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One: The Shift

Digital transformation must be considered as a socio-technical phenomenon, rather than a purely technological shift. This phenomenon constitutes an epistemic rupture in the foundations of the political and economic order. As previously discussed, the classical factors of production identified by Adam Smith – namely, work, land, and capital – are undergoing a process of reconfiguration in the twenty-first century (Smith, 1776).

The mass adoption of generative pre-trained transformers signifies the entry of digital capitalism into a new phase. The dissemination of large language models, such as ChatGPT, Claude and Gemini, has resulted in the integration of artificial intelligence into everyday life, thereby transitioning it from its previous status as a predominantly specialised research domain. Machines are now designed not only to process data but also to generate meaning within the confines of statistically learned regimes. In this context, creativity is transformed into an economic resource, and knowledge, once regarded as a public good, is increasingly privatised (Crawford and Paglen, 2021).

The prevailing structures of this era are platforms, artificial intelligence, and data-driven ecosystems whose internal logic increasingly shapes economic, cultural, and political processes. The platform economy is distinguished by the convergence of market, medium, and power. Network effects, informational asymmetries, and algorithmic control are pivotal to the consolidation of quasi-monopolies that frequently extend beyond the reach of traditional regulatory frameworks (Zuboff, 2019; Doctorow, 2023).

Zuboff (2015; 2019) characterises this phenomenon as "surveillance capitalism", a system in which human experience is transformed into a resource for commercial exploitation. Rushkoff (2021) posits that the function of technology has undergone a shift in which the conventional paradigm of technology as a means of human enhancement has been supplanted by a novel model in which technology is employed as a means of human manipulation.

This diagnosis is consistent with his earlier critique of elite exit fantasies and the social costs of technological acceleration (Rushkoff, 2018).

Concomitantly, digital capitalism remains inextricably material. As Crawford (2021) demonstrates, the supposedly immaterial cloud is dependent on the extraction of physical resources and on vast energy consumption. The generation of global dependencies, resulting from data processing, storage, and model training, is not an impartial process. The strategic importance of lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements, which are indispensable to artificial intelligence systems and batteries, reconfigures bargaining power between the Global North and the Global South.[9]

In this context, the BRICS+ seek to convert their resource endowments and energy leverage into geopolitical influence, thereby contributing to a more explicitly multipolar order in which raw materials, energy, and technological autonomy become axes of power. The historical division of labour between the capitalist West and the South, which was characterised by a concentration of wealth and resources, has reemerged in the form of digital dependency. This new dynamic sees the reconfiguration of infrastructural control and extractive relations through data, platforms and computing technologies (Mishra, 2014; Mishra, 2017). Conversely, a complementary line of argument emphasises the ideological afterlife of the Western model and its discontents as a background condition of this reconfiguration (Mishra, 2015).

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[9] The terms "Global North" and "Global South" are relational analytical categories employed within the disciplines of political economy, development studies, and international relations. These terms do not denote fixed geographical regions in this article; rather, they describe structural positions within a historically constituted global order. The following factors shape these positions: (a) unequal incorporation into global regimes of production, trade, finance and knowledge, (b) asymmetric distributions of institutional and coercive power, and (c) path dependencies rooted in colonialism and imperialism. The Global North is typically understood to denote actors that exercise disproportionate control over capital, technology, rule-making institutions, and norm-setting processes. This enables them to shape global governance and distributional outcomes. The Global South is typically used to denote actors whose policy and development space is more constrained by structural dependence and subordination. Such constraints may take various forms, including but not limited to: unequal terms of trade, debt and conditionality, extractive positions in value chains, unequal intellectual property and knowledge infrastructures, and limited agenda-setting power in international institutions. However, it is important to note that the distinction does not equate to a simplistic "democracies versus non-democracies" or a rudimentary "developed versus underdeveloped" dichotomy. Instead, it primarily encapsulates systemic relations of power and inequality within the global system. In this regard, states are situated along a continuum, with significant borderline and semi-peripheral cases that warrant consideration.

These economic and geopolitical shifts are in marked tension with a distinctly European regulatory mentality that is often expressed in moralised terms. Within the German context, regulation is often linked to claims of normative superiority and bureaucratic control. However, in practice, it has the potential to hinder innovation when it is used as a substitute for industrial, infrastructural, and investment strategy. The discourse surrounding ethical AI can thus be considered a compensatory language that serves to mask the absence of a coherent structural approach. Europe has articulated an ambition for digital sovereignty; however, it is lacking in key material, technological, and institutional foundations that are necessary to realise this ambition on a large scale.

As argued by Mishra (2014), this phenomenon can be interpreted as a manifestation of Western exhaustion, wherein the universalism of Western values is at risk of becoming a myth that obscures ongoing relations of dependency.

Gabriel (2024) and Precht (2018; 2020) propose a cultural and philosophical reorientation of European technology policy. Digitalisation is regarded as an anthropological challenge that necessitates a renewed reflection on autonomy, responsibility, and meaning. In this view, ethics should not replace political agency; rather, it should structure it. Recent public and institutional interventions have developed this orientation in a more programmatic register (Gabriel, 2024; University of Bonn, 2025), alongside the broader philosophical framing already set out in Gabriel (2024).

Stanley (2018a, 2018b) broadens the analysis into the political domain, arguing that platform capitalism can reshape communication and truth as well as consolidate economic power. Algorithmic architectures have the capacity to enable manipulation, polarisation, and forms of soft authoritarianism by altering the conditions under which public reasoning occurs. In this account, democratic erosion is less attributable to coups or coercion than to informational saturation and the monetisation of attention (Stanley, 2018).

The result is an algorithmic modernity in which economic, ideological, and communicative power converge. Europe is in a precarious position, caught between the moral rhetoric of its political discourse and the material dependencies that characterise its position within the European Union. This tension poses a significant challenge to European sovereignty and credibility, as regulation becomes a substitute for capability. The fundamental question is whether moral regulation can be converted into practical capacity before democratic legitimacy is further depleted.

In order to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the democratic process, it is imperative to initiate the analysis with a focus on its non-democratic components. The primary objective of philosophical analysis is twofold: firstly, to identify structural deficiencies inherent within democratic systems; and secondly, to examine the conditions under which democracy becomes fragile, vulnerable, or self-destructive. Contemporary democracy rarely collapses through revolutions; it more often erodes through contradictions generated within its own institutional and economic arrangements.

Digital platform capitalism, algorithmic governance, and generative artificial intelligence have precipitated a shift in both the material and symbolic foundations of democracy. The capacity for effective decision-making, effective communication, and active participation is increasingly contingent upon privately owned infrastructures that are not subject to any form of global oversight. The concept of political agency is displaced by the logic of computation, while public discourse is fragmented by the design and incentives of algorithmic systems.

The economic dimension pertains to the restructuring of production, capital, and value creation through data-driven systems. The geopolitical dimension encompasses the emergence of new centres of power, such as the BRICS+, and the reindustrialisation of resource control. The ideological dimension focuses on the interplay of moral rhetoric, regulatory paralysis, and propaganda mediated communication.

The argument is supported by the works of Zuboff (2015; 2019), Rushkoff (2018; 2021), Mishra (2014; 2017), Stanley (2018; 2019), Gabriel (2024), and Precht (2018; 2020). The argument is made that the democratic crisis of the AI era is primarily structural rather than merely political. Liberal societies encounter the persistent challenge of reconciling moral universalism with the realities of technological development and geopolitical competition. In such a context, regulation has the potential to supersede the imaginative and ethical dimensions of action, rather than facilitating their expression.

The subsequent sections are devoted to the analysis of the dynamics of this paradox. The shift under discussion runs from economic concentration, exemplified by platform monopolies, to a weakening of democratic legitimacy and the emergence of a form of techno-feudalism. The objective of this study is to formulate a critical theory of the digital age that integrates the concepts of economy, politics and culture. In addition, the study aims to specify the conditions under which democracy might regain the capacity to determine its own fate.

The challenge lies not only in articulating its defining features, but also in identifying the forces that stand in opposition to it. A critique that disregards this aspect risks remaining incomplete and devolving into mere sloganism rather than rigorous analysis. The non-democratic is not monolithic. It manifests in overt forms, such as autocracies and dictatorships, but also in less visible forms, including concentrations of economic power, algorithmic decision-making without public oversight, and political dependence on global corporations or international blocs. In the absence of a precise analysis of these mechanisms, the critique risks targeting a vague abstraction rather than an operative structure. It is therefore evident that rigour is contingent upon the presence of an explicit frame of reference.

The concept of democracy is a contentious one, with various schools of thought vying for dominance in the academic and political landscapes. The issue under discussion is whether formal majority rule is sufficient, or whether democracy must also include political self-determination, transparency, and participation.

This raises the question of what constitutes non-democratic behaviour. The issue at hand concerns the exclusion of citizens from the decision-making process, the operation of opaque centres of power, or the dominance of economic and technical elites.

It is only through such conceptual clarity that the concrete mechanisms through which democratic institutions are undermined can be identified. Within a techno-feudal paradigm, core democratic principles are subject to pressure. Transparency is displaced by opaque algorithmic decision-making; participation is reduced to passive data provision; and accountability shifts from elected institutions to unelected global corporations.

This standpoint serves to guard against rhetorical arbitrariness and to refine critical judgement. The primary danger, from this standpoint, encompasses not solely the overt seizure of authority by authoritarian entities but also the covert, systematic erosion of democratic principles through structural asymmetries. Public debates about wealth concentration in Germany illustrate how distributive claims can become identity markers unless anchored in transparent data. Public disagreement on such claims is sometimes treated less as a demand for evidence than as a signal of ideological deviation, which in turn can obstruct sustained structural analysis.

The notion of techno-feudalism encapsulates this silent de-democratisation. Contrary to a straightforward regression to earlier modes of rule, the contemporary landscape is characterised by a network of digital infrastructures, the predominance of global corporations, and data-driven mechanisms of control. The effect is frequently subtle yet far-reaching: a redistribution of power that results in the removal of transparency, participation and accountability from the democratic order. The protection of democracy, therefore, necessitates more than the mere defence of its principles; it demands the identification of the contemporary manifestations of non-democratic power.

Conversely, the employment of rhetoric that conveys an imminent threat can, in itself, become counterproductive if it supplants the necessity of institutional diagnosis. The relevant task is to specify how techno-feudal dynamics function and what forms of agency remain available within them.

In this context, endeavours to impede digital innovation under the pretext of safeguarding data may unwittingly exacerbate reliance. The influence over data, platforms and digital infrastructures is then ceded to transnational corporations that are beyond democratic control. It is therefore proposed that data protection may operate as a boomerang. The term 'boomerang' is employed to denote the phenomenon whereby compliance costs escalate at a rate that exceeds the capacity of domestic entities, thereby intensifying reliance on external providers. The phenomenon under scrutiny in this study is one in which, rather than serving to prevent the emergence of techno-feudal tendencies, it has the potential to entrench them through strategic incapacity and long-term loss of democratic sovereignty.

The European Union currently finds itself at this critical juncture. Despite the substantial scientific and industrial resources available, a domestically anchored digital corporation with global platform reach has yet to be produced. The regulatory approach of the European Union is often characterised by caution, frequently concerning data protection. The fragmentation of the single market and a culture of investment aversion further inhibit the development of scale. These factors serve to reinforce the reliance on external providers for core digital platforms, with costs that are not only financial but also constitutional, insofar as sovereignty is displaced.

In this sense, the data protection regime in which the European Union takes particular pride may indeed become a paradoxical boomerang. The assertion is not that regulation is inherently flawed, but rather that the absence of capability in regulation can lead to the perpetuation of the very asymmetries it aims to address. The surprise at this outcome typically reflects a misreading of how power operates through infrastructure and investment, rather than through legal form alone.

The quality of public reasoning within the European Union is strained by these dynamics, and with it the credibility of actors who claim to defend democratic norms while failing to address their material preconditions.

In an era where social media exerts a significant influence on public opinion, liberal democracies are confronted with a substantial challenge. It is evident that social media platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube have evolved from mere communication tools into significant mechanisms of agenda setting and affective mobilisation. It is evident that these platforms do not function as instruments of social welfare, nor are they designed primarily for public deliberation. The primary objective of these entities is to generate profits by attracting attention and utilising user data free of charge.

The algorithms employed by these platforms determine the content that users see, typically favouring material that is likely to provoke strong emotions and maximise interaction. Whilst engagement is to be celebrated, its systemic consequences are a cause for concern. A significant proportion of content that is widely circulated is opinion presented as fact, disseminated by actors who lack relevant expertise and often without evidential support. The ability to differentiate between evaluative judgement and verifiable information is therefore pivotal to navigating digital media; yet many users find this challenging, increasing their vulnerability to misunderstanding and manipulation.

The efficacy of disinformation, social polarisation, and targeted manipulation through microtargeting has been demonstrated. Algorithmic curation and AI-driven optimisation have been demonstrated to accelerate the dissemination of disinformation, exerting consequences for elections, policy formation, and public trust in democratic institutions. The propagation of polarising content has been demonstrated to facilitate the establishment of echo chambers and filter bubbles, which serve to exclude alternative perspectives. Concurrently, political messages can be microtargeted and delivered to specific groups in ways that remain largely invisible to wider publics.

However, it should be noted that the issue with algorithms is not the only one to be considered. A considerable number of users possess a limited comprehension of the operational mechanisms of these platforms, and they often underestimate the extent of their persuasive influence. A lack of media literacy and critical reasoning has been demonstrated to engender an environment conducive to the orchestration of disinformation campaigns and the manipulation of public opinion.

This article therefore considers whether principles of responsible AI, when coupled with targeted media literacy initiatives, can mitigate some of the challenges posed by social media. Responsible AI is an emerging field that aims to design technologies whose operation is transparent and ethically constrained, prioritising public interest and democratic integrity rather than click-through rates. Education, in turn, equips citizens to become discerning consumers of digital content, capable of recognising and resisting manipulation.

It is imperative to comprehend the interplay between fake news, algorithmic polarisation, and targeted manipulation, and their collective impact on democratic discourse. The question that remains unanswered is whether responsible technological design, in conjunction with an informed and media-literate public, can safeguard democracy against the risks engendered by platform-mediated communication.

The approach delineated herein, in its theoretical guise, finds profound application in the quotidian lives of individuals; the published content focused on a wide range of topics, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in the Gaza Strip, the elections in India, politics in Europe and the United States, and criticism of the Chinese government by Chinese dissidents and foreign governments. The issue pertains to the fact that significant segments of the population are either uninformed about it or no longer recognise it. The repercussions of this phenomenon are of a grave nature.

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Two: Digital Postcolonialism, Power, Knowledge, and Tech Dependency

The term 'digital postcolonialism' is employed to denote forms of economic and cultural exploitation enacted through technology companies and data-driven platforms that control infrastructures, data flows, and market access in the Global South. The concept under discussion foregrounds the claim that new technologies, especially the capacity to extract, aggregate, and operationalise data, are producing power relations and dependencies that recall, in functional terms, patterns associated with the classical colonial era. A comprehensive account of digital colonialism typically encompasses five interconnected dimensions: processes of data extraction and subsequent utilisation; the production of economic dependency; constraints on sovereignty; cultural impacts; and mechanisms of manipulation.

From this standpoint, companies accumulate substantial quantities of user data in the Global South with the objective of commercial exploitation. In the absence of robust data protection legislation and, crucially, effective enforcement in many jurisdictions, major technology firms are able to access and monetise personal information for commercial purposes, often without meaningful awareness on the part of those concerned. Notwithstanding the formal procurement of consent on the part of the user, there may yet be an absence of practical autonomy with regard to the user's data. This is predicated on the assumption that consent is secured under conditions of asymmetric information, limited bargaining power, and non-negotiable terms of service.

In numerous countries within the Global South, digital platforms and social media have become pervasive due to the limited availability of domestic alternatives or their structural disadvantage. It is evident that platforms generate substantial revenues in these markets; however, a significant share of profits is repatriated to corporate centres elsewhere. This dynamic can be interpreted as the extraction of digital resources, in which data, attention, and market access function as inputs to value creation while local economies capture comparatively little of the surplus.

Concurrently, dominant corporations may exert pressure on lawmakers and political institutions, rendering legislation and regulation more vulnerable to influence or subversion through lobbying by major technology actors. Digital platforms have the capacity to influence cultural values and social dynamics, with the potential to result in the establishment of cultural hegemony. Actors with disproportionate reach have the capacity to normalise particular narratives, reorder visibility, and influence which information is encountered, trusted, and shared. It is important to note that, over time, users may become subject to forms of political, economic, and cultural steering that align with the aims of the platform. These aims include the extraction of resources, labour, and markets, and the consolidation of influence. The outcome of this process is a structural imbalance of power, characterised by the unequal extraction of resources and the marginal accrual of benefits to those from whom value is derived.

The analytical relevance of these claims extends across history, politics and sociology. The argument is that the prosperity of many affluent countries has long been linked to the extraction of value from other regions, and that this relationship persists in reconfigured forms within contemporary digital economies. In this framing, global economic structures continue to facilitate the movement of resources and capital towards the Global North, while the sites of extraction remain disproportionately located elsewhere.

From this perspective, China's stringent data protection legislation can be interpreted as an attempt to limit exposure to external forms of digital exploitation while securing sovereignty over domestic data assets. In contrast to certain liberal democracies, China is presented as recognising the strategic risks of reliance on foreign technology and software. Consequently, China is said to be pursuing comprehensive regulatory frameworks with a view to mitigating those risks. This orientation is frequently encapsulated in the assertion that data has emerged as a pivotal resource, akin to 'oil' in its potential for influence, and that the possession of this resource can yield geopolitical and geo-economic benefits. The prevention of data outflow is thus conceptualised as a strategy to treat data as a resource to be retained and used in a comparatively exclusive manner.

Nevertheless, the protection afforded against external digital extraction can be accompanied by intensified state collection and use of mass data for domestic monitoring and for securing economic advantage. Analogous developments have been identified in India, where the protection of a domestic data economy and the promotion of local enterprises and start-ups are described as priorities aimed at reducing dependence on Western and Chinese technology firms.

A further claim pertains to methodology: analysis should adopt a neutral stance to avoid a distorted perception of contemporary realities that are shaped by entrenched economic, cultural, and political interests. In this section, the text puts forward the argument that the rejection of postcolonial frameworks frequently serves to discredit alternative perspectives. This, in turn, serves to delay the process of transformation that has the potential to disrupt established power structures and the economic interests of the Global North. Such dynamics do not necessarily result from deliberate malice; they may also be the consequence of the internalisation of prevailing narratives and ideologies.

For those seeking a more detailed introduction to this complex field, the text recommends attending Nick Couldry's lecture at the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society. Moreover, the Goethe Institut provides an accessible intervention that frames debates about decolonising the internet for broader publics, while Köppert (2024) offers a theoretically oriented contribution situated within contemporary media theory.

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Three: Fake News, Power, Perception, and the Engineering of Belief

The phenomenon of fake news is not a recent development. The unprecedented nature of this phenomenon is evidenced by the accelerated rate at which it is propagating through social media networks. Historically, the dissemination of misinformation was constrained by its reliance on established media channels, including newspapers, television, and radio, which, however imperfectly, operated as filters through editorial scrutiny. The advent of social media has effectively dismantled these conventional barriers, empowering individuals to access vast audiences without the need for professional gatekeeping mechanisms. Consequently, traditional filters have been rendered less effective, and the publication of research is no longer contingent on credentials or systematic editorial oversight and quality control.

In this context, the term 'fake news' is employed to denote reports that have been deliberately fabricated, often taking the form of news articles, with the intent of manipulating public opinion. Disinformation is defined as the deliberate propagation of false or misleading information with the objective of influencing beliefs or inciting specific actions (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017). It is evident that both phenomena predate the advent of the digital era; however, recent years have demonstrated the efficacy with which they can be mobilised to disrupt political processes, particularly during elections and referenda.

The propagation of disinformation on social media platforms is a particularly salient concern, given the tendency of these platforms' algorithms to prioritise content that engenders maximal engagement. This incentive structure has been found to amplify emotionally charged material and polarising content, often at the expense of factual reporting. Empirical research suggests that misinformation spreads more rapidly and reaches more people than accurate information (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018). The viral dynamics of fake news have the potential to exacerbate social division and thereby compromise the epistemic conditions that underpin democratic decision-making.

Severe restrictions on connectivity create an epistemic imbalance: individuals within the affected territory have direct access to events, while external observers are compelled to infer reality from fragmentary signals, mediated testimony, and platform-amplified artefacts. In Iran's information environment in January 2026, independent network telemetry indicated a near-total disconnection of domestic networks from the global Internet. From 8 January 2026 onwards, traffic dropped effectively to zero and remained heavily degraded (Cloudflare, 2026; IODA, 2026). Such conditions are not merely an absence of information; they are an enabling infrastructure for persuasion, because they raise the cost of verification and lower the barrier for emotionally compelling but evidentially weak content to circulate.

From a scientific perspective, the most robust "ground truth" during an information blackout tends to come from measurement systems that do not depend on local user reporting. Internet measurement projects and commercial telemetry provide time-resolved indicators of reachability and traffic volume, allowing researchers to distinguish broad, orchestrated shutdowns from routine outages (Cloudflare, 2026; IODA, 2026; Internet Society, 2026). These datasets do not directly validate on-the-ground claims about violence or casualties, but they do validate a crucial precondition for misinformation: the systematic suppression of ordinary evidentiary pathways (e.g. livestreams, contemporaneous uploads, peer-to-peer corroboration).

Within this evidentiary vacuum, misinformation has a tendency to cluster into predictable and technically tractable forms. Firstly, miscaptioned or context-shifted media repurposes authentic footage in order to tell a false story. A prominent example of this phenomenon involved a video of a woman lighting a cigarette from a burning portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader. Fact-checkers established that the footage was recorded in Canada and had been misrepresented as clandestinely filmed in Iran (Reuters, 2026a; Full Fact, 2026). The persuasive power of such content is rooted in its "indexical feel": given the authenticity of the video, audiences infer the veracity of the caption. However, the veracity of a recording is independent of its attribution, which encompasses its location, date, and the identity of the actor.

Secondly, the utilisation of fabricated institutional artefacts, which leverage the authority of recognisable brands, facilitates the condensation of intricate claims into a unified, shareable image. Documentation by Reuters revealed a counterfeit magazine cover that had been designed to resemble that of Time, complete with an invented headline and imagery. A spokesperson confirmed that the cover was not an authentic one (Reuters, 2026b). This tactic can be considered a form of credibility laundering, whereby an unverified assertion is translated into an apparently verified statement. For example, an assertion such as "this happened" is translated into a seemingly verified statement, such as "a reputable outlet published this".

A closely related category involves edited or altered images that weaponise plausibility rather than photorealism. Reuters exposed an edited image that purported to show a mural of Bob Dylan in Minneapolis that had been painted over to depict Iran's leader. The underlying manipulation relied on the audience's limited ability to validate distant physical facts under crisis conditions (Reuters, 2026c). In addition, Reuters conducted a fact-checking exercise on an AI-generated image that depicted a protester utilising a leaf blower to deflect pepper spray. This motif, which was intuitively perceived as "cinematic", gained widespread circulation due to its symbolic resonance rather than its empirical veracity (Reuters, 2026d). These cases illustrate a recurrent engineering principle: disinformation often optimises for shareability under uncertainty, not for long-term coherence.

Thirdly, synthetic and AI-generated content is increasingly supplying "evidence-like" visuals where real documentation is scarce. As reported by the AFP (2026a), the veracity of a viral video purportedly showing Iranian protesters illuminating streets with phone lights was confirmed through artificial intelligence analysis. The creator of the video subsequently confirmed its synthetic origin. The strategic function is not only to mislead, but also to contaminate the evidentiary pool, thereby rendering genuine documentation more susceptible to dismissal as fabricated and, consequently, increasing overall uncertainty.

It is important to note that the blackout does not merely enable falsehoods; it also distorts the public's estimation of all claims, including true ones. During the period under discussion, it was repeatedly reported by reputable sources that casualty figures and other key metrics were disputed and difficult to verify independently, precisely because ordinary channels of corroboration were disrupted (Reuters, 2026e). The resulting epistemic climate is such that actors who can supply vivid narratives – whether accurate or not – are rewarded, while those who make careful statements with explicit uncertainty are penalised. In practical terms, this process gives rise to a selection effect: content that is both emotionally legible and easily re-posted tends to survive and spread, while content that is methodologically cautious is less likely to do so. This process can result in the initial falsehood becoming entrenched as a de facto truth through the amplification of media and institutional channels. Decisions are then taken on this distorted epistemic basis, with risks and harms externalised: the most direct consequences fall disproportionately on those immediately affected, while legitimacy, attention, and/or economic gains accrue to other actors who are insulated from the costs of failure.

Taken together, these observations lend support to a conservative empirical conclusion: under conditions of large-scale connectivity restriction that are verified, the informational ecosystem becomes structurally vulnerable to the following:

(i) context laundering of authentic media;
(ii) authority laundering via counterfeit institutional cues;
(iii) synthetic-media injection that both misleads and increases general doubt.

The concept of "engineering belief" in such contexts is not merely about persuading audiences of a single false claim; rather, it is about shaping perceived reality by manipulating the costs and affordances of verification.

In the United States, for instance, the dissemination of misinformation through social media has been identified as a contributing factor to the escalation of political polarisation. During the 2016 presidential election, the deliberate circulation of false information was a key strategy employed to shape public perception and deepen political divisions. It is widely argued that such campaigns erode trust in institutions and threaten political stability, particularly in cases where coordinated activity and automated accounts amplify misleading narratives. A comparable dynamic has been identified in relation to the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Mueller, 2019).

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Four: Polarisation and the Algorithmic Logic of Division

Algorithms, particularly those shaped by contemporary artificial intelligence, have become pivotal to the distribution and consumption of information on social media platforms. The majority of platforms utilise ranking systems that prioritise content likely to elicit interaction. The personalisation that results in such cases tends to present users with material that aligns with their existing beliefs and preferences, thereby fostering an echo chamber effect (Pariser, 2011). Nevertheless, the functionality of these systems appears to be of little consequence to a significant proportion of users. From a purely rational standpoint, such indifference is challenging to rationalise.

An algorithm may be defined as a set of rules that enables a computer programme to solve problems or make decisions. Within the domain of social media, algorithms assume a pivotal role in the filtration, categorisation, and prioritisation of content. When the information supplied is optimised for user preferences, the result can be a filter bubble, in which alternative perspectives are systematically excluded. This, in turn, increases the likelihood that users will encounter content that confirms their preexisting views (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016). The exclusion of alternatives becomes particularly consequential when a user's worldview is already insulated from the norms of critical inquiry and open contestation. In such cases, the consolidation of ideological closure may be exacerbated by the application of algorithmic curation, thereby reducing the capacity to assimilate new information or to engage meaningfully with divergent perspectives.

The phenomenon of 'filter bubbles' and the creation of 'echo chambers' have been identified as significant contributors to the exacerbation of polarisation in contemporary society. When individuals are exposed predominantly to content that affirms their existing convictions, they may gravitate towards more extreme positions and come to interpret alternative viewpoints as erroneous, illegitimate, or threatening.

Ribeiro et al. (2020) posit that the utilisation of algorithms on digital platforms such as YouTube has the potential to engender a phenomenon they term the "rabbit hole dynamic", which refers to the repeated presentation of content that is increasingly extreme to users. It is posited that, over time, such pathways may contribute to gradual radicalisation, thereby weakening democratic dialogue and increasing the likelihood of social conflict and misunderstanding.

The consequences of polarisation have the potential to be far-reaching. In circumstances where significant segments of society function predominantly within ideologically closed environments, public discourse faces the risk of fragmentation. This phenomenon has the potential to impede democratic decision-making processes and exacerbate the radicalisation of the broader political environment. In democratic systems, radicalisation has the potential to engender instability when there is a diminution of respect for plural viewpoints and a contraction of the space for compromise.

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Five: Manipulated Opinions and the Engineering of Belief in the Social Media Age

The term 'microtargeting' is employed to denote a marketing strategy that addresses narrowly defined audience segments. Advertisers are able to deliver content that is tailored to users' interests and preferences by drawing on extensive datasets. In the context of politics, microtargeting has been employed to reach and influence specific groups of voters, often through emotionally charged and potentially manipulative messaging.

The process of microtargeting is predicated on the analysis of substantial volumes of data. The functionality of social media platforms is optimised for the capture of behavioural signals, encompassing user preferences, content engagement, and the subjects of user comments. By inference, these signals can also reveal the political dispositions of users. Such data are used to construct detailed profiles, enabling the delivery of personalised messages crafted to resonate with an individual's psychological profile and emotional susceptibilities (Matz et al., 2017).

The ability to execute such campaigns is contingent on the possession of extensive datasets by platforms, which serve as a prerequisite for the implementation of manipulative practices under scrutiny. However, it appears that many users are either unaware of the breadth of this data collection or, if aware, are largely indifferent. The text attributes this apparent indifference to the widespread disclosure of personal information under conditions shaped by a combination of factors, including ignorance, complacency, and social pressure.

A frequently cited example is the 2016 Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which the personal data of millions of Facebook users was harvested and analysed without their consent. This data was then used to develop political messages tailored to the users' inferred psychological profiles, with the aim of influencing voting behaviour. This approach enabled the dissemination of messages that appealed to fears, prejudices, or existing convictions, thereby shaping political choices (Cadwalladr and Graham Harrison, 2018).

It is widely posited that microtargeting poses a threat to democratic integrity by virtue of its capacity to facilitate the psychological manipulation of specific demographic groups. In contradistinction to conventional mass media, which disseminates homogenous messages on a large scale, microtargeting entails the distribution of highly personalised content. It is important to note that such content does not necessarily have to be visible to the general public, thus potentially compromising transparency in political communication. Advertisements of this nature are exclusively displayed to their intended audience, thereby significantly hindering public scrutiny and contestation (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018).

A further concern is that microtargeting often exploits emotional vulnerability. For instance, voters who are anxious about immigration may encounter advertisements designed to intensify those anxieties. When political communication is engineered primarily for affective impact, there is a risk that public debate will be reduced to emotional reaction rather than reasoned deliberation. In such conditions, it is possible that voters' decisions may be shaped through misleading or distorted framings, thereby compromising the integrity of democratic processes.

However, deliberate attempts to manipulate populations for political ends are not a recent phenomenon, and the following chapter provides a detailed historical analysis of such practices.

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Six: A Historical Excursus to Iran in 1953 and the Manipulation of Public Perception

Operation Ajax (TPAJAX) denotes a clandestine operation undertaken in 1953 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in conjunction with Britain's intelligence service, MI6. The operation's objective was to oust Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, thereby consolidating the position of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The episode has become a reference point for later ruptures in Iran's political development and for the long and contested relationship between Iran, the United States, and Great Britain. The subject has been comprehensively addressed in a range of contemporary reconstructions and subsequent scholarly works (Wilber, 1954; Roosevelt, 1979; Abrahamian, 1982; Gasiorowski, 1987; Katouzian, 1990; Kinzer, 2003; Ansari, 2003; Milani, 2011; De Bellaigue, 2012; Abrahamian, 2013). Furthermore, elements of the documentary record, and the history of its disclosure, have also entered the public domain through journalistic circulation (Washington, DC, 29 November 2000).

For the purposes of this study, the outcome is of lesser importance than the mechanics of influence, namely how legitimacy is weakened, how public opinion is manufactured, and how disorder can be staged so that a political settlement appears inevitable. It is evident that these techniques are not confined to their historical setting. These phenomena reoccur under varying technical conditions, wherever political agency is mediated through information control and strategic visibility.

It is well documented that Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Theodore Roosevelt's grandson, played a pivotal operational role in coordinating with MI6 and selected Iranian intermediaries. This aspect has been a common theme in accounts of planning and execution. The strategic objective was to render Mossadegh's government governable only in appearance by intensifying factional conflict, destabilising institutional confidence, and facilitating an alternative centre of authority under the Shah that would be reliably aligned with Western interests (Roosevelt, 1979; Cottam, 1979; Gasiorowski, 1987; Kinzer, 2003; De Bellaigue, 2012; Abrahamian, 2013).

In this framing, the central political problem was not persuasion in a narrow sense, but the construction of a public environment in which removal could be represented as restoration.

The initial component was reputational warfare. Propaganda campaigns were orchestrated with the aim of discrediting Mossadegh by means of the circulation of hostile narratives through newspapers and radio, including allegations of corruption and portrayals of ideological extremism. Furthermore, disinformation was disseminated through the circulation of forged leaflets and fabricated articles that portrayed him as an adversary of Islam and a threat to stability. The operational logic was cumulative. Repetitive claims communicated via multiple channels were designed to transform uncertainty into suspicion, and suspicion into political permission (Wilber, 1954; Roosevelt, 1979; Abrahamian, 2013).

A secondary component pertains to elite brokerage through inducements. It has been documented that there were instances of bribery and patronage directed at parliamentarians, military officers and religious leaders. These actions led to public denunciations of Mossadegh and served to further exacerbate existing institutional divisions. The capacity of religious authority to mobilise constituencies and thereby confer or withdraw moral credibility led to the decisive political influence of clerical positioning in the shaping of perceptions of legitimacy and threat (Wilber, 1954; Cottam, 1979; Katouzian, 1990; De Bellaigue, 2012).

A third component was the staging of disorder. It is evident that demonstrations and street confrontations were orchestrated with the intention of engendering an impression of chaos and a state of affairs in which control was being lost. One recurrent claim is that, on occasion, organised groups have posed as Mossadegh supporters in order to associate his movement with violence and instability, thereby transforming protest into a device of delegitimisation. The function of staged conflict was to serve as a technology of plausibility. The endeavour to portray an engineered narrative as spontaneous civic reaction has been observed (Wilber, 1954; Gasiorowski, 1987; Abrahamian, 2013).

The aftermath of the revolution served to consolidate the Shah's position by virtue of decisive military backing and the establishment of a renewed strategic relationship with Western powers. Subsequent governance is widely characterised as increasingly autocratic and oriented towards the security state, with repression framed as a means of political consolidation. From a historical perspective, 1953 is widely regarded as a pivotal year, representing more than just a change in government; it signifies a fundamental shift in the relationship between the state and society, leaving an indelible mark on the collective political consciousness (Ansari, 2003; Milani, 2011; Abrahamian, 2013).

The economic context is indispensable in this regard. Mossadegh's nationalisation of Iran's oil industry is frequently interpreted as a bid for economic sovereignty against entrenched external dominance, particularly in relation to the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. The fundamental assertion is that the perception of profit disparities, with profits being channelled abroad while Iran received a comparatively modest share, rendered nationalisation a political and economic undertaking. The objective of this initiative was to reclaim control over resources, redirect revenues to domestic development, and pursue a foreign policy less susceptible to external leverage (Cottam, 1979; Abrahamian, 1982; Katouzian, 1990; Kinzer, 2003; De Bellaigue, 2012; Abrahamian, 2013). In this setting, the coup is presented not as an isolated security manoeuvre, but as a reassertion of a regime of ownership and influence.

A thorough examination of the documentation is beneficial in understanding the recurrent nature of justificatory rhetoric in public discourse. Seven of these are particularly noteworthy.

The necessity of the coup was attributed to its role in counteracting communist influences. A prevalent justification for this intervention is the necessity of safeguarding Iran from the threat of communism. This tendency has the effect of heightening the probability of a communist takeover, whilst concurrently providing a rationale for the Cold War. In opposition to this viewpoint, the counterclaim asserts that Mossadegh adopted a strategically non-aligned posture, with anti-communism serving, at least in part, as a legitimising frame for intersecting geopolitical and economic interests (Cottam, 1979; Gasiorowski, 1987; Abrahamian, 2013).

Mossadegh was the dictator of Iran. Another narrative portrays Mossadegh as autocratic in order to normalise his removal. The opposing position emphasises that he was democratically elected and sought to strengthen constitutional constraints and parliamentary oversight, including by limiting monarchical power. In this reading, the dictator label functions as a form of retrospective justification, serving to minimise the impact of subsequent coercive governance (Katouzian, 1990; De Bellaigue, 2012; Abrahamian, 2013).

The coup has proven to be a popular demand. It has been posited that the removal of Mossadegh was met with widespread popular support. A more precise formulation distinguishes between heterogeneous domestic opposition among conservative religious authorities, segments of the elite, and others, and externally facilitated mobilisation that aimed to make opposition appear decisive and spontaneous. The assertion is not that domestic conflict is a modern invention, but rather that visible public sentiment was strategically shaped through funding, inducement, and orchestration (Wilber, 1954; Gasiorowski, 1987; Abrahamian, 2013).

The Shah is regarded as a popular restorer of order. Narratives that celebrate stability and modernisation can obscure the coercive architecture of post-coup rule. In the counter account, the Shah's legitimacy was contested and increasingly maintained through repression and security institutions, contributing to deeper alienation and later revolutionary mobilisation (Ansari, 2003; Milani, 2011; Abrahamian, 2013).

The primary motive is the stabilisation of global oil markets. Accounts that frame the coup as necessary for global energy stability can obscure the more specific question of control, namely ownership, profit allocation, and political leverage in the oil economy. From this perspective, the nationalisation of assets and resources was perceived as a threat to the prevailing distribution of revenue and influence, rather than to global supply as such. Fear-based framing was employed as a means to secure public consent for interventions that primarily served narrow interests (Kinzer, 2003; De Bellaigue, 2012; Abrahamian, 2013).

Mossadegh was an anti-Islamic figure. It has been asserted that Mossadegh sought to weaken religion or eradicate Islam, and that this was used to mobilise religious opposition by portraying constitutional reform as a spiritual threat. A more defensible description is that Mossadegh aimed to differentiate religious authority from political power in order to protect constitutional governance, rather than to abolish religion (Cottam, 1979; Katouzian, 1990; De Bellaigue, 2012).

The year 1953 marked the conclusion of a significant chapter in history. The notion that the year 1953 is consigned to the annals of history, thus disregarding its contemporary relevance, serves to underrepresent the endurance of political memory. The coup continues to be a significant reference point in Iran's perceptions of Western intentions, shaping the moral and strategic vocabulary of foreign relations. The 1979 Revolution is widely regarded as a significant geopolitical turning point. The argument presented here is that the year 1953, and the manipulation of public perception, played a pivotal role in shaping the prehistory of that pivotal moment. This was achieved by establishing the foundations for subsequent conflicts over legitimacy and fostering an environment of suspicion towards external interference (Ansari, 2003; Milani, 2011; Abrahamian, 2013).

The excursus elucidates a pivotal assertion of this study. The phenomenon of manipulation is not a recent innovation; it pre-dates the advent of algorithmic platforms. The advent of the platform age has precipitated a paradigm shift in the realm of behavioural influence, characterised by the augmentation of its capacity to accelerate, segment, and exert influence over behaviours. The 1953 case demonstrates how strategic narratives can obscure underlying interests and how staged visibility can substitute for democratic legitimacy. These dynamics remain analytically relevant wherever political agency is mediated through information control.

In this context, the significance of partial acknowledgements and selective silences in Western public discourse diminishes as moral signals, and instead assumes a role as indicators of the management of responsibility and the containment of political learning. The German concluding hypothesis should be treated accordingly. If the *Wirtschaftswunder* is regarded as a purely domestic achievement, it risks becoming a narrative that under theorises international resource dependencies. When considered in this manner, the issue is best approached as a research question, necessitating the specification of mechanisms, timelines, and economic linkages prior to the drawing of robust conclusions.

Indeed, as demonstrated by GAMAAN's nationwide online survey of Iranians' Attitudes toward Political Systems, the following argument is posited: a "Mossadegh-like" leadership profile is situated within empirically observed preference patterns rather than anecdote (Maleki, 2022).[10]

A leader who mirrors Mossadegh's characteristics could prove to be remarkably effective in the contemporary Iranian context, and this can be attributed to a straightforward political rationale. Such a figure would likely align with the prevailing "overlapping consensus" that is evident in the Iranian public's attitudes. This consensus encompasses a pronounced inclination for democratic governance, a widespread rejection of rule by religious law, and a profound scepticism towards hereditary or lifelong political authority. Concurrently, Mossadegh's enduring symbolic appeal posits the hypothesis that a contemporary leader could potentially amalgamate institutional democratic commitments (constitutionalism, accountable government, separation of powers, civil liberties) with a credible language of national sovereignty. The blend of factors is significant because it is not confined to a specific faction; rather, it is capable of addressing constituencies that prioritise secular republicanism, those who advocate for a constitutional settlement of a distinct nature, and a substantial segment of the population who may be politically dissatisfied but not firmly aligned with a single ideological camp.

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[10] Conducted 17–27 February 2022; >20,000 respondents; final analytic sample of 16,850 literate residents inside Iran aged 19+ – approximately 85% of the adult population – reported as generalisable to that target population at a 95% credibility level with ±5% credibility intervals.

In practical terms, this leadership model has the potential to provide Iran with a state that is both legitimate and capable. Such a state would govern through law rather than coercion and pursue reform without being captive to either clerical tutelage at home or external patronage abroad.

The claim that foreign states would "fear" such an outcome is best understood not as melodrama but as a sober observation about incentives. A genuinely sovereign and democratically legitimate Iran would be more difficult to pressure, isolate, or instrumentalise. Sanctions, for example, tend to function most effectively as leverage when domestic legitimacy is brittle and elite cohesion is fragile; a more stable, accountable political order can reduce the political yield of coercive economic tools.

Likewise, regional security arrangements and energy diplomacy would have to adjust to an Iran that can credibly negotiate, credibly commit, and credibly resist. Rather than oscillating between crisis management and vulnerability. This does not imply that "the international community" has a single unified preference; it suggests, rather, that for some external actors a perpetually constrained Iran can be strategically convenient, whereas a capable, self-directed Iran would alter existing bargaining positions and impose new constraints on others' freedom of manoeuvre. In short, the discomfort is less about Iran's prosperity in the abstract and more about the redistribution of agency that a sovereign, well-governed Iran would entail.

In the event of Iran achieving independence and establishing a democratic government, or even a basic democratic institutional framework, it would represent a considerable challenge for any nation seeking to impose its will and interests through the use of force. It is evident that those of an intelligent disposition are cognisant of this fact, and thus endeavour to intervene wherever possible, engage in sabotage, create false narratives and pursue political interests in order to circumvent the geopolitical ramifications.

Finally, for those who persist in circulating an erroneous account of the truth about this historical event, based on rudimentary knowledge gleaned from social media or elsewhere, a copy of the original CIA documents from the organisation that orchestrated the coup are attached.[11] The purpose of providing such accounts is to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the events in question by offering a perspective that is often overlooked.

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[11] See Appendix B.

Sources for Six:

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Seven: Manipulation Logics of Power Then and Now

A thorough examination discloses striking parallels between the manipulation practices implemented in Iran in 1953 and contemporary manipulation tactics observed on social media platforms in 2026. In both cases, the mobilisation of targeted propaganda, disinformation, and psychologically calibrated messaging is observed, with the overarching aim of achieving political objectives. Nevertheless, the disparities between these two categories are of equal significance. The issues under discussion are infrastructure, speed, scale, attribution, and the capacity to measure and optimise influence in real-time. The subsequent comparison will highlight the most significant contrasts.

Technological Infrastructure and Speed of Dissemination

1953: The dissemination of propaganda and misinformation was primarily facilitated through newspapers, radio, and paid public events. The extent of the initial intervention was comparatively limited, the dissemination of information was a protracted process, and the effects on public opinion frequently lagged behind the initial intervention (Wilber, 1954).

2026: The dissemination of contemporary information operations can occur on a global scale within a matter of hours. The dissemination of content, whether a post, a hashtag, or a short-form video, can be propagated to a vast audience through platform infrastructures that are designed to facilitate seamless sharing and near-instantaneous replication. The alteration of speed has been demonstrated to influence not only reach but also audience response, since rapid diffusion enables cascading reactions prior to the intervention of verification or deliberation.

Algorithmic Amplification

1953: The propagation of a narrative was contingent on human intermediaries, including editors, organisers, compensated actors, and staged events, as well as the uncertain translation of messaging into public action (Wilber, 1954).

2026: Platform ranking systems have been shown to amplify content that is likely to generate engagement. Consequently, polarising and emotionally evocative material is inherently well-positioned in terms of structure, and the dissemination of misleading content can be elevated without additional effort by its originators. The pivotal transformation pertains not merely to the distribution process, but rather to the realm of automated selection. Visibility is determined by means of algorithmic optimisation as opposed to editorial judgement.

Reach and Target Audience

1953: The target audiences were geographically defined. The development of influence necessitated the establishment of local networks and the implementation of paid dissemination within specific constituencies, resulting in increased operational costs and organisational constraints (Wilber, 1954).

2026: The advent of social media has engendered a paradigm shift in the realm of campaign targeting, enabling the implementation of highly sophisticated demographic segmentation strategies on a large scale. Microtargeting, through the use of personalised advertising and tailored messaging, enables influence operators to address narrowly defined groups with a high degree of precision, drawing on behavioural and psychographic profiling (Matz et al., 2017; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). The distinctive feature of this approach is the capacity to run many parallel campaigns simultaneously, each of which is optimised for a different audience.

Anonymity and Concealment

1953: Operations necessitated physical presence and direct involvement on the ground. The phenomenon of bribery, coordination, and staging had to occur through identifiable networks, increasing exposure and making concealment more difficult in practice (Wilber, 1954).

2026: Digital influence operations can be conducted through fabricated profiles, coordinated inauthentic networks, and automated accounts. The generation of false identities is a relatively straightforward process, whilst their subsequent tracing is a complex undertaking, thus reducing the risk of identification and complicating the process of attribution. The outcome of this process is a diffusion of responsibility. The phenomenon of manipulation manifests as public opinion, whilst the organisers of this process remain largely invisible.

Automation, Bots, and AI-enabled production

1953: The dissemination of information was a laborious process that relied on human agents whose effectiveness was contingent on skill, access, and local credibility (Wilber, 1954).

2026: Automated bots and AI-enabled tools have the capacity to generate content, scale distribution, and coordinate activity across large networks. These phenomena can simulate the impression of an emergent wave of support or opposition that is perceived as authentic by observers, despite being artificially engineered.

Scalability and Cost

1953: Large-scale influence operations require substantial financing and logistics, including payments to intermediaries, coordination across institutions, and construction of a propaganda infrastructure (Wilber, 1954).

2026: The execution of manipulation can be achieved with minimal effort. The coordination of campaigns and botnets can be conducted without the necessity of a costly physical presence. Furthermore, scale is inherent to the platforms themselves, and control over reach is achieved through targeting, repetition, and algorithmically amplified visibility.

Access to the Public and Interactivity

1953: The primary function of audiences in this context was that of recipients. The mechanisms for providing feedback were limited, and opportunities for direct contestation were comparatively scarce.

2026: These platforms enable users to engage in activities such as commenting, sharing, and reacting, thereby facilitating rapid feedback loops. Interactivity thus becomes a resource. Influence operators have the capacity to provoke, test and iterate messages through engagement metrics, using likes, shares and comments as both amplification mechanisms and as signals of what will travel furthest.

Continuous Data Analysis and Behavioural Optimisation

1953: The evaluation of success was dependent on intermittent reports, observation, and inference. The precision measurement of message performance was limited (Wilber, 1954).

2026: Platforms are able to track and analyse interaction at scale, thus enabling continual adaptation. Behavioural data can be utilised to infer susceptibilities and to optimise content for maximum persuasive effect, thereby producing a form of iterative, data-driven influence that is difficult to replicate with earlier infrastructures (Matz et al., 2017; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018).

Three conclusions may be deduced from this comparison.

Firstly, it is evident that deception, disinformation, and manipulative tactics are not a novel phenomenon. The infrastructural environment in which they operate has undergone significant changes. The contemporary manipulation of information is characterised by its expeditious nature, its ability to operate anonymously, its global reach, and its capacity to target and optimise influence through extensive data analysis. Activities that formerly necessitated costly and intricate logistics can now be accomplished expeditiously and cost-effectively, with scalability to an extent that is virtually limitless, facilitated by platform affordances and automated systems.

Secondly, in order to combat manipulation in the digital age, a multifaceted response is required. It is evident that public education plays a pivotal role in fortifying epistemic resilience. However, it must be acknowledged that this endeavour is inherently limited in its efficacy. In order to ensure the effective functioning of these systems, it is imperative that they are accompanied by responsible design and governance of algorithms, transparent platform practices, and regulatory coordination capable of operating across jurisdictions. The practice of microtargeting, in particular, gives rise to significant concerns regarding democratic transparency. This is because personalised political messages may never become visible to the public sphere, where contestation and accountability are intended to occur (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018).

Thirdly, the integrity of democratic systems appears to be under increasing strain. The erosion of confidence in democratic institutions engenders a more conducive environment for manipulation, and a more volatile context in which AI is developed and deployed. The restoration of trust cannot be reduced to declaratory ethics. The necessity for transparency, public oversight, and enforceable standards for political communication and data use is paramount. In the absence of such foundational elements, there is a heightened probability that AI will be utilised as a means of behavioural control as opposed to a catalyst for collective advancement.

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Eight: The Media and the Erosion of the Fourth Estate

The advent of social media has had a profound impact on the economic foundations of legacy media, thereby altering the conditions under which quality journalism can be produced. As digital advertising revenues are increasingly captured by dominant platforms, most notably Facebook and Google, many news organisations have been compelled to operate under persistent financial constraint.

This vulnerability has a direct impact on the scope and quality of journalism, a discipline that is indispensable to democratic accountability. The subsequent evolution of these dynamics in conjunction with the broader diffusion of large language models remains to be elucidated. However, it appears improbable that established platform incumbents will relinquish their market position in the absence of substantial countervailing pressure.

In recent years, the financial provision formerly allocated to newspapers and broadcasters by advertising revenue has been reallocated to major technology companies. It is widely acknowledged that Facebook and Google disproportionately influence the digital advertising ecosystem, exerting adverse consequences for the viability of numerous news organisations (McChesney, 2015). For a considerable proportion of news outlets, this transition has resulted in a decline in investigative projects and a shift towards less in-depth, resource-intensive reporting. Concurrently, there has been an increased emphasis on formats that maximise audience engagement and a rapid turnover of content. In practical terms, when users conduct a significant proportion of their daily online activity within platform environments, they contribute to the sustenance of a media economy in which the quantity of clicks and reach can displace journalistic substance. The result is an informational environment that is more susceptible to disinformation and to the trivialisation of public discourse.

The contraction of newsrooms has also been attributed to economic pressures. Pickard (2020) has described a broad decline in journalistic capacity and argued that reductions in reporting resources weaken the informational infrastructure on which democratic scrutiny depends. In circumstances where there is a paucity of journalists assigned to the coverage of complex institutions and where investigative work is regarded as financially unviable, the public is deprived of access to reliable information with which to hold power to account.

A democracy that is predominantly sustained by superficial media is unlikely to provide a stable foundation for governance. In order to ensure the preservation of democratic functioning in the context of rapid technological change, it is imperative that the forces shaping information flows, irrespective of their institutional form, are subject to effective oversight. However, the implementation of regulatory measures becomes challenging when technological innovation is intricately interwoven with prevailing economic incentives and concentrated corporate power.

The concept of quality journalism has historically been theorised as a fourth estate, with the capacity to expose malpractice and ensure a degree of accountability is upheld by governments and corporations. In the contemporary era, mounting financial pressures and the migration of audiences towards social media platforms are progressively eroding the function of traditional news outlets. Platform environments have been shown to offer preferential treatment to content that is sensational, polarising, and highly shareable. These incentives have the potential to influence editorial practice, resulting in an increased emphasis on click-through rates as a metric of success. The outcome of this process is not merely a diminution in available resources but rather a reallocation of focus. It is important to note that the most visible element does not necessarily constitute the most informative.

A further difficulty is that a considerable proportion of the public now consumes news primarily through social media, where verification norms and editorial standards are uneven, and where false or misleading material can circulate alongside professional reporting.

The Reuters Institute Digital News Report posits that platform-mediated news consumption is associated with shifting patterns of trust and exposure, and it documents the role of social media in shaping how audiences encounter and evaluate information (Newman et al., 2020). As trust in traditional media outlets erodes, societies may encounter greater difficulty in maintaining shared factual standards for collective decision-making.

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Nine: Extremism, Populism and the Linguistic Dynamics of Radicalisation

The capacity of populist and extremist actors to disseminate messages to large audiences has expanded exponentially with the advent of social media. The circulation of content by such groups, facilitated by targeted communication, offers simplified solutions to complex problems. However, this content has a tendency to polarise opinion. The affordances of such platforms, including low-cost publication, frictionless sharing, and algorithmically allocated visibility, enable such messages to disseminate extensively, exerting downstream effects on social cohesion.

Populist movements are known to present political and social conflict through simplified diagnostic and moral framings. The strategic distribution of such content is facilitated by social media, which enables actors to cultivate audiences by attributing societal problems repeatedly to elites or established systems. This dynamic has been shown to reinforce a polarised political environment, characterised by heightened antagonism and a decreased tolerance for political discord (Mudde, 2004).

A particularly evident illustration of this phenomenon pertains to far-right and nationalist movements, which employ social media platforms to mobilise adherents and to normalise radical ideologies. The dissemination of false information can be employed as a tactic of destabilisation in this context. The circulation of false or misleading claims by certain actors has been demonstrated to have the potential to inflame grievance, amplify distrust, and deepen pre-existing divisions (Conway et al., 2019). Algorithmic curation has the potential to exacerbate polarisation when ranking systems prioritise controversial and emotionally charged content, thereby increasing the likelihood of encountering and disseminating radical material. Concurrently, assertions that such movements are conspicuously deficient in providing effective solutions are evaluative in nature. In instances where this judgement is maintained, it is preferable to present it as an analytical observation concerning programme content, policy feasibility, and governance capacity, as opposed to a purely rhetorical dismissal.

The phenomenon of the "rabbit hole" can be defined as the process by which users are directed down pathways of progressively more extreme material the longer they engage with particular topics. Ribeiro et al. (2020) posit that the utilisation of recommendation systems on platforms such as YouTube has the potential to generate such trajectories, thereby exposing users to increasingly radical content over time. In this sense, social media may function as an enabling environment for extremist ideologies, not necessarily by compelling belief, but by narrowing the informational field and reducing incidental exposure to alternative perspectives.

The broader ramifications may be considerable. The persistent circulation of radical frames, in conjunction with ideological isolation, has the potential to engender a coarsening of political discourse and a diminution of the propensity to engage in dialogue across the divide. In circumstances where public communication is primarily characterised by antagonism, democratic life is susceptible to deterioration. The process of compromise becomes increasingly arduous, and the civic practices that facilitate plural coexistence are gradually eroded.

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Ten: The Erosion of Privacy in the Digital Age

The extensive collection and use of personal data by social media platforms poses a significant threat to user privacy. It is evident that social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter systematically gather a wide range of detailed information, encompassing location data, expressed interests, and interaction patterns. In certain contexts, these platforms also collect facial recognition data. This information is frequently monetised and, in some cases, shared with third parties. In democratic societies, privacy is widely regarded as a fundamental right. Nevertheless, it is evident that recent technological and economic developments have contributed to its gradual erosion.

The construction of detailed user profiles is of particular consequence. These profiles form the basis of targeted advertising, yet they also engender capacities for surveillance and manipulation. Each interaction, whether a like, a comment, or a shared post, contributes to an evolving behavioural record that can be used to model attention, preference, and susceptibility. Zuboff (2019) situates these practices within the paradigm of surveillance capitalism, in which behavioural data is converted into predictive products and used to shape conduct. In this context, the practice of profiling entails more than mere observation; it also involves active participation in the modulation of behaviour.

The political salience of these capabilities becomes especially visible in authoritarian contexts. In the People's Republic of China, for instance, the Social Credit System has been discussed as an infrastructure through which behaviour is monitored and regulated. Liang et al. (2018) describe it as a data-driven arrangement that evaluates conduct across multiple domains and assigns scores that have the potential to influence access to rights and opportunities. The aggregation of data facilitates comprehensive oversight, while behavioural modification is pursued through calibrated incentives and penalties. The extension of comparable architectures into democratic contexts would raise acute questions concerning the protection of fundamental rights.

Beyond direct surveillance, extensive data collection has been demonstrated to generate a chilling effect, in which individuals alter their behaviour when they believe they are being observed. In environments where interactions are tracked, users may avoid certain content or refrain from political participation for fear that expressed opinions will carry consequences. Penney (2017) contends that such dynamics have the capacity to materially constrain freedom of expression and to narrow public discourse, both of which are constitutive of democratic life.

In numerous democratic states, ongoing discourse persists regarding the enhancement of privacy protection in the digital era. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was designed to enhance privacy and data protection. However, significant challenges remain in practice. The scale and opacity of platform data collection have the potential to compromise democratic processes by enabling surveillance, microtargeted persuasion, and self-censorship. The fundamental issue, therefore, is not merely the existence of legal rights in theory, but rather the question of whether institutional capacity and enforcement are commensurate with the informational power of platform ecosystems.

Sources for Ten:

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77. Liang, F., Das, V., Kostyuk, N. & Hussain, M.M. (2018). 'Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China's Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure', Policy & Internet.

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Eleven: Responsible AI and an Opportunity to Reclaim Agency

The impact of social media on democratic processes is inextricably linked to the manner in which artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems regulate visibility. The aforementioned entities engage in the systematic ranking, prioritisation, and dissemination of content on a large scale, thereby exerting a significant influence on the content that is perceived, deliberated, and accorded relevance by the public. The question of how artificial intelligence can be deployed responsibly to safeguard democracy has therefore become increasingly central. Responsible artificial intelligence can be defined as the design and use of algorithmic systems that are transparent, fair, and oriented towards the public good. In practice, this necessitates a deliberate shift in platform incentives and design choices, with the overriding objective being the reduction of disinformation propagation, polarisation dynamics, and manipulative affordances (IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, 2019).

The primary concern pertains to the dissemination of false information. Engagement optimised ranking systems have been observed to reward content that provokes a strong emotional response, including outrage and polarisation. Consequently, responsible artificial intelligence would necessitate platforms to transcend click-based metrics and implement mechanisms that measurably curtail the circulation of demonstrably false material. This does not imply technocratic censorship, but rather the introduction of standards, procedures and interventions that are subject to public scrutiny and which are proportionate, with the aim of reducing the structural advantage currently enjoyed by sensationalist or misleading content. It is important to note the close relation of the dynamic of echo chambers and filter bubbles. Personalisation systems infer preferences from behavioural traces and subsequently increase exposure to similar material, thereby reinforcing existing beliefs and narrowing the informational field. The concept of microtargeting builds upon this logic by combining user data with inferred traits to deliver bespoke political messages, including messages designed to exploit emotional susceptibility (Zuboff, 2019).

A responsible approach would therefore include limitations on targeted political advertising and stronger transparency requirements regarding the use of data, the drawing of inferences, and the showing of particular messages to particular users.

A secondary consideration pertains to the broader informational ecosystem. The reallocation of advertising revenue from traditional media to digital platforms has had a detrimental effect on the financial viability of numerous news organisations, thereby diminishing their capacity to conduct investigative reporting and to produce journalism that sustains public interest. If platforms are able to mediate attention, then responsible design has the potential to support the visibility of high-quality journalism and reduce the incentives that favour superficiality over substance. This assertion does not imply that digital platforms possess the capacity to resolve the challenges confronting journalism; rather, it underscores the unavoidable influence these platforms exert on the environment that determines the viability or marginalisation of journalism.

A third consideration pertains to the phenomenon of extremism and radicalisation pathways. The utilisation of social media by extremist groups for the dissemination of polarising messages and the recruitment of supporters has been well documented. Furthermore, engagement optimisation algorithms have been shown to have a tendency to amplify controversial material. A responsible artificial intelligence strategy would seek to curtail the propagation of content that is demonstrably deleterious, whilst concurrently constraining the trajectory of recommendations that systematically direct users towards materials of an increasingly extreme nature. This would address the "rabbit hole dynamic" previously discussed. However, it is imperative that such interventions are meticulously designed, incorporating procedural safeguards to mitigate potential risks. It is imperative that they adhere to the principles of impartiality, empiricism, and structured organisation, in order to ensure that any restriction on legitimate forms of expression is both necessary and proportionate. The objective is to safeguard democratic contestation whilst concomitantly diminishing the algorithmic incentives that are presently conducive to escalation.

A fourth consideration pertains to the issue of privacy. The implementation of large-scale data collection and profiling has the potential to compromise democratic autonomy by facilitating commercial manipulation and forms of surveillance.

Consequently, the concept of responsible artificial intelligence is inextricably linked to the principle of data minimisation. Systems should be designed to utilise only the information necessary for defined functions, and users should be granted meaningful control over the collection and utilisation of data. It is imperative to recognise that consent should entail more than a mere formal acceptance of intricate terms. It is imperative that such information is both readily accessible and actionable in practice, encompassing the capability to delete personal data in a comprehensive manner (Zuboff, 2019).

Within this conceptual framework, a responsible artificial intelligence agenda can be specified in concrete governance terms. The utilisation of AI-supported systems has the potential to facilitate the process of fact-checking by means of triaging content for review and by flagging signals associated with coordinated deception. However, this capacity is contingent upon the transparency of error costs, appeals processes, and standards of evidence, as well as the contestability of these elements. Conversely, the implementation of transparent and auditable moderation and ranking systems has the potential to empower users by providing clarity regarding the rationale behind the promotion, downranking, or removal of content, and by facilitating independent scrutiny of systemic effects. The incorporation of countervailing perspectives within recommendation systems has been demonstrated to mitigate informational closure in contexts where such integration is deemed appropriate, without the imposition of an artificial symmetry between truth and falsehood. In addition, it is imperative that users are provided with substantial control over content diversity, enabling them to personalise or vary their feed according to their preferences. While such configurability would not entirely eliminate the phenomenon of 'filter bubbles', it would serve to reduce opacity and increase agency over the informational environment.

The dissemination of political advertising is subject to a range of regulatory safeguards, which are designed to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.

The restriction of manipulative targeting techniques has the potential to curtail the exploitation of fear and prejudice in the context of political persuasion. It is imperative that political advertisements are clearly and transparently labelled, accompanied by comprehensive explanations regarding their display to a specific user. Moreover, these advertisements should be supported by readily accessible disclosures of targeting criteria and funding sources. Furthermore, in circumstances where political information is of particular relevance, such as during elections or referenda, platform design can be tailored to prioritise credible journalism and facilitate the evaluation of provenance. This approach is intended to mitigate exposure to sensationalist or systematically misleading sources, thereby promoting a more informed and responsible engagement with political content. It is evident that mechanisms for compensating publishers, such as revenue sharing arrangements, have the potential to mitigate some of the structural imbalance created by platform dominance in digital advertising markets. However, it should be noted that such measures cannot substitute for broader media policy reform.

These design questions also intersect with an uncomfortable political reality. State actors utilise social media to influence public perception, organise societal consent, and, in certain contexts, automate repression. A seminal concept in this field is that of cyber troops, defined as individuals employed by governments or political parties to influence and manipulate public opinion in the online sphere. As stated in the 2019 report, there were already seventy countries that had highly active cyber troops (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019). The text further claims that, among countries officially recognised as liberal democracies on criteria such as free and fair elections, human rights protections, press freedom, and the separation of powers, nineteen met the definition on paper, and that nine European Union member states appeared among them, namely Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Spain, and the Czech Republic (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019). The claim's significance, if substantiated, lies in its potential to challenge the prevailing assumption that organised manipulation is exclusive to authoritarian regimes. Moreover, it poses a significant governance challenge within liberal democracies themselves.

This has created a further tension for the European Union. The Union presents itself as a global leader in the regulation of artificial intelligence, including through its proposal for harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (European Union, 2021).

However, if member states employ manipulative platform practices concurrently, the credibility of regulatory leadership is diminished and the public basis for trust erodes. The underlying structural observation is that the propagation of manipulative techniques may be contingent less on the regime typology than on the strategic incentives of the governing actors, particularly in circumstances where visibility management becomes a norm in the context of political competition (Bradshaw and Howard, 2019).

From this perspective, manipulation is not merely an external threat to democratic systems. It may also be indicative of a more extensive transformation in the manner in which power is exercised and public opinion is managed. The existence of effective oversight mechanisms, transparency measures, and a critical and well-informed public is therefore necessary for the protection of free opinion formation and democratic discourse. In circumstances where governments and political parties engage in opaque and manipulative practices whilst simultaneously invoking democratic ideals to criticise alternative regimes, declining trust can be understood not as an anomaly but as a predictable consequence.

In order to rebuild trust in this particular account, it is necessary to ensure consistency between stated norms and actual communicative practices. Furthermore, it is essential to implement enforceable transparency and accountability standards for the political use of social media and artificial intelligence.

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80. IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (2019) – "Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems".

81. Zuboff, S. (2019) – "The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power".

82. European Union (2021) – "Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act)".

Twelve: U.S. Strategic Architecture vis-à-vis China, Russia, and Iran

The Spanish–American War of 1898 signified the United States' transition from a predominantly continental power to a maritime and overseas power. From a geopolitical perspective, this signified a strategic advance into the Pacific region, extending as far as the Philippines. From an economic perspective, this signified an expanded scope for action. The extent of this scope would henceforth be contingent on industrial output, maritime logistics, and the long-term financing of overseas operations. At the turn of the century, American strategists were already developing concepts for a two-ocean fleet presence. The assertion of the United States' role as the privileged guarantor of security in the Western Hemisphere was anchored in the principles set forth in the Monroe Doctrine. Subsequently, the concept was articulated in normative terms, underpinned by the notion of "manifest destiny". The construction of the Panama Canal provided this claim with an infrastructural foundation. The canal had the effect of reducing transit times and redeployment costs. The result was a more efficient operational connection between the Atlantic and the Pacific. This development resulted in a notable enhancement in the efficiency of maritime power projection. In this particular context, infrastructure functioned as a geo-economic lever. This strategic decision enabled the company to achieve a more favourable cost structure.

The fundamental motivation behind these ambitions was not primarily doctrinal in nature. The catalyst for this shift was the rapid industrialisation of the American economy. By the onset of the First World War, the United States had already come to account for a considerable share of global economic output. Consequently, Britain's status as the preeminent industrial nation was challenged. This shift resulted in an expansion of the resources that shape modern power politics. The resources in question encompassed production capacity.

The aforementioned factors encompass technological innovation, capital accumulation, and a tax base. This tax base has the potential to support elevated military and diplomatic expenditures over an extended period. This dynamism was facilitated by the prevailing institutional conditions.

These conditions fostered experimentation, entrepreneurship, and technical invention. Furthermore, they maintained a comparatively open social mobility. A further factor was the economically significant ability to attract skilled immigration. The United States also demonstrated a relatively expeditious integration of immigration policies. This dynamic resulted in a consistent influx of human capital. The impact of this initiative was twofold, with concomitant increases in productivity and the rate of innovation. This approach consequently led to the stabilisation of the expansion of national power, albeit in an indirect manner.

The First World War represented the inaugural large-scale stress test. The evidence presented indicated that the American economy had the capacity to facilitate a military presence in Europe. This could be achieved not only through political decision-making, but also through the development of material capacity. The mobilisation of troops necessitated the establishment of industrial and logistical infrastructure. The same was true of supply chains. The production of armaments was also a contributing factor. This infrastructure operated beyond national borders. Concurrently, a distinct American diplomatic initiative emerged, characterised by its normative aspirations for Europe's order. This ambition gained plausibility because it was based on an economically underwritten power position. Notwithstanding, the war maintained a primary European focus. The self-inflicted damage to Europe's economy has accelerated its decline. The aforementioned damage was caused by three factors: resource depletion, mounting debt, and political destabilisation. The US entry has been identified as a catalyst for an existing shift. Europe became increasingly an object of global power and competition. The focus of these dynamics shifted accordingly.

Notwithstanding this rise, no durable American leadership role was established at first. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the United States was predominantly characterised by the ideology of isolationism. The notion of the United States as a "continental island" was a concept that was also informed by the prevailing paradigm of security thinking. This retreat was not indicative of economic weakness. Conversely, it reflected the capacity to experience affluence and stability without enduring global engagement.

During this period, totalitarian systems experienced a period of increased strength on the European continent. Nevertheless, American power was politically restrained. This included a fleet presence that had become highly capable. The European powers appeared to be the most significant international actors. Japan also gained importance.

The European era was brought to a definitive conclusion with the conclusion of the Second World War. This conflict is noteworthy as the first war to reach truly global proportions. The simultaneous entanglement of continents and oceans served to illustrate this point with particular clarity. The prevailing geopolitical order, predicated on the organisation of world politics along European regional lines, has become untenable. Of greater significance than this symbolic globality was the economic finding. Europe exhausted its industrial and financial reserves. The capacity to determine the outcome was held by two non-European actors. The two primary actors in this geopolitical dynamic were the United States and the Soviet Union. Both emerged as successors to a recurring European pursuit of global pre-eminence. This pursuit had remained unfinished. The American position was shaped by a distinctive combination of factors. The superiority of the latter was indisputable. The period was distinguished by significant technological innovation. Furthermore, it exhibited the financial resilience to support a global expansion over an extended period.

The ensuing decades of the Cold War can be interpreted as a period of system competition. In this competition, geopolitics and economics were inextricably intertwined. A maritime power, firmly established in the Atlantic and the Pacific, confronted a continental Eurasian land power. Both of these scholars linked power politics to universalist ideologies. The purpose of these ideologies was to ensure the continued mobilisation and loyalty of the populace. The advent of the nuclear age rendered the prospect of a direct great-power war a rationality. From an economic perspective, the decision was not rational. Moreover, it was deemed to be irrational from an existential standpoint. It was therefore determined that the decision would be transferred to other dimensions. In the context of protracted rivalries, these dimensions assume a particularly pronounced significance. The latter include economic performance. Among the measures proposed are those pertaining to technological modernisation.

These include organisational efficiency and alliance management. Furthermore, cultural attractiveness is incorporated as a "soft" resource. This attractiveness is frequently associated with discernible enhancements in living standards.

From a geostrategic perspective, the conflict was primarily fought on the periphery of Eurasia. This peripheral strategy was underpinned by economic rationale. It is evident that the strategic positioning of the object in question was achieved without incurring the financial burden of a direct collision in the core. In the late phase, a southern focus emerged. In this regard, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf assumed a pivotal role. This focus had both energy and financial significance. The primary objective of this military intervention was to restrict Soviet resources in Afghanistan. The objective of the initiative was twofold: firstly, to act as a deterrent to any further expansion in the Gulf region, and secondly, to achieve this aim in a manner that was both strategic and sustainable. The two aims were to raise the opponent's cost curve. In addition, there was an attempt to stabilise one's own position in an economically central region.

The outcome was determined to a greater extent by structural asymmetries than by decisive battles. The Western-led coalition demonstrated a notable degree of flexibility in organisational and political terms. The system in question was notable for its ability to accommodate a wide range of interests without resorting to rigid doctrinal centralisation. In contradistinction, the Soviet-led order was characterised by a more pronounced hierarchy and ideological rigidity. Such features have the potential to facilitate control in the short term. This can result in diminished adaptability over time. Furthermore, they have the capacity to amplify efficiency losses. The implications of alliance constraints were also a salient factor. It is evident that America's primary allies exhibited a marked weakness in comparison to the United States. It is evident that the notion of China being confined to a perpetual subordinate role is an implausible proposition. This, in turn, served to undermine the stability of the bloc.

Over time, economic and technological divergence intensified. The United States demonstrated its capacity to withstand elevated defence expenditures. Furthermore, the potential for research in this area is significant. It has the potential to support both a consumer society and an innovation society concurrently. The Soviet Union experienced a period of stagnation. Concurrently, the development of inefficiencies and a technological lag became evident. The presence of ideological constraints resulted in the weakening of the correction of distorted incentives. The increase in waste was a key concern. This has had a deleterious effect on the team's competitiveness. Consequently, a legitimacy deficit emerged. The issue at hand was not solely political. This phenomenon became manifest in a tangible manner. The concept of cultural attractiveness did not manifest as a superficial "superstructure" in this context. The subsequent analysis focused on the perceived future viability of the project. In West Germany and Japan, recovery aligned strongly with American models. The United States was regarded as a paradigm of successful modernisation. In a significant proportion of Central and Eastern Europe, Soviet dominance remained culturally weakly legitimised. This phenomenon was perceived as a decoupling from reference spaces that were conceptualised as "European". Rivalries over status and interpretive authority also emerged in the context of relations with China.

Ultimately, centrifugal forces precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Non-Russian groups increasingly interpreted central control as imperial foreign rule. In Central Asia, the process of Islamic identity formation has been accompanied by a marked increase in the distance from the centre. A recurring logic was observed, as has been the case in many empires before. The dissolution process did not necessitate a single external force. The impetus for this shift was rooted in a confluence of factors, including but not limited to: economic overstretch, social strain, and a concomitant erosion of political legitimacy. Empires rarely collapse instantaneously. It has been observed that these materials tend to disintegrate over time. This process is frequently gradual. Furthermore, it can be characterised as abrupt.

In this economically accentuated reading, the attainment of global pre-eminence is not chiefly the result of individual wartime decisions. This phenomenon is attributable to a model that establishes a correlation between economic growth, innovation, infrastructure, and alliance capacity. This linkage ensures the financial sustainability of power projection over time. Consequently, the Cold War is best regarded not as a conflict that was "won" by military means. It would appear that the determining factor in this matter is system performance. The decisive system was characterised by a combination of heightened productivity and greater adaptability. Furthermore, it presented a more optimistic outlook for the future.

In light of this history[12], contemporary U.S. political programmes can be interpreted as endeavours to recalibrate the institutional and regulatory conditions that shape system performance. This encompasses the governance of digital platforms as pivotal infrastructures of innovation, legitimacy, and alliance cohesion.

The 2024 Republican Party platform sets out a governing agenda centred on deregulation, tighter immigration controls, and an appeal to "traditional American values" (Trump and Vance, 2024). Notwithstanding the document's internal tensions, a recurring theme is opposition to alleged censorship and a pledge to restore free speech, particularly in relation to social media. When analysed as a programme for government as opposed to a rhetorical artefact, this emphasis gives rise to a structural question: namely, how commitments to "free speech" are operationalised in platform governance, and with what consequences for democratic debate and informational integrity.

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[12] Reference on page 92 (no. 83) is highly recommended in the history context.

A fundamental tenet of the platform's strategy is to minimise governmental influence over social media platforms, on the grounds that state pressure can become a proxy for censorship. However, a general retreat from oversight and moderation is likely to generate predictable secondary effects. In the event that digital platforms are confronted with diminished incentives to moderate extensively, content that is polarising and extremist in nature, which is already bolstered by engagement-driven ranking algorithms, may disseminate with greater ease. Consequently, the amplification dynamics previously discussed may be exacerbated.

The practical issue is not the theoretical question of whether speech ought to be free in principle, but rather the question of how visibility, reach, and recommendation are allocated in environments where algorithms systematically reward emotionally charged content. In the absence of effective regulatory frameworks, deregulatory approaches have the potential to unintentionally exacerbate fragmentation and accelerate the radicalisation of public discourse.

The platform's internal tensions become more evident in its selective approach to the concept of "censorship". While the organisation professes to be dismantling "left-wing censorship mechanisms", it also advocates the removal of content characterised as "radical gender ideology" or "critical race theory" from schools and public institutions (Trump and Vance, 2024).

Irrespective of one's substantive perspective on these debates, the juxtaposition of maximalist free speech rhetoric and targeted content exclusion gives rise to concerns regarding viewpoint asymmetry. The risk is not only formal restriction, but also a form of de facto suppression in which particular perspectives become systematically disadvantaged. In the context of digital environments, the implementation of such disadvantage does not necessitate the utilisation of explicit bans. The phenomenon may emerge as a consequence of policy enforcement choices, asymmetric reporting pressures, and visibility dynamics influenced by ranking systems. This is problematic in relation to pluralist democratic norms, which are predicated on contestation across a diversity of viewpoints under conditions of procedural fairness.

The platform's position also pertains to the concept of responsible artificial intelligence. Its repudiation of what it terms "left wing principles" in the development of artificial intelligence may, in practice, result in the weakening of ethical and social standards in the design of algorithms. A responsible artificial intelligence approach, at minimum, requires transparency and accountability in algorithmic decision-making, including standards that protect privacy and enable independent scrutiny. Conversely, an agenda characterised as "free artificial intelligence development" in a context of relaxed oversight has the potential to increase the probability that platforms will prioritise engagement and profit over democratic integrity.

The pertinent question is not whether innovation should be pursued, but whether it is structurally constrained by enforceable rules that protect citizens in information environments dominated by large-scale behavioural data and automated ranking.

This is, in essence, a problem of balancing: the challenge of safeguarding freedom of expression while protecting democratic publics against disinformation, polarisation, and manipulation. A credible defence of open discourse cannot be reduced to deregulation alone, because platform environments are not neutral conduits. These systems are engineered to allocate attention and amplify particular forms of content. In the absence of alternative integrity mechanisms, the concept of "free expression" may be used as a justification for the consolidation of an unaccountable attention economy, which is structurally conducive to societal division.

From a European perspective, this issue is not merely a domestic American concern, but also a manifestation of a transatlantic divergence in digital governance. The European Union has pursued a more regulatory approach to artificial intelligence and platforms. Conversely, the United States, under the policy orientation represented here, may move in the opposite direction.

The following three issues are of particular concern: the European Union's capacity to regulate technologies that have been largely developed and deployed beyond its jurisdiction; the enforceability of European rules where core platform infrastructures remain externally controlled; and the strategic implications of other major actors, including China, Russia, Iran, and India, whose interests and capabilities complicate any simplistic framing of the United States versus Europe.

Within this broader context, the United States National Security Strategy of November 2025 functions as a signalling document, thereby rendering the strategic logic comparatively legible (The White House, 2025). The concept of national power is presented as being less dependent on the maintenance of permanent forward military primacy and more as the outcome of tighter coupling between economic and technology policy, industrial capacity, energy policy, and selective deterrence.

Concurrently, it endeavours to redistribute a greater proportion of the expenses associated with maintaining order to allies, while positioning Washington as the initiator and coordinator within a conditional network of partnerships.

This logic is most explicit in the emphasis on burden sharing and burden shifting. Partners are urged to assume "primary responsibility" for their regions, including by increasing defence contributions to NATO (The White House, 2025). The document presents a partnership architecture in which incentives, including market access, technology cooperation, and defence procurement, are explicitly conditional on strategic alignment, including alignment on export controls. When interpreted in a strict sense, this can be better understood as a reorganisation of leadership rather than a turn to isolationism. The United States has signalled a reduced willingness to absorb ongoing costs, while increasing its reliance on conditionality, coordination, and economic statecraft.

A secondary organising principle is the elevation of economic security to the core of national security. The strategy treats reindustrialisation, supply chain security, protection of the defence industrial base, critical minerals, and energy capacity as strategic foundations rather than merely supporting policies (The White House, 2025). Competition is thus conceptualised as an industrial and value chain contest in which power depends on standards, capital flows, and the capacity to sustain production under pressure.

Within this theoretical framework, China is positioned as the primary structural competitor. The strategy combines economic constraints, using trade, technology, and investment levers, with a deterrence posture concentrated in the Indo-Pacific, including Taiwan and maritime access and denial logics, while explicitly presuming measurable participation by allies (The White House, 2025). Europe is characterised by a distinct framing of the concept. Russia remains a central player in this geopolitical landscape, but the strategy signals an expectation that Europe should "stand on its own feet", with Washington pursuing a stability-oriented approach that links European security to de-escalation, strategic stability, and a recalibration of NATO's role and trajectory (The White House, 2025).

In contrast, Iran is regarded through a lens of relative Middle Eastern deprioritisation without abandonment of core interests. As The White House (2025) have explicitly stated, maritime chokepoints, non-proliferation and counter-terror imperatives, and Israel's security remain salient. Moreover, decades-long nation-building is explicitly rejected, and partner architecture is emphasised. The strategy also signals a broader shift in the foundations of power. The concept of coalition capacity is defined as the ability to secure strategic resources, critical supply chains, and technological standards. This is achieved through conditional alliance building for resource security (The White House, 2025).

When considered as a whole, these documents support a set of cautious inferences. The 2025 strategy conceptualises United States power increasingly in terms of economic and technological statecraft, industrial capacity, energy policy, and selective deterrence, while formalising burden shifting through conditional partnership design.

The People's Republic of China is regarded as the primary systemic competitor, and it is imperative that this nation be constrained economically and deterred militarily. It is anticipated that allies will play an active role in this endeavour. Russia is regarded as a European stability problem within a division of responsibility framework that presumes greater European self-reliance. The Islamic Republic of Iran is regarded as a persistent regional risk in a Middle East that is no longer regarded as the primary arena of day-to-day American strategy. Across these theatres, the document's own logic implies that success depends less on rhetorical posture than on implementation: industrial scaling, coalition coherence, enforceable export controls, maritime security, and credible deterrence (The White House, 2025).

In summary, the contemporary global context is not undergoing a "smart transition". Since the declaration of US foreign and security policy, it can be interpreted as a rupture of the preceding international order, which was predominantly driven by the United States. At this juncture, it is imperative for all stakeholders to relinquish the notion of a dependable, rules-based international cooperation and to instead adopt a realistic perspective. Those who attempt to adapt to this new reality through mere adaptation or self-deception will invariably find themselves living within a lie.

In this modified strategic environment, any reliable diagnosis of the fractured order must be anchored in its material drivers, given that the erosion of "rules-based" cooperation is inseparable from intensifying competition over the productive inputs that determine technological and geopolitical advantage.

The aforementioned historical line thus yields a clear final pattern. The ability to prevail on a global scale is contingent upon the capacity to mobilise the key factors of production and to finance them over time. In the early 20th century, the factors considered to be most significant were industrial output, logistics, and capital. In 2026, the bottleneck shifts towards computing power. Furthermore, an observable transition towards electricity, hardware supply chains, and critical raw materials is evident. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected a substantial increase in data-centre electricity demand by 2030 within its baseline scenario. Furthermore, the report anticipates a substantial augmentation in the demand for electricity, necessitating an escalation in supply to meet these requirements.

This dynamic already exerts macroeconomic effects. A recent energy forecast has explicitly linked record electricity consumption to the operations of artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency data centres.

In the context of the AI era, the economic rivalry between China and other global powers assumes a pivotal role, with the focus on addressing the compute bottleneck being a central tenet of this strategic competition. The export of advanced AI chips is no longer regarded as a standard commercial activity. These goods are regarded as strategic commodities. In early 2026, the US Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), revised the licensing review policy for certain semiconductor exports to China. The organisation has adopted a case-by-case review process for a select number of items, including highly capable accelerator chips. In accordance with the historical template, this constitutes the politicisation of contemporary "industrial capacity". The industry's core has undergone a transition, with a shift from steel and shipbuilding to other sectors. The primary focus of this initiative is the development of training infrastructure and the facilitation of access to advanced semiconductor chips.

China's structural position in critical minerals adds a further lever. These minerals are of significance for the field of AI hardware. Moreover, their significance extends to robotics, energy infrastructure, and defence technology. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has observed that the People's Republic of China has implemented export controls, including measures that were introduced in October 2025. The scope of these controls encompasses rare earths and associated products or technologies. The establishment of licensing requirements gives rise to the potential for scarcity or delay. European analyses also document a high degree of interdependence in this area. It is particularly noteworthy that the import shares for magnets are notably high. Furthermore, the report highlights a notable concentration of power along the value chain. The fundamental economic premise remains consistent with that of the industrial age. The entity that exerts control over bottleneck inputs possesses the capacity to exert influence over the growth tempo of the opponent. This dynamic also exerts a significant influence on productivity, innovation, and the potential for military-technological modernisation.

The significance of Russia in 2026 is predicated on its capacity to influence macroeconomic conditions through the channels of energy and raw materials. These channels thus define the cost base for AI scaling. Furthermore, they establish the cost base for industrial production. Data centres are known to be highly energy-consuming. Furthermore, Russia's capacity as a state is inextricably linked to its energy revenues. Current analyses indicate sharp declines in seaborne exports under increased pressure. Furthermore, the study puts forward the hypothesis that production cuts are becoming increasingly probable. Furthermore, Russia's fiscal position is also clearly strained by falling oil revenues.

This renders the conflict economically salient in two distinct ways. Firstly, it is important to note that sanctions and countermeasures give rise to transaction costs. The aforementioned costs are incurred within the insurance, financial, and "shadow" logistics sectors. It is evident that such practices have a detrimental effect on efficiency levels, whilst concurrently creating a fragmentation of markets. Secondly, energy policy becomes location policy for AI infrastructure. The EU's repeated extension and expansion of sanctions serves to emphasise the lasting impact of this conflict on established trade and financial regulations.

It is evident that Iran's economic significance is disproportionate to the size of its current economy. This is due to its strategic location at a pivotal point in global energy and transport geography. As demonstrated by the US Energy Authority, the Strait of Hormuz accounted for in excess of 25% of the global seaborne oil trade in both 2024 and in the initial quarter of 2025. Furthermore, it is estimated that approximately one-fifth of global oil and product consumption is attributable to this region. Furthermore, it should be noted that the aforementioned country was responsible for approximately a fifth of the global LNG trade. In an AI era, characterised by the centrality of electricity prices and grid stability, escalation in risk related to Hormuz can trigger a global cost and inflation shock. Such a shock would have a significant impact on investment in energy-intensive digital infrastructure. In other words, the flows of energy and transport through Hormuz are sufficiently substantial to exert a considerable influence on price formation and supply security. This assertion remains valid even in the absence of comprehensive "control" over global energy flows in a technical sense.

In other words, Iran occupies an effective gatekeeping position over energy flows that underpin roughly 20 to 25 per cent of the world economy.

The sanctions dimension also remains of economic significance. It has been argued that this results in the narrowing of financing and trade channels. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that this phenomenon also serves to perpetuate regional conflicts, thereby disrupting global supply chains. In late January 2026, the EU adopted further restrictive measures against Iran.

In accordance with the economic rationale provided by these historical facts, the present study posits that power conflict in the AI era becomes a contest over the production function of the next growth wave. The fundamental inputs to this process are computation, energy, raw materials, and secure trade routes. The significance of China, Russia and Iran is attributable to their possession of at least one of these pivotal factors. It is evident that such disruptions are not solely attributable to foreign policy. It is evident that the aforementioned elements constitute a triad of productivity policy, price policy and investment policy.

Public communication frequently superimposes these material causes with normative and legal frameworks. The legitimising narratives that emerge in such contexts have the potential to obscure the true interests involved. Furthermore, they have the capacity to moralise conflict, reducing it to binaries of "good" and "evil". This dynamic can facilitate the escalation of political tensions in a more sustainable manner. An analytical perspective that foregrounds bottlenecks, cost structures, and incentive patterns has been shown to reduce the risk of self-stylisation. Furthermore, it provides a more precise understanding of the drivers of strategic competition.

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Thirteen: Germany and the Politics of Denial

The so-called Böckenförde Doctrine, associated with the German constitutional scholar and former judge of the Federal Constitutional Court Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, names a constitutive tension within liberal democracy. In the statement that has become known as the Böckenförde Dictum, the aforementioned author sets out the paradox as follows: The liberal, secularised state is characterised by a series of prerequisites that it is unable to guarantee in its own right. The sentence was first published in 1967 in Böckenförde's essay "The Emergence of the State as a Process of Secularisation" (Böckenförde, 1967).

The paradox is both straightforward and far-reaching in nature. The liberal constitutional state is characterised by its commitment to the promotion of extensive individual freedoms, while also upholding a principle of ideological and religious neutrality. However, the stability of this arrangement is contingent upon forms of pre-political commitment, including civic dispositions, social trust, and a minimum of cohesion, that cannot be compelled without undermining liberalism itself. Böckenförde's assertion does not imply that the state is inherently powerless; rather, it highlights the potential for restriction of individual freedom. It is imperative that the system in question relies on binding forces generated within society while refraining from coercive measures that would destroy the very conditions of legitimacy it seeks to preserve (Böckenförde, 1967).

In contemporary democracies, the doctrine remains relevant precisely because pluralisation and fragmentation increase the likelihood that shared premises become contested. The following three inquiries are presented in a logical sequence.

First, how can social cohesion be sustained under conditions of deepening diversity and polarisation?

Second, how can a democratic state navigate tensions generated both internally and externally while maintaining liberal principles?

Third, how can it protect itself as an institutional order without converting self preservation into restrictions on the freedoms it exists to guarantee?

These questions assume particular significance in the context of international crises, which generate domestic pressures in multicultural societies, such as Germany's.

The doctrine is closely linked to questions of legitimacy. The fundamental tenets of democracy, such as the rule of law, liberty, justice, and pluralism, are predicated on widespread acceptance of its underlying principles. This acceptance, in turn, is influenced by motivational factors that transcend mere legal considerations. The critical issue, therefore, is what occurs when acceptance erodes in particular social segments, or when state action is perceived as partial and therefore unjust. The doctrine posits that the legitimacy of a state cannot be maintained through the application of coercion alone, as this results in a deviation from the liberal form whose legitimacy is purportedly being safeguarded (Böckenförde, 1967).

This dilemma is rendered particularly evident during periods of international crisis. While government positioning may be intelligible within its own historical and strategic frame, it is important to recognise that certain segments of the population may perceive such positioning as biased. In circumstances where citizens perceive marginalisation or exclusion, there is the potential for a weakening of trust in democratic institutions. This is not necessarily due to an irrationality in dissent, but rather because of a perceived damage to procedural fairness, which is an essential component of liberal legitimacy.

Domestic measures undertaken in times of crisis have the potential to exacerbate this perception. It is submitted that prohibitions on demonstrations, sanctions against critical speech, and inconsistent application of principles across comparable cases can be experienced as infringements of freedom of expression. The salient claim is not that democratic states are inherently resistant to the imposition of restrictions, but rather that perceived asymmetries, particularly where measures appear to be selectively enforced, can engender the impression that the state favours certain groups and viewpoints over others. In accordance with Böckenförde's theoretical framework, such perceptions can be considered to incur a cost, insofar as they are capable of eroding the pre-political dispositions on which the notion of voluntary consent is predicated.

It is at this juncture that the threat to personal liberty assumes a heightened political significance. Böckenförde's argument suggests that liberal democracy cannot treat dissent as a pathology to be eliminated through coercion without undermining the very conditions of civic loyalty and consent that sustain it. Should the state elect to respond to polarisation primarily through suppression, there is a risk of intensifying the divisions it seeks to contain, thereby increasing the very vulnerability identified by Böckenförde (Böckenförde, 1967). The doctrine, therefore, functions as a warning against confusing stability with silence and order with legitimacy.

The subsequent implication pertains to the methodological framework. Liberal democracy must repeatedly demonstrate neutrality, fairness, and transparency, especially in pluralistic societies, because voluntary support depends on citizens' confidence that institutions do not treat political disagreement as disloyalty. One-sidedness, whether in symbolic alignment or in the perceived handling of dissent, carries the risk of alienating constituencies and weakening the state's capacity to sustain cohesion without coercion. In this particular sense, democracy is inextricably linked to discursive practice. The legitimisation of the state is perpetuated through the continuous process of public contestation and the judicious adjudication of political decisions. The blanket condemnation of criticism is thus ill-advised, as it is likely to engender adverse outcomes. The phenomenon under scrutiny has been observed to serve the function of exacerbating existing polarisation rather than mitigating it.

Tolerance, defined as the capacity to accept divergent views within a unified constitutional framework, is a fundamental prerequisite for the sustained existence of a democratic system.

In this sense, the Böckenförde Doctrine highlights the constraints and challenges associated with liberal governance. A liberal order invariably entails a certain element of risk with regard to personal freedom, given its inability to artificially generate the civic dispositions on which it is contingent. The risk is increased when state conduct weakens trust. When the government pursues policies that are widely perceived as contradicting the principles it claims to uphold, whether in domestic or international contexts, social cohesion may erode as a result of the state's own actions. The potential repercussions extend beyond mere reputational damage. The weakening of cohesion has been demonstrated to result in a corresponding weakening of the informal binding forces that serve to stabilise liberal democracy.

The responsibility of democratic politics, therefore, is not to eradicate the risk of freedom, but to regulate it in a manner that does not forsake the liberal form. Within the German context, this suggests a renewed commitment to the balance between freedom, justice and order that Böckenförde's formulation makes conceptually explicit (Böckenförde, 1967).

This German predicament also intersects with a broader European paradox of sovereignty. It is evident that political actors, institutions and intellectuals persist in invoking sovereignty, whether in a digital, economic or moral context, despite the fact that the practical means of achieving this are diminishing. The rhetoric of autonomy endures, whilst the critical infrastructures of autonomy are increasingly situated in disparate locations. It could be argued that Europe has refined the language of sovereignty more quickly than it has built the capacities that sovereignty requires.

This prompts a specific inquiry. The question must therefore be posed: how can independence be claimed when computational architectures, energy systems and digital ecosystems are imported, rented or licensed? Sovereignty, understood in its minimal sense as the capacity to decide and to act, becomes fragile when action is displaced by administration and when technological agency is outsourced to private corporations or foreign states. The paradox is not intended as rhetorical hyperbole. This phenomenon can be attributed to systemic factors.

Europe has historically been a significant site for the development of critical theory; however, the continent often exhibits a profound mistrust of innovation and experimentation, including a pervasive scepticism towards political risk. Venture capital is known to migrate towards regions where friction is lower, while European hesitation is frequently moralised as prudence. The result is an inversion in which ethical rhetoric expands while implementation capacity contracts.

The fundamental question pertains to the reasons why a culture that persistently venerates its philosophers might concurrently harbour a sense of trepidation towards its engineers. A further question is why institutions designed to stabilise democratic reason, including the media, appear increasingly drawn into the dynamics of populism and outrage rather than consistently resisting them. It is imperative to note that these inquiries are not posed with the intention of provocation. These arguments are derived from the Böckenförde problem itself. In circumstances where civic cohesion is compromised and agency is outsourced, the state is exposed to heightened risk of diminution of freedom, and the reproduction of legitimacy becomes more challenging.

This phenomenon may be interpreted as a subtle crisis of confidence in modernity, signifying a dissolution of the formerly prevalent belief that knowledge, freedom, and progress reinforce one another. In circumstances where progress is feared, knowledge is outsourced, and freedom is reduced to consumption, the practical conditions of sovereignty erode. Europe risks becoming a moral power without material agency, a region that governs the grammar of ethics more readily than the architecture of technology.

The recovery of sovereignty will necessitate more than mere regulation or virtue. The ability to build, and to accept uncertainty as a condition of innovation, will be essential. In the absence of such capacity, the European idea risks hardening into stagnation, manifesting as a politics of principles devoid of the means of action.

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Fourteen: The European Union and the Idea of the Peace

The utilisation of algorithms by social media platforms is of paramount importance in the prioritisation of polarising and emotionally charged content, a phenomenon that is ordinarily attributable to the maximisation of user engagement that such material engenders. In practice, this incentive structure has the potential to engender filter bubbles and echo chambers, in which users are exposed disproportionately to content that confirms rather than challenges existing beliefs. Concurrently, erroneous information can disseminate expeditiously within contemporary digital environments, frequently eclipsing the pace at which verification and rectification can be undertaken. When considered collectively, these dynamics have the potential to undermine electoral processes, distort decision-making, and contribute to a decline in public trust in institutions.

The capacity of social media to deliver political messages with high precision is enabled by the aggregation of extensive behavioural data and the use of microtargeting. This development has the potential to diminish the transparency of political discourse, not by eradicating speech, but by dispersing it. It is evident that diverse audiences are exposed to disparate messages, frequently without the existence of a shared platform for the contestation of these messages. A frequently cited illustration of this phenomenon is the Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which personal data was harvested without consent and used to influence voting behaviour. These practices are designed to exploit psychological vulnerabilities and fears, thereby posing a direct challenge to the integrity of democratic processes.

However, the phenomenon of manipulation is not a recent innovation in the context of the platform age. In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom utilised propaganda and disinformation to overthrow a democratically elected government in Iran in an operation known as Operation Ajax. The contemporary difference is primarily attributable to infrastructural conditions.

The dissemination of information via social media platforms is characterised by its expeditiousness, cost-effectiveness and pervasiveness. These characteristics enable the rapid shaping of public opinion across diverse national contexts, with the potential to influence real-time responses.

The preeminence of social media has also had a profound impact on the political economy of journalism. It is evident that digital advertising platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have become predominant players in this market, consequently impacting the revenue base that historically sustained resource-intensive reporting. The outcome of this phenomenon is a diminution of resources available for investigative journalism, which consequently results in a weakening of the democratic function of the fourth estate. If liberal democracies are reliant on a watchdog press, then the erosion of journalistic capacity cannot be regarded as a secondary issue. This phenomenon can be considered a structural vulnerability in the process of democratic self-correction.

A further consequence of this phenomenon is the facilitation of populist and extremist communication. The advent of social media has empowered these actors to disseminate simplified frames and polarising messages on a large scale, often through the utilisation of algorithmic amplification that rewards controversy. In circumstances where recommendation dynamics repeatedly expose users to increasingly extreme material, radicalisation pathways can be strengthened and political discourse can become coarser and more antagonistic. It is evident that liberal democracies are unable to address these effects through the provision of reassurance alone. It is imperative that proportionate and enforceable measures are implemented to reduce the structural advantages currently enjoyed by inflammatory and misleading content.

At the same time, platform infrastructures accumulate large volumes of personal data. This data can be used not only for targeted advertising but also for surveillance and behavioural influence, raising questions about privacy and freedom of expression. The Chinese Social Credit System is frequently cited as a relevant case because it illustrates how data-driven technologies can be integrated into social control architectures.

The point, analytically, is not to equate political systems, but to show how the technical capacity for monitoring and behavioural modulation can be scaled when institutional constraints are weak.

Within this landscape, the concept of responsible AI points to the design of transparent and ethically accountable algorithms that reduce disinformation and polarisation incentives. Potential mechanisms may include the flagging of demonstrably false content, the introduction of exposure to countervailing perspectives in appropriate contexts, robust privacy protections, and meaningful user control over feed configuration. The fundamental prerequisite is not merely ethical aspiration but governance capacity. It is imperative that standards are implementable, contestable, and enforced.

The EU's AI Act embodies a rigorous regulatory paradigm that seeks to safeguard fundamental values through the implementation of mandatory regulations. Conversely, the United States Republican programme under Donald Trump prioritises deregulation and the promotion of free speech. However, the interpretation of what constitutes free speech in practice is subject to contention and political bias. The divergence between these approaches risks widening the technological and economic gap between Europe and the United States, whilst concomitantly contributing to a more fragmented global digital environment.

This overarching concern can be articulated in straightforward terms. The potential for unregulated platform power to pose a threat to democratic structures stems from the evolution of platforms from mere communication tools to systems that allocate attention and influence belief formation. Algorithms that amplify polarising and emotional content have been associated with disinformation, social division, and radicalisation (Smith, 2023). In the absence of clearly defined ethical constraints and effective oversight, platforms have the potential to become conduits through which democratic values are weakened and public discourse is degraded. This diagnosis does not, however, constitute an inherent incompatibility with the principles of liberal democracy. A liberal order is capable of defending rights whilst still holding accountable those who seek to exploit tolerance in order to undermine the conditions of plural coexistence.

Consequently, it does not necessitate the inference that liberal democracies are inherently dictatorial. Instead, it identifies a governance problem in which power operates through visibility, incentives, and infrastructure.

A response that is to be considered credible must comprise technical, institutional and civic components. Responsible AI, understood as transparent and accountable AI, has the potential to curtail the propagation of extreme content and circumscribe the dissemination of disinformation. However, it is not a panacea, and cannot supplant a population that is capable of discerning manipulation. Consequently, media literacy is regarded as a civic capability rather than an optional addition. Concurrently, the EU's regulatory framework is beset by inherent structural deficiencies. Despite well-intentioned policies, the Union's capacity to coordinate effectively and act cohesively can be constrained in practice, resulting in a divergence between regulatory ambition and implementation. In circumstances where the power of rhetoric exceeds its practical application, the credibility of the message is diminished, particularly in external contexts where the European moralised discourse is perceived as being divorced from tangible capabilities.

The divergence between the United States and the European Union is therefore not merely legalistic in nature. The phenomenon under discussion is of a geopolitical nature. The EU aims to establish ethical standards through the AI Act, while the United States, following the trajectory described, is moving towards deregulation. In the longer term, this has the potential to result in the fragmentation of the digital space into a number of incompatible governance regimes, particularly in instances where alternative models are advocated within the context of BRICS+ dynamics. The credibility of the European approach is contingent not on rhetorical ethical leadership, but rather on consistent implementation. In this context, the AI Act should not be regarded as a heroic culmination, but rather as an attempt to secure relevance and authority in a field where technological leadership has largely accrued elsewhere.

The structural lag is evident in investment patterns. A comparison of venture capital investment across the United States, China, Japan, Germany, and India, normalised by purchasing power and expressed as venture capital investment per one thousand United States dollars of purchasing power, indicates that Germany has invested significantly less than the United States, China, and India over the period 2004 to 2023.

The following table provides a quantitative basis for the comparison presented herein. It draws on purchasing power data and national venture capital sources as indicated in the note.[13]

Year	USA	China	Japan	Germany	India
2004	0.55	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.02
2005	0.56	0.12	0.06	0.03	0.03
2006	0.60	0.15	0.07	0.04	0.04
2007	0.70	0.20	0.08	0.04	0.05
2008	0.64	0.25	0.09	0.04	0.06
2009	0.44	0.30	0.10	0.03	0.07
2010	0.50	0.35	0.11	0.03	0.08
2011	0.62	0.40	0.12	0.04	0.09
2012	0.63	0.45	0.13	0.05	0.10
2013	0.67	0.50	0.14	0.06	0.11
2014	1.00	0.60	0.15	0.07	0.12
2015	1.18	0.70	0.16	0.08	0.13
2016	1.35	0.80	0.17	0.09	0.14
2017	1.51	0.90	0.18	0.11	0.15
2018	1.85	1.00	0.19	0.13	0.16
2019	2.36	1.10	0.20	0.16	0.17
2020	2.68	1.20	0.21	0.17	0.18
2021	5.79	7.22	0.12	0.55	11.00
2022	4.31	6.50	0.10	0.28	9.00
2023	4.75	6.80	0.11	0.31	10.00

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[13] For per-capita purchasing power data, see World Bank (no. 83); For venture capital investment data in the respective countries, see: National Venture Capital Association (USA, no. 84), China Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (China, no. 85), Japan Venture Capital Association (Japan, no. 86), Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften (Germany, no. 87) und Indian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (India, no. 88). Method note: The figures are a normalised indicator constructed by dividing annual venture capital investment totals as reported by the respective national associations by GDP (PPP) for the same year, and expressing the result as VC investment per US$1,000 of purchasing power. The indicator is intended for cross-country comparison of relative VC intensity, not as a measure of absolute innovation output. Differences in reporting standards and category definitions across associations may affect comparability.

It is evident from the figures presented that Germany's average investment level is significantly lower than that of the United States, China, and India during the specified period. The implication drawn is not that regulation is irrelevant, but rather that it is incapable of compensating for limited investment capacity and weak implementation structures. If Europe's strategic response consists primarily in the establishment of rules and regulations, there is a risk that it will become influential chiefly as a regulator within its own market rather than as a driver of technological capability.

This strategy has parallels in other domains, including cryptocurrency regulation. The European Union adopted a cautious posture initially, prior to proposing a comprehensive framework, as evidenced by the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation. When interpreted in this manner, the AI Act can be regarded as an example of a more extensive template logic. In circumstances where the capacity for technological leadership is constrained, regulatory authority assumes the role of a tool for shaping market behaviour within the Union's economic space.

Nevertheless, the establishment of ethical standards has the potential to become counterproductive if it leads to a situation where moral reassurance becomes the primary focus, rather than fostering capacity building. Stringent requirements have the potential to constrain local actors when compliance costs are high and supporting infrastructures are weak. This, in turn, can reinforce dependence on external innovation centres. The objective is not to relinquish ethical principles, but rather to align ethical aspirations with the material and institutional foundations necessary for their implementation. In the absence of such alignment, Europe risks being perceived as a moral rule setter without the operational agency that would enable sovereignty to transcend rhetoric.

Recent comparative research has been conducted in order to provide a more detailed analysis of the problem from a legitimacy perspective. The Global Satisfaction with Democracy report, produced by the University of Cambridge, indicates record levels of dissatisfaction with democracy (Foa et al., 2020; University of Cambridge, 2023).

Pew Research Center surveys similarly report that, while democratic ideals remain widely endorsed, many respondents are critical of how representative democracy is functioning and, in some contexts, open to non-democratic alternatives if these are perceived to deliver better outcomes (Pew Research Center, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2024). International IDEA documents pressures on democratic checks and balances and an increasing presence of hybrid or illiberal patterns in multiple contexts (International IDEA, 2023). According to the report published by Freedom House in 2024, there has been a continuation of the global democratic decline, with the issue of complacency regarding the erosion of institutions being highlighted, including within high-income democracies.

A paradox emerges from an analysis of these sources. While majorities continue to value the freedoms and opportunities associated with democratic systems, many express declining confidence in the institutions through which democracy is enacted. Formal mechanisms, parties, parliaments and elections are increasingly described as ineffective or unresponsive. The consequence of this is a dissonance between democratic aspiration and institutional commitment. Citizens aspire to a democratic lifestyle; however, there is a decline in willingness to invest in, defend, or meaningfully participate in the structures that sustain democratic life. Should this discord persist, there is a risk of democracy eroding from within, with norms being retained in appearance but institutional resilience being lost in practice. In consideration of the aforementioned background, four potential scenarios for the European Union can be delineated.

The first, European Democracy 2.0, proposes institutional adaptation through the establishment of digital citizens' assemblies and structured deliberative platforms, supported by responsible AI that strengthens transparency and protects against manipulation. Media literacy has emerged as a civic priority, with democratic states collaborating to establish international standards for AI governance and platform regulation. In this scenario, the Union evolves into a technologically competent and globally credible democracy capable of defending values and sovereignty.

A second scenario, known as managed decline and illiberal stability, involves the retention of democratic forms while there is a concurrent erosion of substantive capacity. Elections and parliaments endure, yet meaningful decision-making is increasingly concentrated among economic and technological elites. Polarisation, disinformation, and radicalisation continue to be issues, and there is an increasing sense of disconnection between citizens and institutions. The Union adopts a democratic facade, whilst concurrently exhibiting an inability to effect meaningful transformation.

A third scenario, post democratic authoritarianism, emerges through crisis logics. Governments have historically sought to concentrate power in the name of stability and efficiency. The phenomenon of social media is subject to direct political control through overt censorship or through more subtle forms of algorithmic manipulation. The expansion of surveillance is often justified by the need for protection, but this can result in the erosion of both privacy and political freedom. It is posited that citizens may accept these measures so long as there is a perception of preservation of living standards and security. Once entrenched, reversal becomes difficult.

A fourth scenario, entitled the 'fragmented democratic order', is characterised by the presence of uneven outcomes across various regions and member states. The presence of competing blocs, such as the European Union, the United States, and the BRICS+ configuration, gives rise to the development of incompatible political and digital ecosystems. This phenomenon results in the internet becoming segmented into spheres of governance and information control. European democracy, while still extant in certain aspects, has adopted a defensive posture, grappling with the challenge of safeguarding its core values in the context of a fractured global environment.

It is important to note that these scenarios are not mutually exclusive. It is acknowledged that elements may unfold concurrently across different parts of the Union. A central implication is shared by both. The credibility of Europe as a democratic force in the twenty-first century is contingent on its ability to combine participatory legitimacy, technological competence, and geopolitical realism.

A reimagined, technologically literate, participatory democracy appears to be the most promising trajectory, but it demands innovation, institutional courage, and a willingness to revise comfortable assumptions. In the absence of such renewal, there is a risk that the Union may move towards an illiberal stability or a post-democratic order, in which the assurance of prosperity is achieved at the expense of political freedom.

However, it is important to recognise that internal democratic processes do not occur in isolation. These actors are influenced by geopolitical and economic structures, including resource constraints and the dynamics of blocs.

In the following analysis, the framework of capitalism of finitude (Orain, 2025) is employed. This framework calls into question the long-standing binary between market and state, proposing instead a distinction between an open growth logic and an ideology of finitude that treats resources, markets and export capacities as limited. In finite environments, the gains of one actor are indicative of the losses of another. This dynamic, in turn, has the effect of encouraging the monopolisation of territory, strategic routes, and emerging domains such as cyberspace and outer space.

Orain's conceptual framework encompasses a cyclical progression, characterised by periods of expansion interspersed with periods of constraint. The author traces mercantilist competition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the relative liberalisation of the nineteenth century Pax Britannica, and the scramble for resources culminating in the crises of the 1930s. Subsequent to 1945, the Pax Americana facilitated multilateralism and liberal market optimism, reaching its zenith in the 1990s, before being disrupted by ecological limits and structural deindustrialisation in the early twenty-first century. From this standpoint, the prevailing paradigm of power organisation undergoes a transition, with a reallocation of authority towards the regulation of critical inputs and material substrates.

Within this configuration, the text considers the strategic complementarity of a potential BRICS+ alignment and extends the hypothetical to include Brazil and South Africa as a transcontinental scarcity bloc. The assertion is that coordination does not necessitate formalisation through treaties.

The alignment of policy and mutual recognition of objectives has the potential to convert open market access into conditional, politically mediated access to resources. The argument then develops quantitative estimates of potential control over fossil fuels, rare earth processing, key industrial metals, agricultural exports, and maritime chokepoints, concluding that control over innovation inputs becomes strategically equivalent to innovation itself.

The political ramifications for Western democracies are posited as being substantial. For the European Union, the argument anticipates a shift from a normative, rules-oriented configuration to a more security-oriented and resource-oriented posture. This would entail a more profound military integration, a greater centralisation of strategic decision-making, and a more transactional foreign policy. For the United States, a parallel shift is anticipated towards selective resource nationalism and expanded industrial policy, with risks of intensified internal polarisation and civil liberties constraints under supply chain security rationales. In both cases, the argument suggests that scarcity pressures would reshape governance logics and place value-based orders under strain, incentivising pragmatic compromises and selective legal enforcement.

The text illustrates these tensions through a reference to Argentina under President Javier Milei, framed as a test of democratic resilience under material pressure and as a warning against complacency in societies that assume prosperity and institutional endurance are self-sustaining. The text then moves on to a generalisation of this point. The post-1945 economic prosperity of Western countries was contingent on the uninterrupted supply of affordable materials. The consequences of such a scenario would be a tightening of consumer markets, pressure on welfare states, a compression of middle classes, and the facilitation of populist movements.

The argument attributes Europe's present vulnerability partly to strategic misjudgement. The hypothesis is put forward that a rhetorical commitment to liberal universalism, when combined with a failure to establish durable resource partnerships with actors later integrated into rival blocs, has had a detrimental effect on European autonomy and bargaining capacity.

The overarching conclusion drawn from Orain's framework is that, under conditions of finitude, control over material substrates is decisive. Consequently, Western societies must integrate technological innovation and military capability with the political capacity to reconcile normative aspirations with strategic realism.

The section concludes with the invocation of a provocative historical analogy, which is employed to illustrate how administrative capacity can influence long-term trajectories of power and innovation. Notwithstanding the necessity for meticulous historical substantiation to be provided for a stronger version of that lineage, a narrower point remains pertinent. The ability of an institution to demonstrate durable institutional capability, including the capacity to organise resources, infrastructure, and knowledge, can function as a precondition of technological leadership. In circumstances characterised by material scarcity, strategic resource politics and global bloc formation, gains associated with cooperative and open orders may be susceptible to reversal. The question for the European Union is therefore not merely whether it can formulate responses to legitimacy crises, but whether it can implement them before the window for effective action closes.

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102. Foa, R. S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. & Collins, R. (2020), The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020. Cambridge: Centre for the Future of Democracy, available at: https://www.cam.ac.uk/system/files/report2020_003.pdf.

103. University of Cambridge (2023), Global dissatisfaction with democracy at a record high, available at: https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/dissatisfactiondemocracy.

104. Pew Research Center (2019), Global Views of Democracy Report, available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/04/Pew-Research-Center_Global-Views-of-Democracy-Report_2019-04-29_Updated-2019-04-30.pdf.

105. Pew Research Center (2024), Representative Democracy Remains a Popular Ideal, but People Around the World Are Critical of How It's Working, available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/02/28/representative-democracy-remains-a-popular-ideal-but-people-around-the-world-are-critical-of-how-its-working/.

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111. National Venture Capital Association (n.d.), Data & Research, available at: https://nvca.org/.

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113. Japan Venture Capital Association (n.d.) Statistics, available at: https://jvca.jp/research/trends?.

114. Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften (BVK) (n.d.) Statistiken, available at: https://www.bvkap.de/.

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Fifeteen: Conclusion

The sequence of events commenced with a seemingly innocuous scene beneath palm trees, where long-tailed macaques in Bali were observed expropriating tourists' valuables and subsequently "returning" the loot in exchange for sustenance. The subject matter is initially amusing, even endearing, but upon closer inspection, its true nature becomes apparent. A system characterised by scarcity, reward, and feedback has the capacity to engender patterned behaviour in the absence of any necessity for individuals to comprehend, let alone formulate, the overarching plan. The macaques do not require any theoretical framework to be in place. It is sufficient that specific actions yield a positive outcome. What pays gets repeated.

This same logic, albeit with vastly higher stakes, now structures our information spaces. The question of veracity is increasingly being superseded by the question of efficacy in the realm of public communication. Attention has become a valuable commodity, with reach being directly proportional to revenue generation. Similarly, outrage has been shown to be a significant source of yield. Generative artificial intelligence has not itself invented this mechanism, but it has industrialised it; the production of variants, the tailoring of messages to specific audiences, and the simulation of "evidence" have become so inexpensive that the truly scarce resource is no longer content, but verification. The veracity of a claim is a possibility that remains open, yet this process becomes costly. It necessitates time, expertise, institutional trust, and occasionally, courage. Conversely, falsehood can be readily modified, refined, disseminated, and superseded by subsequent iterations as required.

At this juncture, the narrative transitions from a media concern to a geopolitical hazard. In circumstances where verification is rendered costly, it is not merely the propagation of misinformation that is observed; rather, there is a concomitant alteration in the form of conflict itself. Conflicts of interest, encompassing issues of allocation, and the relative weight accorded to different priorities, are not inherently intractable. The assumption is made of a shared foundation: a minimal shared reality, shared standards of proof, and at least some accepted referees. The concept of reality is predicated on the premise that the floor itself is not subject to contestation.

The dispute has evolved from a focus on resources or rules to a consideration of the events that transpired, the legitimacy of the parties involved, the veracity of their statements, and the determination of the primary aggressor. The inherent complexity of reality, in its intricate interconnection and multi-faceted nature, renders it ill-suited for simplistic categorisation or commodification through trade. Consequently, the act of compromise becomes tainted, where concessions are perceived as capitulation, corrections as acts of aggression, and mediation as betrayal.

In the context of geopolitical affairs, this is not merely a rhetorical device. This structural shift in the menu of available options is of particular significance. In circumstances where conventional fact-finding procedures are rendered ineffective, diplomacy forfeits its most valuable asset: the ability to communicate in a credible manner. In such cases, states and societies tend to place a higher value on costlier, supposedly clearer signals of intent, such as actions, rather than words. It is rare for actions intended as signals to be without consequence; sanctions, export controls, blockades, derecognition, coercive postures and proxy support are all examples of this. The more a conflict is framed in terms of legitimacy and reality, the more straightforward it becomes to moralise such instruments and to stabilise them within a domestic context. It is evident that economic measures are becoming increasingly indistinguishable from obligations, and military deterrence is no longer perceived as a risk but rather as a prudent course of action. This is followed by a cascade in which coercion is not inevitable, but increasingly rational, because the epistemic conditions that make de-escalation cheap have already been damaged.

The contribution of AI infrastructure is therefore not merely "more propaganda", but rather a novel form of continuous operation. In the context of older propaganda regimes, the dissemination of messages was frequently characterised by a campaign-like approach, exhibiting a high degree of uniformity. In the contemporary era, narratives can be adapted in real time to suit different milieus, emotions, registers and events. Each rebuttal does not result in silence; rather, it produces the next iteration. The contention, which was previously based on factual evidence, has evolved into a competition involving optimisation processes.

The individual or entity that can articulate a convincing narrative with the greatest expediency, channel public discontent with the most alacrity, and disseminate uncertainty with the most efficacy, will gain a temporal advantage. In the context of conflict, the ability to utilise time strategically is a crucial factor in achieving success.

The transition from the realm of monkeys to that of world politics is, in fact, disarmingly brief. The issue at hand is not a sudden lapse in cognitive faculties; rather, it is an adjustment in the economic factors that govern cognitive processes. An infrastructure has been constructed, the purpose of which is to ensure that impact is reliably rewarded and verification reliably taxed. In such circumstances, it would be unwise to assume that veracity would prevail without external assistance, just as it would be imprudent to expect macaques to relinquish the most advantageous rewards in the absence of moral restraint.

The crux of the argument is as follows: the fundamental conflict is not concerned with truth as content, but rather with the institutions and procedures that facilitate its accessibility. The escalation of conflicts pertaining to reality is not primarily attributable to an overabundance of individuals subscribing to erroneous beliefs; rather, it is predominantly a consequence of a paucity of domains in which facts can be reinstated as a collective foundation, which is both verifiable and auditable, and can be utilised even by those with divergent perspectives. In the absence of these spaces, power becomes the method by which reality is determined, initially through rhetoric, subsequently through economics, and ultimately through military force.

The political implications of this phenomenon are both unwelcome and unambiguous. The present age, characterised by the advent of generative artificial intelligence, necessitates a reevaluation of strategies employed in the combat of propaganda. The conventional approaches, such as content moderation and didactic discourse on "media literacy", are insufficient to address the complexities of this emergent landscape. The necessity for counter-architecture is evident: the provenance of media should be clearly delineated, robust chains of verification should be in place, auditable recommendation systems should be implemented, institutionally independent review capacities should be developed, and international procedures capable of settling disputed claims before they harden into casus belli should be established.

In summary, it is imperative to construct a global environment in which truth is not merely a moral ideal, but rather a tangible economic and infrastructural prospect.

In essence, the fundamental question remains unchanged, as it pertains to the consequences of our actions within a system, albeit with a less entertaining outcome. The question that remains unanswered is: what are the consequences of our actions within the system? Should the present course be continued, with impact being rewarded and truth becoming inaccessible, the system will respond in an appropriate manner. The cost will be shouldered not by those who create headlines, but by those whose lives are influenced by them.

Germany, in particular, must adapt its democratic institutions to these conditions; the possession of a strong moral sense and a large-scale military rearmament are not a sustainable security strategy. It is therefore realistic to assume that, should Germany continue on its current trajectory, prioritising moral posture and reactive rearmament over democratic and epistemic resilience, it will struggle to remain governable, cohesive, and strategically capable under the pressures of AI-accelerated influence operations and cascading crises. The behaviour exhibited by macaques in relation to the theft of smartphones cannot be attributed to malevolence on their part; rather, it is a consequence of the system's design, which offers tangible rewards for such actions. The propagation of disinformation is not a consequence of its perceived strength; rather, it is the result of the ease and efficacy with which it can be disseminated within the context of a flawed system. The objective is not to prioritise morality or armaments, but rather to ensure the continued functionality of a democracy within an AI-accelerated information economy. Germany's approach does not prioritise the pursuit of truth; rather, it is focused on the establishment of the necessary infrastructure to make truth financially viable once more. In the absence of such measures, the sole remaining security strategy is self-assurance coupled with armament, a model that is not viable in the long term. It is imperative for the Member States of the European Union to comprehend, acknowledge, and execute this understanding in order to present a united front and articulate a robust position in the face of opposition.

Appendix A: A GUIDELINE TO MANIPULATION IN PRESENT BASED ON MEDIA-DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE

The following figure illustrates, in exemplary form, a communicative chain in which attention, propaganda, and manipulation are functionally interconnected. This case study offers a valuable illustration of how strategic communication in platform-mediated publics can be methodically organised across successive stages.

(As illustrated in Figure 1, a screenshot of a media report on the commissioning of major platforms (Google, YouTube, X) to distribute government communications content is presented: https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/h1retvocxx?)

The intended objective of the state institution could be described as follows: the commissioning of a publicly funded digital campaign, the purchase of advertising inventory at scale, and the leveraging of the technical distribution capabilities of a small number of platforms with substantial market power and reach. In this configuration, reach is not merely an incidental by-product of public debate; rather, it is considered an infrastructure that can be deliberately produced and scaled through commercial distribution mechanisms, most notably advertising auctions and targeting.

This case is well suited as an empirical entry point into a common chain of strategic communication that can be heuristically differentiated into three stages:

1. The allocation of attention is determined by distributional power.
2. Pertains to the concept of propagandistic framing.
3. The focus should be on the identification of manipulative amplification mechanisms. The particular emphasis here should be on those mechanisms which rely on covert, coordinated or technically scaled practices. The central analytical point is that, in this context, propaganda and manipulation are not best defined primarily by the truth-value of individual claims. Rather, these phenomena are defined by the structures of production, distribution, and amplification that systematically organise perceptual environments in asymmetric ways.

The initial point of departure is the conceptualisation of attention as a purchasable infrastructure, or, alternatively, paid distribution. The figure under discussion foregrounds a communicative strategy that addresses international publics not primarily through diplomatic channels or editorial media work, but through paid media. The generation of visibility is predicated on the logics inherent to platform economies, with attention being allocated through the mechanisms of advertising auctions, algorithmic delivery, and audience segmentation. This affords state actors – analogous to commercial advertisers – access to the same scaling mechanisms through which reach is distributed as a scarce resource and public salience is produced.

The second point to consider is the transition of propaganda into the realm of framing and legitimation, which is characterised by issue campaigning. It is widely acknowledged that, on the basis of purchased visibility, a second stage typically follows: the consolidation of interpretive schemes through narrative means. The term 'propaganda' is not treated here as synonymous with 'crude falsehood', but rather as strategic meaning-making oriented towards political objectives. Such objectives may include delegitimization, mobilization, or the stabilisation of interpretive authority. These objectives are achieved through consistent framing, repetition, and affectively resonant cues. Paid distribution functions as a lever in this stage insofar as it increases the probability that particular frames will dominate over competing interpretations.

Thirdly, the term 'manipulation' is employed to denote covert coordination, inauthenticity, and technical scaling. The third stage is characterised by the deliberate manipulation of environmental perceptions and social signals by actors, through methods such as coordinated behaviour, inauthentic accounts, manufactured controversy, or automated amplification. Consequently, the analytical focus shifts from the communication of content to the manipulation of visibility, relevance signals, and trust heuristics. Empirically, this dimension is often most clearly observable through takedowns, investigations, or threat reports. That is to say, it is observable at the point at which covert activity is documented as coordinated, system-level behaviour.

When considered as a whole, the model delineates a mechanism in which distributional power initially focuses attention, thereby establishing a stabilising frame of interpretation. This, in turn, can lead to an amplification of interpretive horizons, resulting in an increased perceived plausibility and social acceptability of a favoured narrative. The framework does not, in itself, entail a normative judgement; it is intended for analytical reconstruction of mechanisms rather than for blanket attributions of intent.

The above discussion yielded a "systematic approach" that can be outlined as follows:

The Attention–Propaganda–Manipulation–Model (APMM) is introduced here as a heuristic framework for the reconstructive analysis of strategic communication in platform-mediated publics. Rather than conceptualising communicative power as being primarily determined by the truth-value of isolated statements, the model places emphasis on the socio-technical conditions under which visibility, plausibility, and social evidence are produced. Analytically, APM distinguishes three functionally interlinked stages[14] through which communicative influence may be generated and stabilised.

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[14] Distribution, interpretation, and amplification.

Firstly, attention is conceptualised as a scarce resource that is allocated through platform distribution mechanisms, including advertising markets, algorithmic delivery, and targeting. Empirically, this stage is examined by mapping how reach is generated (organic, paid, or hybrid), which platforms and intermediaries structure visibility, which audiences are addressed through segmentation, and which resources are mobilised (e.g., budgetary spend, data infrastructures, or campaign logistics). The central claim being put forward at this stage is that visibility in platform environments can be deliberately produced and scaled, thereby shaping public salience before substantive contestation over meaning takes place.

Secondly, propaganda is conceptualised as strategic meaning-making enacted through framing and legitimation work. In this context, propaganda is not equated with obvious falsehood; rather, it is understood as the systematic organisation of interpretive frameworks through recurrent frames, moral dichotomies, and causal narratives. Empirical analysis at this stage therefore focuses on identifying dominant frames (for example, security, humanitarianism, betrayal, or moral urgency), tracing how actors and institutions are legitimised or delegitimised through attributed characteristics, and assessing how uncertainty is managed—whether through differentiation and evidential nuance or through simplification and context reduction. From an APM perspective, the procurement of visibility in the attention stage functions as a lever that serves to augment the probability of particular frames attaining dominance relative to competing interpretations.

Thirdly, manipulation is defined as the distortion of social signals, visibility, and credibility heuristics through technical or organisational means. The initial two stages pertain to the production and circulation of messages and frames, while the manipulation stage focuses on the engineering of the surrounding informational environment in which those messages are evaluated. Empirically, this encompasses indicators of covert coordination, such as temporal synchronisation, network clustering, and repeated textual templates. In addition, it includes inauthentic identity performance, including sockpuppets, cloned outlets, and pseudo-news infrastructures.

Finally, it is characterised by technically scaled amplification, which encompasses automation and, where relevant, AI-enabled content production. This stage is often most directly observable through platform enforcement actions, investigative reporting, or threat assessments documenting coordinated system-level behaviour.

Taken together, the APMM model implies a system-level approach to communicative influence: manipulation is not best understood as a property of individual statements, but as a property of the distribution and amplification architecture within which statements acquire salience and apparent credibility. Accordingly, the application of the model proceeds by:

(i) delimiting the case and relevant time window;

(ii) mapping distributional pathways and resource inputs;

(iii) reconstructing dominant frames and legitimation patterns; and

(iv) assessing whether amplification dynamics indicate coordination, inauthentic signalling, or technical scaling.

This procedure enables transparent differentiation between direct evidence, plausible indicators, and unresolved hypotheses, thereby supporting methodologically explicit analysis of how attention, framing, and amplification jointly structure political perception and decision-making in platform environments.

The preceding discourse thus gives rise to the following pre-conclusion.

In order to provide a credible, mechanism-oriented account of influence and information manipulation, it is necessary to cease the propagation of the reassuring fiction that such practices are the exclusive domain of "others" while "we" merely defend truth. Across regime types, the empirical record shows recurring configurations of the same underlying chain: namely, attention allocation via platform distribution, propaganda as framing and legitimation work, and, in some cases, manipulative amplification through inauthentic or covert infrastructures. Variation is primarily observed in transparency, oversight, legal constraints, and accountability, rather than in the basic availability of the instruments themselves.

United States. Documentary evidence from Reuters reveals a clandestine Pentagon initiative that utilised fictitious social media accounts to disseminate information during the period of the ongoing global pandemic, illustrating a clear instance of the third stage of the chain, in which an inauthentic identity infrastructure is employed to shape perceived social evidence.[15]

Germany. The Bundeswehr has publicly stated that the Zentrum Operative Kommunikation is responsible for the production of media outputs and the targeting of specific groups, "for example via the internet". This provides primary-source evidence of institutionalised strategic communication capacity corresponding chiefly to the chain's first and second stages, namely distribution and framing.[16]

France. According to a report by Reuters, Meta/Facebook has taken enforcement action against coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The report describes influence activity originating in France that relied on fake accounts posing as locals and coordinated posting. This activity maps directly onto the chain's third stage, i.e. manipulative amplification through inauthentic networks.[17]

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[15] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covid-propaganda/?

[16] https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/cyber-und-informationsraum/kommando-und-organisation-cir/kommando-cyber-und-informationsraum/zentrum-operative-kommunikation-der-bundeswehr

[17] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/french-russian-trolls-wrestle-influence-africa-facebook-says-2020-12-15/?

Canada. The Canadian Army has established an Influence Activities Task Force, which provides explicit documentation of an institutional influence capability that primarily aligns with stages one and two. A publication by Defence Research and Development Canada also demonstrates formal research engagement with social-media influence techniques as an operational problem.[18]

Japan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Bluebook presents "Strategic Communications" as an organised practice involving the dissemination and rebuttal of information, providing a stage-one/two illustration of the institutional management of attention and framing, rather than a documented covert network.[19]

India. According to Reuters, Facebook removed networks of fake accounts linked to a digital marketing firm in India (and another in Egypt). This action illustrates manipulation via inauthentic network infrastructures. Furthermore, Reuters reports India's tightening of platform takedown timelines. This governance intervention conditions stage-one distribution dynamics by altering the time window in which content can accumulate visibility.[20]

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[18] https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/rddc-drdc/D68-3-177-2018-eng.pdf and
https://www.canada.ca/en/army/corporate/5-canadian-division/influence-activities-task-force.html
[19] https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2024/en_html/chapter3/c030401.html
[20] https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/facebook-removes-two-middle-east-focused-fake-account-networks-idUSKBN20P2XG/? and https://www.reuters.com/world/india-gives-social-media-companies-three-hours-take-down-unlawful-content-2026-02-10/?

Iran. In their special report, Reuters describe an infrastructure distributed across numerous ostensibly independent websites. This is an example of how distribution and framing can be routed through media façades and networked dissemination, rather than through isolated statements.[21]

China. Google's Threat Analysis Group has reported that over 10,000 instances of the "DRAGONBRIDGE" operation were disrupted in Q1 2024 across YouTube and Blogger. This provides a prototypical account of high-volume, persistent, technically mediated amplification dynamics that correspond to the chain's third stage, where scaling and coordination become system properties.[22]

The Russian Federation. According to Reuters, the U.S. Justice Department has thwarted a Russian government-sponsored influence operation that utilised approximately 1,000 AI-augmented fake accounts, exemplifying a third-stage case that typifies the connection between inauthentic identity, automation, and coordinated amplification.[23]

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[21] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FE/?

[22] https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/google-disrupted-dragonbridge-activity-q1-2024/?

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justice-dept-says-it-disrupted-russian-social-media-influence-operation-2024-07-09/?

Three fundamental and definitive conclusions can be derived from these illustrations.

1. When considered in their totality, the national case studies support a methodological conclusion that is independent of any actor's formal regime type, whether labelled democracy, autocracy, monarchy, or otherwise. From the standpoint of mechanism-based analysis, the question of whether states should be classified as "good" or "bad" in an abstract moral sense is both analytically immaterial and empirically misleading.

2. The narrative that is presented is one of comfort, yet it is one that obscures the operational regularities that can be observed across cases.

3. Consequently, the analysis focuses on how, within specific institutional and technological constraints, processes of distribution, framing, and amplification are assembled into influence architectures. The subsequent analysis examines how the resulting costs and benefits are differentially allocated between affected population groups and decision-making elites, with particular attention to the concentration of material resources and political leverage within select collectives, enabled by asymmetric capacities to control attention, define interpretive horizons, and engineer credibility signals.

Appendix B: THE MANIPULATION OF THE IRANIAN POPULATION IN 1953 ON THE BASIS OF CIA PRIMARY DOCUMENTATION

(Sources: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/)

June 18, 2000

Editor's Note:

The C.I.A.'s history of the 1953 coup in Iran is
made up of the following documents: a historian's
note, a summary introduction, a lengthy narrative
account written by Dr. Donald N. Wilber, and, as
appendices, five planning documents he attached.
On April 16, 2000, The New York Times on the Web
published the introduction and several of the
appendices.

The Times has now decided to publish the main body
of the text after removing certain names and
identifying descriptions. The editing was done after
consultations with historians who believed
there might be serious risk that the families of
some of those named as foreign agents would face
retribution in Iran.

The introductory summary and the main body
of the document are inconsistent on a few dates
and facts. In its reporting on the document, the
Times has relied upon details presented in the
main body of the text.

The table of contents provides navigation throughout
the document. Each entry is linked to the relevant
section of this file. The table of contents page
appears at the end of each chapter and appendix.

SUMMARY

By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the
Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching
an oil settlement with interested Western countries;
was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal,
deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian consti-
tution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq's tenure
of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq's desire for
personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies
based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian
Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely
with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In view of
these factors, it was estimated that Iran was in real
danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that hap-
pened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the
Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle
East. No remedial action other than the covert action
plan set forth below could be found to improve the exist-
ing state of affairs.

It was the aim of the TPAJAX project to cause the
fall of the Mossadeq government; to reestablish the pres-
tige and power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadeq
government with one which would govern Iran according to

constructive policies. Specifically, the aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.

Once it had been determined definitely that it was not in American interests for the Mossadeq government to remain in power and CIA had been so informed by the Secretary of State in March 1953, CIA began drafting a plan whereby the aims stated above could be realized through covert action. An estimate entitled "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed on 16 April 1953. It was here determined that an overthrow of Mossadeq was possible through covert operations. In April it was determined that CIA should conduct the envisioned operation jointly with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). By the end of April, it was decided that CIA and SIS officers would draw up a plan on Cyprus which would be submitted to CIA and SIS Headquarters, and to the Department of State and the Foreign Office for final approval. On 3 June 1953, US Ambassador Loy Wesley Henderson arrived in the United States where he was fully consulted with regard to the objective and aims, as stated above, as well as CIA's intentions to design covert means of achieving

the objective and aims.

The plan was completed by 10 June 1953 at which time Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, CIA (who carried with him the views of the Department of State, CIA, and Ambassador Henderson); Mr. Roger Goiran, CIA Chief of Station, Iran; and two CIA planning officers met in Beirut to consider the plan. With minor changes the operational proposal was submitted to the SIS in London on 14 June 1953.

On 19 June 1953, the final operational plan, agreed upon by Mr. Roosevelt for CIA and by British Intelligence in London, was submitted in Washington to the Department of State; to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA; and to Ambassador Henderson for approval. Simultaneously, it was submitted to the British Foreign Office by SIS for approval. The Department of State wanted to be assured of two things before it would grant approval of the plan:

1. that the United States Government could provide adequate grant aid to a successor Iranian Government so that such a government could be sustained until an oil settlement was reached;

2. that the British Government would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department

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of State, its intention to reach an early
oil settlement with a successor Iranian
Government in a spirit of good will and
equity.

The Department of State satisfied itself on both of these
scores.

In mid-July 1953, the Department of State and the
British Foreign Office granted authorization for the im-
plementation of the TPAJAX project, and the Director of
CIA obtained the approval of the President of the United
States. The SIS, with the concurrence of the CIA Direc-
tor and Ambassador Henderson, proposed that Mr. Roosevelt
assume field command in Tehran of the final phases of the
operation. It was determined by the Department of State
that it would be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to
postpone his return to Iran, from Washington consultation,
until the operation had been concluded. Arrangements were
made jointly with SIS whereby operational liaison would be
conducted on Cyprus where a CIA officer would be temporarily
stationed, and support liaison would be conducted in Wash-
ington. Rapid three-way communications were arranged through
CIA facilities between Tehran, Cyprus, and Washington. The
time set for the operation was mid-August.

In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct

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an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through the press, handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken the Mossadeq government in any way possible. In the United States, high-ranking US officials were to make official statements which would shatter any hopes held by Premier Mossadeq that American economic aid would be forthcoming, and disabuse the Iranian public of the Mossadeq myth that the United States supported his regime.

General Fazlollah Zahedi, former member of Mossadeq's cabinet, was chosen as the most suitable successor to the Premier since he stood out as the only person of stature who had consistently been openly in opposition to Mossadeq and who claimed any significant following. Zahedi was to be approached by CIA and be told of our operation and its aim of installing him as the new prime minister. He was to name a military secretariat with which CIA would conclude a detailed staff plan of action.

From the outset, the cooperation of the Shah was considered to be an essential part of the plan. His cooperation was necessary to assure the action required of the Tehran military garrisons, and to legalize the succession of a new prime minister. Since the Shah had shown himself to be a man of indecision, it was determined that pressure

on him to cooperate would take the following forms:

1. The Shah's dynamic and forceful twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, was to come from Europe to urge the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq. She would say she had been in contact with US and UK officials who had requested her to do so.

2. Arrangements were made for a visit to Iran by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the US Gendarme Mission, whom the Shah liked and respected. Schwarzkopf was to explain the proposed project and get from the Shah signed firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq, appointing Zahedi, and calling on the Army to remain loyal to the Crown.

3. The principal indigenous British agent, whose bona fides had been established with the Shah, was to reinforce Schwarzkopf's message and assure the Shah that this was a joint US-UK action.

4. Failing results from the above, Mr. Roosevelt, representing the President of the United States, would urge the Shah to sign the above-mentioned firmans. When received, the firmans would be released by CIA to Zahedi on the day called for

in the plan. On D-Day, the Shah was to be at
some location outside of Tehran so that Zahedi,
armed with the royal <u>firmans</u> and with military
support, could take over the government without
danger of the Shah's reversing his stand, and
to avoid any attempt on the Shah's life.
Through agents in the Tehran military, CIA was to ensure,
to the degree possible, Tehran Army cooperation in support
of the Shah-appointed new prime minister.

The following public statements made in the United
States had tremendous impact on Iran and Mossadeq, and
contributed greatly to Mossadeq's downfall:

1. The publication, on 9 July 1953, of President
Eisenhower's 29 June 1953 letter to Premier Mossadeq
made it clear that increased aid would not be forth-
coming to Iran.

2. The Secretary of State's press conference of
28 July 1953 stated that ".... The growing activities
of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toler-
ation of them by the Iranian Government has caused
our government concern. These developments make
it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."

3. The President's Seattle speech at the Governors'
convention, in which he stated that the United States

would not sit by and see Asian countries

fall behind the Iron Curtain, had definite

effect.

In cooperation with the Department of State, CIA had

several articles planted in major American newspapers and

magazines which, when reproduced in Iran, had the desired

psychological effect in Iran and contributed to the war

of nerves against Mossadeq.

After considerable pressure from Princess Ashraf and

General Schwarzkopf, and after several meetings with Mr.

Roosevelt, the Shah finally signed the required firmans

on 15 August 1953. Action was set for 16 August. However,

owing to a security leak in the Iranian military, the chief

of the Shah's bodyguard, assigned to seize Mossadeq with

the help of two truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers, was over-

whelmed by superior armed forces still loyal to Mossadeq.

The balance of the military plan was thus frustrated for

that day. Upon hearing that the plan had misfired, the

Shah flew to Baghdad. This was an act of prudence and had

been at least partially foreseen in the plan. Zahedi re-

mained in hiding in CIA custody. With his key officers,

he eluded Mossadeq's security forces which were seeking

to apprehend the major opposition elements.

Early in the afternoon of 17 August 1953, Ambassador

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Henderson returned to Tehran. General Zahedi, through a CIA-arranged secret press conference and through CIA covert printing facilities, announced to Iran that he was legally prime minister and that Mossadeq had staged an illegal coup against him. CIA agent assets disseminated a large quantity of photographs of the _firmans_, appointing Zahedi prime minister and dismissing Mossadeq. This had tremendous impact on the people of Tehran who had already been shocked and angered when they realized that the Shah had been forced to leave Iran because of Mossadeq's actions. US Ambassador Burton Y. Berry, in Baghdad, contacted the Shah and stated that he had confidence that the Shah would return soon to Iran despite the apparent adverse situation at that time. Contact was also established with the Shah in Rome after he had flown there from Baghdad. Mr. Roosevelt and the station consistently reported that Mossadeq's apparent victory was misleading; that there were very concrete signs that the Army was still loyal to the Shah; and that a favorable reversal of the situation was possible. The station further urged both the British Foreign Office and the Department of State to make a maximum effort to persuade the Shah to make public statements encouraging the Army and populace to reject Mossadeq and to accept Zahedi as prime minister.

On 19 August 1953, a pro-Shah demonstration, originating in the bazaar area, took on overwhelming proportions. The demonstration appeared to start partially spontaneously, revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah and the public alarm at the undisguised republican move being started by the Communists as well as by certain National Frontists. Station political action assets also contributed to the beginnings of the pro-Shah demonstrations. The Army very soon joined the pro-Shah movement and by noon of that day it was clear that Tehran, as well as certain provincial areas, were controlled by pro-Shah street groups and Army units. The situation was such that the above-mentioned military plan could then be implemented. At the station's signal, Zahedi came out of hiding to lead the movement. He first broadcast over Radio Tehran and announced that the government was his. The General Staff offices were then seized, Mossadeq's home was gutted, and pro-Mossadeq politicians and officers arrested. By the end of 19 August, the country was in the hands of the new Premier, Zahedi, and members of the Mossadeq government were either in hiding or were incarcerated.

The Shah returned shortly to Iran where he was given a rousing popular reception. The Shah was deeply moved by the fact that his people and Army had revolted in the

face of adversity against a vindictive Mossadeq and a Communist Party riding the crest of temporary victory and clearly planning to declare Iran a republic. The Shah felt for the first time that he had the mandate of his people, and he returned determined to regain firm control of the Army.

In order to give Zahedi badly needed immediate financial assistance so that month-end payrolls could be met before the United States could provide large scale grant aid, CIA covertly made available $5,000,000 within two days of Zahedi's assumption of power.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

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I. PRELIMINARY STEPS

Representatives of British Intelligence met with Near East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washington during November and December 1952 for the purpose of discussing joint war and staybehind plans in Iran. In attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British Intelligence station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruce Lockhart, SIS Washington representative. In attendance for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch; Mr. John W. Pendleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff.

Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought up the proposition of a joint political action to remove Prime Minister Mossadeq. The NEA Division had not intended to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so. The meeting concluded without any decision being made and with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in more detail the political action proposals advanced by British Intelligence.

In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran
Station which stated that General ███████████████ had
contacted the assistant military attache and had requested
Ambassador Henderson's views as to whether or not the US
Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian
military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq. A meeting was
held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then
in the field, and station personnel were in attendance.
A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and
its substance delivered to General ██████████. The reply
did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly
encouraging and revealed some US interest in the idea.

On the basis of the ███████████ overture and other
clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was tak-
ing shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reck-
less attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq,
General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State,
determined that the US Government could no longer approve
of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor
government in which there would be no National Frontists.
The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA
Division was informed that it was authorized to consider
operations which would contribute to the fall of the
Mossadeq government. The Department of State and CIA

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jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the operational authorization. The Director, on 4 April 1953, approved a budget of $1,000,000 which could be used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Full authority was given to Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or all of the $1,000,000 to be used without further authority, as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred.

On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled: "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed. The Study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq, particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizeable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.

Subsequent contact was made with General ███████. Although his motives appeared serious, it soon became apparent that he had no concrete plan and was in fact in no position to take action against Mossadeq.

General Zahedi, who at one time was a member of Mossadeq's cabinet, stood out as the only major personality in undisguised opposition to Mossadeq. For this reason

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he attracted to himself a considerable following. The Tehran Station, in April 1953, reestablished covert contact with Zahedi through Commander Eric Pollard, the US Naval Attache. In order to make the covert liaison with Zahedi more effective and reliable, and also for security reasons, Zahedi's son, Ardeshir Zahedi, was selected as the means of contact with General Zahedi in June 1953. After 21 July 1953, contact with General Zahedi was made directly.

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II. DRAFTING THE PLAN

Near the end of April 1953 Dr. Donald N. Wilber, cov-
ert consultant to NEA, was selected by the Division to go
to Nicosia and, in close collaboration with SIS, draw up
a plan for the overthrow of Mossadeq. The assumption by
Headquarters was that the planners would come up with a
project which they could conscientiously recommend.

The discussions were begun at Nicosia on 13 May 1953
between Wilber and SIS Officer Norman Matthew Darbyshire.
Occasionally Mr. H. John Collins, Chief of SIS station at
Nicosia, was also present. Mr. Darbyshire, who was in
charge of SIS's Iran branch, had been in Iran for several
years and was fluent in the language. Discussions were
concluded on 30 May 1953, and the completed draft of a
recommended operational plan was cabled by Dr. Wilber to
Headquarters on 1 June.

The opening meetings consisted of a review of all
the important personalities on the political scene in
Iran with a view toward determining whether General Zahedi,
the most prominent politician in opposition to Mossadeq,
was in fact the sole figure worthy of support and, if so,
what individuals and elements should be enlisted in his
support. It soon became apparent that Dr. Wilber and

Mr. Darbyshire held quite similar views of Iranian personalities and had made very similar estimates of the factors involved in the Iranian political scene. There was no friction or marked difference of opinion during the discussions. It also quickly became apparent that the SIS was perfectly content to follow whatever lead was taken by the Agency. It seemed obvious to Wilber that the British were very pleased at having obtained the active cooperation of the Agency and were determined to do nothing which might jeopardize US participation. At the same time there was a faint note of envy expressed over the fact that the Agency was better equipped in the way of funds, personnel, and facilities than was SIS.

Wilber reported the preliminary conversations concerning a three-way channel, set up for this occasion, which was designed to insure immediate relay between Washington, Nicosia, and Tehran. That is, a message originating at any one of these places would be sent by the most expeditious route to the other two. This route was the Middle East Communications Authority (MECA) link, the relay station a few miles outside of Nicosia.*

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*Unfortunately, communications between Nicosia and Tehran were not as rapid as was hoped during this period in which more than 45 cables were exchanged.

Discussions at Nicosia moved on to a disclosure of assets by both parties. Those by SIS were centered upon the contacts of the Rashidian brothers in such fields as the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other influential figures. When this material was relayed from Nicosia, the Tehran Station commented that it was their belief that these assets had been far overstated and oversold. In reply it was pointed out that SIS was as aware as we of the weaknesses of the Rashidians, but that one of the strongest points in their favor was their avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their lives in an attempt against Mossadeq. In the critical days of August 1953 the Rashidians did display such a willingness. SIS disclosures were followed by those of Dr. Wilber for CIA. Prior to Wilber's departure a discussion was held at Headquarters to determine which of the station assets should be disclosed to the SIS in return for promised disclosures by the SIS of the assets which they were prepared to put into an operational plan. It was agreed at Headquarters that the identities of the vitally important principal agents of the Tehran Station, █████████ ██ █████████ would not be disclosed. Since the SIS had been

informed during the November 1952 meetings referred to above that CIA had two major principal agents in Iran, it was necessary to offer two such in place of ███████████ ██████. This was done, naming a station agent* and a sub-agent**of ████████████████ to these important posts. To the best of our knowledge ███████████████ were not uncovered by the Rashidian brothers or any other SIS agents during the course of this operation.

The continuing conversations at Nicosia were reflected by outgoing cables requesting, principally from the Tehran Station, information which would be helpful in drafting the operational plan.

Discussions now narrowed down to a series of basic assumptions which were stressed both in the draft plan and in its final form. It was determined that the details of the operational plan should be included within a framework of such basic assumptions as these: that Zahedi alone of potential candidates had the vigor and courage to make him worthy of support; that the Shah must be brought into the operation; that the Shah would act only with great reluctance but that he could be forced to do so; that if the

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issue was clear-cut the armed forces would follow the
Shah rather than Mossadeq; that the operation must, if
possible, be made to appear legal or quasi-legal instead
of an outright coup; that public opinion must be fanned
to fever pitch against Mossadeq in the period just preceding
the execution of the overthrow operation; that the military
aspect would be successful only if the station were able
to review the plan with the Iranians chosen by Zahedi to
execute it; that immediate precautions must be taken by
the new government to meet a strong reaction by the Tudeh
Party. Some of these assumptions were presented in cables
sent off before the draft plan was completed. The reactions
from the Tehran Station and Headquarters did not always
express agreement with the ideas of the planners. The
station expressed its feeling that the Shah would not act
decisively against Mossadeq, while Headquarters wondered
whether we should not support some other individual and
whether the Persians themselves might not take the lead in
action designed to overthrow Mossadeq. It was, however,
agreed that the station should begin at once with its new
policy of attacking the government of Mossadeq through grey
propaganda. The station relayed this line to its own agents
and passed it on to the Rashidian brothers of SIS. The CIA
Art Group, a section of the PP Staff Advisory Panel, was

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asked to prepare a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons.

The meetings were interrupted for several days when one of the Rashidian brothers managed to get permission to leave Iran*--not at all an easy matter during the Mossadeq period--and went to Geneva where he was met by SIS officer Norman Darbyshire. He not only briefed Darbyshire on the current situation but was able to give comprehensive answers to a number of specific questions. It should be noted that the SIS station at Nicosia had been in tri-weekly wireless contact with the Rashidian brothers at Tehran, employing the best of the British trained staybehind operators. This contact, in Persian, was naturally limited in time, and even more limited after we passed word to Darbyshire on his return from Geneva that the Iranian armed forces were now in possession of directional finders supplied under MAAG.

Mr. George A. Carroll (FI Deputy Tehran, Designate) arrived at Nicosia on 29 May, in time to pass along reactions

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*It is interesting to note that Rashidian obtained his exit visa to leave Iran and his reentry permit from no less a supporter of Mossadeq than Foreign Minister Hoseyn Fatemi. This lends some evidence to long held CIA views that Fatemi was from time to time susceptible to British overtures and was trying to keep a hand in with the opposition and British in the event Mossadeq fell. He was certainly aware of Rashidian's agent status with the British.

and suggestions from Headquarters, prior to the completion of the draft plan. As stated, this draft was cabled to Head-quarters on 1 June 1953. (See Appendix A for a typed transcript of the cable.)

While Nicosia proved to be a handy point of contact with the British and a fairly good communications intersection point, it did have certain disadvantages. It was remote from the headquarters of either agency and, even worse, the SIS station files were extremely inadequate so that any in-formation on personalities, especially members of the Iranian armed forces, had to be obtained by querying the Tehran Station and Headquarters.

Once the draft plan had been cabled, it was agreed with SIS that their copy would be hand-carried to London where the viewpoint of the SIS headquarters would be incorporated prior to 15 June. In the meantime, as had been agreed with Headquarters, the Agency would conduct a searching scrutiny of the plan at Beirut, and then bring these results to Lon-don for amalgamation with the draft as reworked by SIS at London. Carroll remained a few days after the completion of the draft to begin work on the military aspect of the plan. He also returned to Nicosia for a few additional days after the close of the Beirut meetings for this purpose. It must be noted that Miss Helen E. Morgan, CIA representative at Nicosia, gave strong support to the CIA personnel who worked at Nicosia.

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III. CONSOLIDATING THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

On the afternoon of 9 June all those who were to take part in the discussions arrived at Beirut: Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief NEA and project chief throughout the operation, came in by plane from London; Carroll came from Cyprus by plane; Roger Goiran, Chief of Station at Tehran, drove on from Damascus by car; and Wilber came in from Cairo by air.

On the morning of 10 June the talks got underway and continued for four days. The usual schedule was to start quite early, carry through until about two o'clock, and then assemble again in the late afternoon. The first order of business was a reexamination of all the factors and elements of the political scene in Iran in the light of the current and comprehensive information supplied by the Tehran chief of station. After all the basic principles of the draft plan had been accepted, the attention of the conferees turned to a section by section consideration of the plan. The object of the meetings was to determine how each section could be given the maximum structure and impact. One switch in general outlook was made that was most salutary for all later thinking. The draft plan had implied that definite counteraction would have to be taken against some of the strongest elements supporting Mossadeq, such as

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the Qashqai tribal leaders; but it was now decided that every effort should be devoted to increasing the size and effectiveness of the anti-Mossadeq forces, the assumption being that Mossadeq's supporting elements would not react once their leader was out of the picture.

The Tehran chief of station suggested that an alternative plan to provide for the overthrow of Mossadeq be developed. This was to become the Amini/Qashqai plan which the station kept alive as a possible alternative until the successful conclusion of TPAJAX.

Saturday afternoon the group held its final meeting and on the next morning, 14 June, departed by plane for its several destinations.

Roosevelt and Wilber arrived in London on 15 June and reported to the main offices of the SIS at 54 Broadway. They turned over the Beirut revision of the plan. No copy of the original Beirut draft exists, since it was reworked to form the final "London" draft.

The London meetings were held in one of the conference rooms at 54 Broadway, notable only for a large sign with the legend in red, "Curb Your Guests." For the SIS, Commander Maurice M. Firth and Norman Darbyshire, who had come on from Nicosia by way of Geneva (where he had seen Asadollah Rashidian a second time before the latter went

back to Iran) were always present. Upon occasion Major
P.(Paddy) J. Keen, whose post seemed to be that of desk
officer for several Middle East countries, also participated.
Montague Woodhouse, clearly one of their most highly esteemed
officers, attended a single meeting but had little to con-
tribute.

From the moment the discussion began, it was clear that
the SIS had no major comments of their own on the draft plan.
Nor did they have much to say on the Beirut version beyond a
certain close attention to phraseology. As at Nicosia it was
apparent that the Americans were to be placated and allowed
to run things as they pleased. They did, however, seem to
have abundant confidence in the plan and in the successful
outcome of the operation, and said that the Rashidians would
be ordered to follow completely the orders of CIA's Tehran
Station.

At the final meeting those present reviewed the future
conduct of affairs. The SIS officers stated that they
thought it would take some time to obtain a firm decision
from their government as to the approval or non-approval
of the plan.

Roosevelt and Wilber left London on 17 June, and
Roosevelt was back in his office by noon of the 18th.

There the plan was immediately reconstructed and typed
up. (It is given as Appendix B and it should be read
at this point in the chronological account of the
operation.)

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IV. THE DECISIONS ARE MADE: ACTIVITY BEGINS

Since the meetings at Beirut and London had taken such a relatively short time, there was not too much that Headquarters could do in the interval from the time of Roosevelt's departure until his return. Progress had, however, been made in setting up a specific and close liaison with the State Department. The fact that an operational plan was being prepared was already known to a very restricted number of individuals in the State Department,* and it should be noted that the security there seems to have been excellent up to the time of the event.

The Greece-Turkey-Iran (GTI) office of the Department of State presented its informed opinion in two papers: one was a top secret paper of 6 June 1953 entitled, "Proposal to Bring about a Change of Government in Iran" and the other a top secret undated GTI memorandum on the subject, "Measures which the United States Government might take in support of a successor government to Mossadeq."

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* Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith
Deputy Under Secretary of State, Harrison Freeman Matthews
Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. Henry A. Byroade
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State/NEA, Mr. John Durnford
  Jernegan
Liaison, Mr. James Lampton Berry

It was not the task of officers of the State Department
to obtain high level decisions on the plan. However, the
State Department did assert that, prior to acceptance of
the plan, assurance must be forthcoming from the British
that they would be flexible in their approach to the govern-
ment that succeeded Mossadeq as far as the oil question was
concerned.

Mr. Leslie Herbert Mitchell, UK Embassy officer (SIS
representative) charged with liaison with the Agency, con-
cerned himself with this point and did expedite the required
assurances from the British Government. These assurances
took the form of a foreign office memorandum presented by
British Ambassador to the United States, Roger Mellor Makins,
to Under Secretary of State Smith on 23 July 1953. (Copy
attached as Appendix C.) Also the Department of State wanted
to satisfy itself that an adequate amount of interim economic
aid would be forthcoming to the successor government before
it would finally approve decisive action.

During this same period discussions between Agency
officers and Ambassador Henderson (in Washington, having
arrived on consultation 3 June) began 8 June. (This is
recorded in a memorandum of conversation contained in
TPAJAX files.) The Ambassador appeared to backtrack some-
what from his earlier opinion that the premise of the plan

that the Shah would cooperate was fallacious, and that
the Shah would not issue a firman naming Zahedi unless
in response to a vote of inclination by the Majlis. The
Ambassador, who was always thoroughly cooperative, was
absorbed in a search for constructive suggestions and
willingly agreed to delay his return to Tehran by arrang-
ing a prolonged visit in Europe. From the standpoint of
the plan it was not considered advisable to have the
Ambassador in Tehran when the final operation was under-
taken. In addition, his continued absence was thought to
be an important factor in the war of nerves which was to
be conducted against Mossadeq.

The following approvals of the operational plan were
obtained on the dates indicated:

Director CIA	- 11 July 1953
Director SIS	- 1 July 1953
Foreign Secretary	- 1 July 1953
Secretary of State	- 11 July 1953
Prime Minister	- 1 July 1953
President	- 11 July 1953

Pending final approval or disapproval of the opera-
tional plan, the station was carrying forward activities
already authorized toward the achievement of the goal.
In addition to the general authorization of April enabling
the Tehran Station to spend up to $1,000,000 in covert
activity in support of Zahedi, the station on 20 May was

specifically authorized to spend one million rials a week (rate of 90 rials to the US dollar) in purchasing the cooperation of members of the Iranian Majlis.

On or about the end of June the station had established direct contact with the Rashidian brothers and was prepared to instruct them as to their role and those of their contacts in the development of the operation.

At Headquarters two groups were organized within the NE/4 Branch on 22 June in support of Tehran Station operational preparations. One group, headed by Carroll who had returned from Nicosia in mid-June, was to make an exhaustive study of the military aspects of the overthrow operation. (Carroll's final report on the military aspect of TPAJAX planning is attached as Appendix D.) The intent was to present Zahedi and his chosen military secretariat with a concrete plan for their modification or improvement. It was felt that every effort should be made to bring the rather long-winded and often illogical Persians into a position where each one knew exactly what specific action was required of him. The soundness of this feeling was demonstrated when the failure of the Persians to maintain security resulted in the initial breakdown. The other group, headed by Wilber, assumed responsibility for the psychological warfare phases of the plan. Overall direction

of these groups and of relations with the field station were in the hands of Mr. John Henry Waller, head of NE/4 Branch.

Carroll left for Tehran in mid-July. He stopped over at London to discuss his military plan with SIS officer Norman Darbyshire and finally reached Tehran on 21 July. Wilber's group sent guidance cables and dispatches to the station, all intended to flesh up the skeleton of psychological operations as presented in the plan itself. In the meantime a considerable number of anti-Mossadeq articles were written or outlined by the group while the CIA Art Group was given constant guidance in its preparation of a large number of anti-Mossadeq cartoons and broadsheets. In addition, these artists did an effective drawing for a wall poster showing Zahedi being presented to the Iranian people by the Shah. Written and illustrative material piled up rapidly, and on 19 July a special courier took it all to Tehran. On 22 July the station began to distribute the material to several agents. What happened to this material will be described in later pages.

By the time that the go-ahead had been received from all parties involved, the NEA Division had picked out qualified individuals for special assignments connected with the project: Mr. Roosevelt, Chief, NEA, was to be

field commander in Tehran; John H. Leavitt, NEA/CPP, was
to go to Nicosia to be in contact and liaison with the SIS
station and to maintain the three-way wireless contact estab-
lished earlier; while Lt. Colonel Stephen Johnson Meade drew
the job of representing the Agency in meetings in Paris with
Princess Ashraf, energetic twin sister of the Shah. Mr.
Joseph C. Goodwin, Chief of Station in Tehran, was to act
for purposes of TPAJAX as chief of staff to the field com-
mander, Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. George Carroll, Chief FI Tehran,
was given the military planning responsibility first in
Washington, then in Tehran. Dr. Donald Wilber was charged
throughout the operation with the propaganda aspects of the
plan and worked closely with the CIA Art Group in the prepa-
ration of propaganda material. Mr. John Waller, just having
returned from service as Chief FI, Tehran, was charged with
the Headquarters support responsibilities during TPAJAX and
maintained the required liaison with the Departments of
State and Defense. Although not present in Tehran for the
final implementation of TPAJAX, Mr. Roger Goiran, previous
Chief of Station Tehran, directed the early stages and
preliminaries of the operation in Tehran. It should be here
noted that Mr. Goiran, more than any other officer, was
responsible for having developed, over a five-year period,
station assets which proved valuable and necessary to the
operation.

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V. MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHAH

From the very beginning it had been recognized that
the Shah must be forced to play a specific role, however
reluctant he might prove to be. Therefore, the plan pre-
sented a series of measures designed to rid him once and
for all of his pathological fear of the "hidden hand" of
the British, and to assure him that the United States and
the United Kingdom would firmly support him and had both
resolved that Mossadeq must go. The measures were also
intended to produce such pressure on the Shah that it would
be easier for him to sign the papers required of him than
it would be to refuse.

On 23 June the timetable covering all the envoys to
be sent to the Shah was drawn up at Headquarters. In
execution all these steps went off as planned.

The initial task was to brief Princess Ashraf, who was
thought to be in Paris at that time. It was planned to
approach her about 10 July in Paris and have her back in
Tehran to see the Shah about 20 July. Asadollah Rashidian,
still in Geneva, was to call upon her first and prepare her
for the joint visit of Darbyshire for SIS and Meade for CIA.
(SIS had assured Headquarters that this call could be made
in Paris at any time.) Meade arrived in London by air on

10 July and went at once to Paris with Darbyshire. Then
an unanticipated delay occurred. Princess Ashraf was not
in Paris, and it was not until the 15th that she was lo-
cated on the Riviera and visited by Asadollah Rashidian.
He reported that she had shown no enthusiasm at all with
regard to her proposed role. However, the next day the
"official" representatives had two meetings with her and
she agreed to do everything that was asked of her. She
did say that her arrival would arouse a strong reaction
from the pro-Mossadeq press and hoped that we would be
able to put out effective counterblasts. Meade reported
in London to Roosevelt and Leavitt. He then returned to
Paris and stayed close to Ashraf until her departure for
Iran.*

Ashraf reached Tehran as a passenger on a commercial
flight on 25 July. As expected, her unauthorized return
did create a real storm. Neither the Shah, himself, nor
the government of Mossadeq had been asked to permit her to
return. Both were furious. The Shah refused to see her
but did accept a letter passed on through the medium of
███████████████,** head of the Shah's household, who was

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* Meade's character study of Ashraf is in the TPAJAX file.
**SIS agent within the palace.

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loyal and devoted in an effective way throughout this
period. This letter contained news that US General
Schwarzkopf was coming to see the Shah on an errand simi-
lar to that of Ashraf, herself. The Shah welcomed this
news and received his sister on the evening of 29 July.
The session opened stormily but ended on a note of recon-
ciliation. On the next day she took a plane back to
Europe. This was as had been planned, but it came as a
relief to know that she was out of the country in view of
the pro-Mossadeq press reaction.

The second emissary arrived on the scene in the per-
son of Asadollah Rashidian, the principal SIS agent. Accord-
ing to the plan, Asadollah Rashidian's initial task with
the Shah was to convince the ruler that Rashidian was the
official spokesman of the UK Government. The advance plan,
that of having the Shah select a key phrase which would
then be broadcast on the British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
Persian language program on certain dates, was followed.
In London the necessary arrangements had been made by
Darbyshire to send the phrase over the BBC. On 30 July
and again on the 31st the Shah saw Asadollah Rashidian.
He had heard the broadcast, but he requested time to assess
the situation. Asadollah was, however, able to prepare the
Shah for the visit of the American emissary, General

Schwarzkopf, and to stress the point that this emissary would repeat the message and, hence, give an additional guarantee of the close collaboration between the United Kingdom and the United States in this undertaking.

Schwarzkopf had been chosen by the drafters of the operational plan because of the fact that he had enjoyed the friendship and respect of the Shah in the period from 1942 until 1948 when he headed the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie. Approached on 26 June 1953 by John Waller, Chief, NEA/4, briefed at Headquarters on 19 July, Schwarzkopf took to his mission with relish. He said that he had a reputation with the Shah for telling him unpleasant truths that others withheld from him, and he stated that he was sure he could get the required cooperation from the Shah. Schwarzkopf was given a cover mission consisting of a short tour to Lebanon, Pakistan, and Egypt so that his visit to Tehran would appear as a brief stop en route to a principal destination. Schwarzkopf left by air for Beirut on 21 July.

Schwarzkopf's mission was to obtain from the Shah the three papers which are described more fully in the operational plan. They were: (1) a _firman_ naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff, (2) a letter indicating his faith in Zahedi which the latter could employ to recruit army

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officers for the plan in the name of the Shah, and
(3) a _firman_ calling on all ranks of the army to support
his legal Chief of Staff. It was felt that it would be
easier to get the Shah to sign such statements than to
issue a _firman_ dismissing Mossadeq. It was also believed
that the action of replacing Mossadeq would be initiated
through the Majlis.

Certain events of 21 July at Tehran both shocked and
aroused from their attitude of complacency the more con-
servative elements which had firmly supported Mossadeq.
Demonstrations marked the anniversary of rioting against
the government of Qavam and of efforts made at that time,
two years earlier, to settle the oil issue. However, it
was obvious to all that the number of Tudeh participants
far outnumbered those assembled by the National Front, and
it was this fact more than anything else which alerted the
thinking public to the strength acquired by the Tudeh under
the Mossadeq government. At this time station personnel
were active on several fronts. The propaganda campaign
against Mossadeq was now gaining momentum.
owner of ███████████████████████████████████████ was
granted a personal loan of some $45,000 on signed notes
in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to
our purposes. Headquarters-prepared propaganda material

was turned over by the station to Asadollah Rashidian, and by the end of the month an entirely separate and specially planned campaign in favor of the Shah as opposed to Mossadeq was under way in Azerbaijan. The parallel and alternative plan of keeping in close touch with the ██████ ██████ combination for the purposes of diverting their attention from TPAJAX and of discovering the plans and strength of this group remained in effect. Talks with the ██████ continued. At one point the station suggested sending one of the brothers to this country, and Headquarters made an immediate investigation of the mechanics required for making such a trip. The SIS was informed of these talks, and they suggested that their facilities might be used to stir up tribal revolts in the homeland of the ██████.

The station was now in direct contact with Zahedi, who had left his sanctuary in the Majlis on 21 July. After several meetings Station Chief Goiran and Station Chief Designate Goodwin reported that Zahedi appeared lacking in drive, energy, and concrete plans. They concluded that he must be closely guided and that the necessary plans must be made for him.

By 26 July a number of key individuals had moved into position: Roosevelt and Schwarzkopf were at Tehran,

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Leavitt had been at Nicosia for several days, and
Ambassador Henderson had come to rest at Salzburg, where
he was to remain, anxious but cooperative, for the next
two weeks. At Nicosia, Leavitt did a most capable job of
reassuring SIS officials who frequently felt that they
were not receiving enough current information. Concomi-
tantly, these SIS officials passed on valuable suggestions
coming from London, such as detailed plans for putting the
central telephone exchange out of operation.

With Roosevelt's arrival in Tehran the situation was
restudied. As a part of the war of nerves against Mossadeq,
it was considered advisable to cut down close contacts be-
tween high-ranking US officials and officials of Mossadeq's
government. Technical Cooperation in Iran (TCI) Director
William E. Warne was requested to reduce his normal govern-
ment contacts, and General Frank McClure, Chief of the US
Military Mission in Iran, was requested to appear less
friendly with those general officers who were firmly support-
ing Mossadeq. At this stage it was decided to alter the
nature and number of documents which would have to be signed
by the Shah. These documents would be limited to one firman
naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff and one letter denouncing
the government-staged referendum on the question of the
dissolution of the Majlis as an illegal proceeding. As

the month of July ended, station personnel in charge of

the propaganda campaign reported on the effective anti-

Mossadeq activity of the formerly pro-Mossadeq politicians,

███████████████████████████. It was stated that

very effective use had been made of the 28 July statement

by Secretary of State Dulles* (made at CIA's suggestion).

A request was made that US papers reflect the Iranian

press campaign against Mossadeq and that inspired articles

be placed in the US press.

On 1 August, two days after Princess Ashraf had left

Iran and the Shah had heard the BBC message designed to

convince him that Asadollah Rashidian was the official

spokesman of the UK Government, Schwarzkopf had an ex-

tended meeting with the Shah. Fearful of planted micro-

phones, the Shah led the General into the grand ballroom,

pulled a small table to its exact center, and then both

sat on the table. The Shah rejected the proposal that he

sign the required documents at once, asserting that he was

not fully confident of the loyalty of the army; that he

must give advance approval for all members of a new cabinet;

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*This statement, made at a press conference, was as
follows: "The growing activities of the illegal Communist
Party in Iran and the toleration of them by the Iranian
Government has caused our government concern. These
developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran."

and that he must have time to make his own estimate as to the probable success or failure of the undertaking. On the other hand, he said that should Mossadeq carry through his referendum and dissolve the Majlis then he, himself, would have full powers under the constitution to dismiss Mossadeq and replace him by a prime minister of his own choice. This meeting was to be followed by a series of additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the Shah and some between Rashidian and the Shah, in which relentless pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision.

On 2 August Roger Goiran, for so long the experienced and valuable chief of station, left Tehran headed for Head-quarters duty. While his knowledge had been of inestimable value in the preparatory stages of TPAJAX, it was judged that his departure at just this time would be an important factor in the war of nerves against Mossadeq, and in the planned efforts to confuse and disturb the potential opposition. By this time the Counselor, Gordon Henry Mattison, and the ranking political officer, Mr. Roy Malcolm Melbourne, had been briefed on TPAJAX and were discreetly helpful. Mattison, in interviews with █████████████████ ███████████, followed station direction in a successful effort to divert the attention of the ███████████ group

from the real purpose of TPAJAX.

During this period Mossadeq, as always, had been on the alert to try to hold the initiative and keep his growing opposition off balance. His attention turned toward the Majlis, where opposition appeared to be hardening. On 14 July he directed the deputies supporting the government to resign. Several of the neutral or timidly anti-Mossadeq deputies followed suit until a total of 28 had resigned. Headquarters urged that the anti-Mossadeq deputies be given every encouragement to keep their posts and to take up bast (political sanctuary) in the Majlis. The theme to be built up was that those who had not resigned from the Majlis would constitute the legitimate parliamentary body. This stand was at least partially responsible for Mossadeq's growing belief that the body must be dissolved. Such action would leave him as the undisputed dictator of the country since his full-powers bill had several months more to run. However, he still had to get around the provision of the constitution that only the Shah had the authority to dissolve the Majlis. He did this by staging a national referendum in which the people were to state "yes" or "no" to the question as to whether the Majlis should be dissolved. The referendum was a clear and palpable fake. Held throughout the country beginning 4 August, some two million

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were said to have voted for dissolution and only a few hundred against. As a maneuver the action was not as satisfactory as Mossadeq anticipated since it clearly revealed abuse of the constitution. This provided an issue on which Mossadeq could be relentlessly attacked by the CIA/SIS subsidized opposition press. The action also did much to alarm the more stable and established elements of the populace, who were nationalists along with everyone else, but who did not favor such a fraudulent breach of the constitution.

During the days of the referendum the station reported in detail on the multiple efforts of station agents to exploit the illegality of this referendum, both before and during the event. Also every declaration made by a religious leader in these days stressed this point. The station indicated that some 20 local newspapers were now in violent opposition to Mossadeq and that some 15 Headquarters-prepared anti-Mossadeq cartoons had appeared in these papers during the referendum week. On 4 August word reached the station that Mossadeq was aware of the true purpose of the visit of Ashraf, and the personnel on the scene felt strongly that action must be mounted very soon. On 4 August Ambassador Henderson per schedule set out from Salzburg for Tehran. He was to be met on 9 August at Beirut by Leavitt,

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who persuaded him to put off his return in view of the
delayed but imminent date for action. In these same days,
Henderson, officials of the State Department, and officials
of the Foreign Office were drafting proposed statements
which their governments planned to issue upon the success-
ful conclusion of TPAJAX.

At Tehran the meetings with the Shah were continuing.
On 2 August Asadollah Rashidian had presented His Majesty
with specific details concerning the manner in which the
operation would be carried out, and reported that the Shah
had agreed to dismiss Mossadeq and to appoint Zahedi as
both Prime Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. The
Shah also agreed to name General Vosuq as Chief of Staff.
On 3 August, Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session
with the Shah. The latter stated that he was not an adven-
turer and, hence, could not take the chances of one.
Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which
the government could be changed and the test was now be-
tween Mossadeq and his force and the Shah and the army,
which was still with him, but which would soon slip away.
Roosevelt finally said that he would remain at hand a few
days longer in expectation of an affirmative decision and
then would leave the country; in the latter case the Shah
should realize that failure to act could lead only to a

Communist Iran or to a second Korea. He concluded by say-
ing that his government was not prepared to accept these
possibilities and that some other plan might be carried
through. In a later meeting with the Shah, the latter
requested Mr. Roosevelt to solicit from President Eisen-
hower assurances that it was advisable for the Shah to
take the initiative in removing Mossadeq. Mr. Roosevelt
stated that he would pass this request on to the President,
but he was very confident that the latter would adopt the
attitude that the Shah had already had US desires made
adequately clear to him. By complete coincidence and good
fortune, the President, while addressing the Governors'
Convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script
to state by implication that the United States would not
sit by idly and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Roosevelt used the President's statements to good effect,
by telling the Shah that Eisenhower did indeed feel further
assurances of US attitude toward Mossadeq were unnecessary
but that his reference to Iran in the Governors' Convention
speech was made to satisfy the Shah. In the end the Shah
said he would again discuss the question with Rashidian.
In the cable describing this meeting, Roosevelt stated his
belief that it was hopeless to attempt to proceed without
the Shah, and that it must be decided whether to exert

ultimate pressure for the next two or three days or to accept a delay of up to ten days in which the Shah might finally be won over. On 7 August Rashidian met again with the Shah who agreed that action should be taken on the night of either the 10th or 11th. On 8 August Roosevelt again saw the Shah and struggled against a mood of stubborn irresolution which broke down to the extent that the Shah agreed to give oral encouragement to selected army officers who would participate in the action. Then, he said, he would go to Ramsar* and let the army act without his official knowledge, adding that if the action was successful he would name Zahedi as Prime Minister. On 9 August Rashidian took over the struggle in his turn and reported that the Shah would leave for Ramsar on the 12th, and that prior to his departure he would see Zahedi and key officers and express orally his choice of Zahedi as the new head of the government.

On 10 August Colonel ███████████ saw the Shah and informed him of the names of the army officers who were ready to take action upon receipt of an order from the Shah. The Shah again asserted that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. ██████

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*Royal resort on the Caspian Sea, north of Tehran.

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registered a protest at this decision, and the Shah again
sent for Rashidian to discuss this all important point.
Rashidian carried a message from Roosevelt to the effect
that the latter would leave in complete disgust unless
the Shah took action within a few days. At the conclusion
of the audience the Shah stated that he would sign the
papers, would see Zahedi, and then would leave for Ramsar
on the Caspian. The next day he did see Zahedi and did
leave for Ramsar, but the papers, contrary to the promise
of the Rashidians, were not ready for the signature of the
Shah. The Shah thus promised to sign the papers as soon
as they were sent to him at Ramsar.

After discussion between Roosevelt and Rashidian, they
reverted to a decision closer to the original London draft
of TPAJAX, deciding that there should be two _firmans_ (royal
decrees), one dismissing Mossadeq and one naming Zahedi as
Prime Minister. Rashidian and ███████, the Shah's ████████
███ and an established UK agent, prepared the documents,
and on the evening of 12 August ████████████████████████,
████████████████████████ took them by plane to
Ramsar.

At this same time the psychological campaign against
Mossadeq was reaching its climax. The controllable press
was going all out against Mossadeq, while ████████████

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███████████████ under station direction was printing
material which the station considered to be helpful. CIA
agents gave serious attention to alarming the religious
leaders at Tehran by issuing black propaganda in the name
of the Tudeh Party, threatening these leaders with savage
punishment if they opposed Mossadeq. Threatening phone
calls were also made to them, in the name of the Tudeh,
and one of several planned sham bombings of the houses
of these leaders was carried out.

The word that the Shah would support direct action in
his behalf spread rapidly through the "Colonels' conspiracy"
fostered by the station. Zahedi saw station principal
agent, Colonel ███████████, and named him as liaison
officer with the Americans and as his choice to supervise
the staff planning for the action. Then ██████████ took
General ██████████ and Colonel ██████████ to see Zahedi.
CIA officer Carroll maintained close contact with ██████████
and members of the "Colonels' conspiracy," and on 13 August
was present at the final meeting of those individuals to
whom would fall the responsibility of carrying out the
operational staff plan. However, this meeting was the
last one in which the station was represented, and the
fact that contact was broken proved to have serious results.

Late on the evening of 13 August, Colonel ██████████

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returned to Tehran with the firmans signed by the Shah
and delivered them to Zahedi; according to his story
(which has never been confirmed), it was Queen Soraya
who finally convinced the Shah that he must sign. If
this is true, here was an ally from a totally unexpected
quarter.

On 14 August the station cabled that upon the con-
clusion of TPAJAX the Zahedi government, in view of the
empty treasury of the country, would be in urgent need
of funds. The sum of $5,000,000 was suggested, and CIA
was asked to produce this amount almost within hours after
the conclusion of the operation. No more news came in
from Tehran on the 14th, and there was nothing that either
the station or Headquarters could do except wait for action
to begin.

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VI. THE FIRST TRY

The precise order of events of the night of 15 August 1953 has not yet been established in all detail. The early accounts of various participants differed widely enough to make it impossible to follow the slender thread of truth through the dark night. However, the main outline of this first try is clear, as are two basic facts connected with it. These facts are: that the plan was betrayed by the indiscretion of one of the Iranian Army officer participants--primarily because of the protracted delay--and that it still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.

Not until the evening of 14 August were Tehran Station personnel informed that action had been postponed from that night until the next one. Station principal agent Colonel ███████ was no longer in touch with events and the station was unable to guide General ████████, Zahedi's Chief of Staff designate--if, indeed, it was he who had assumed the main responsibility.

According to a statement by Mossadeq's Chief of Staff, General Taghi Riahi, he was informed of all the details of the "plot" at five in the afternoon of 15 August. But curiously enough--and according to his own account--he did

not leave his house in Shimran, where National Frontists Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas were staying, until 2000 hours and then drove to the staff headquarters in Tehran. Riahi did, however, order the commander of the 1st Armored Brigade to have the brigade ready at 2300 hours. At 2300 hours Riahi sent his deputy, General Kiani, to the Bagh-i-Shah, the army barracks on the western side of Tehran which included the barracks of the Imperial Guard. Kiani was arrested there by Colonel ████ who had arrived at the Bagh-i-Shah sometime earlier with several officers who supported him.

In the meantime a number of truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers were making arrests. About 2330 hours they came to Riahi's house in Shimran and, finding him out, arrested Zirakzadeh and Haqshenas. Also about 2330 hours several officers and a considerable body of soldiers rushed into the home of Hoseyn Fatemi, Mossadeq's Foreign Minister, and took him away before he had a chance to put on his shoes. This meager haul of prisoners was driven to the guard house of the Imperial Palace (Saadabad) at Shimran.

Officers who were aware that Riahi had been alerted took no action, but others who were not, carried out their tasks.

Sometime before 2330 hours a limited attack had been made against the telephone system. Wires leading to the house of Fatemi and to the houses of others who were to be arrested were cut; the wires between GHQ (staff

headquarters) and the Bagh-i-Shah were cut; and Colonel
███████ with a small armed force, occupied the telephone
exchange in the Tehran bazaar.

When Riahi did not hear from General Kiani, who had
gone to the Bagh-i-Shah, he (according to his own account)
phoned Colonel Momtaz of the 2nd Mountain Brigade and
Colonel Shahrokh of the 1st Armored Brigade and told them
to take their forces to the Bagh-i-Shah. At or before
this time he also alerted other officers, including Colonel
Parsa of the 1st Mountain Brigade; Colonel Ashrafi, the
Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Mountain
Brigade; and Colonel Novzari of the 2nd Armored Brigade.
However, according to the accounts of Zahedi men engaged
in their operation, Momtaz and Shahrokh were arrested at
the Bagh-i-Shah and held there with Kiani for some time.

Government sources differ in their accounts as to what
happened when Colonel ███████ tried to deliver to Mossadeq
the Shah's _firman_ dismissing him. According to General
Riahi, Colonel Momtaz was on his way to the Bagh-i-Shah
when he ran into Colonel ███████ in the street and there-
upon arrested him. According to the official communique
of the Mossadeq government, ███████ showed up before Mossadeq's
house at 0100 hours on 16 August with four trucks full of
soldiers, two jeeps, and an armored car. He claimed that

he had a letter to deliver to Mossadeq, but was at once arrested by the guards at the house of the Prime Minister. Farzanegan had still another version, claiming that ██████ was arrested at 2350 hours at Mossadeq's house. After his arrest, ██████ is alleged to have said that a delay of two minutes in the arrival at Mossadeq's house of Lt. Colonel ████████ with two truckloads of soldiers caused the plan to fail.

It does seem fairly certain that Riahi had been able before midnight to get detachments of soldiers to the strategic points most likely to be attacked. Just what incident or what reaction on the part of Riahi and others loyal to Mossadeq caused the pro-Zahedi officers to falter in their duties is not clearly known. It is known, however, that Zahedi's Chief of Staff, General ████████, lost heart and went into hiding. This undoubtedly did much to lower morale at the crucial time, as did the rapidly circulated word of ██████ arrest. Colonel ████████ went to the Chief of Staff's office at 0100 hours on the 16th to meet ████████ and it is known that General ████████ did approach the GHQ with the intention of taking it over but was frightened off when he saw tanks and troops in readiness. He then rushed to Zahedi and told him to flee, but Zahedi only laughed at him. Even the trucks with the

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prisoners had come down from Saadabad to the GHQ but, finding it in hostile hands, retreated to Saadabad. Those in charge of the trucks released the prisoners at dawn. Zahedi waited in vain for an escort to come and conduct him to the Officers' Club. By about 0230 hours those Persians who were still willing to carry out the operation were convinced that the cause was lost, as they saw strengthened detachments, more troops moving into the city, and vehicles being stopped for questioning. ███████ and General ███████ themselves, toured the town about 0230 hours; then presumably separated, since ███████ was soon picked up, while ███████ found sanctuary in station hands. At the Embassy the station personnel had spent a nerve-racking period of hours. The army radio-equipped jeep called for in the plan failed to arrive at the compound, and there was no way of knowing what was happening in the city.

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VII. APPARENT FAILURE

At 0545 hours on the morning of 16 August 1953, Radio Tehran came on the air with a special government communique covering the so-called abortive coup of the night just ending, and by 0600 hours Mossadeq was meeting with his cabinet to receive reports on the situation and to take steps to strengthen the security forces at government buildings and other vital points. Again at 0730 hours the communique was broadcast.

Station personnel had passed an anxious, sleepless night in their office. From the fact that certain actions provided for in the military plan failed to materialize-- no jeep with radio arrived at the compound, and the telephone system continued to function--it was obvious that something--or everything--had gone wrong. At 0500 hours, as soon as the curfew was lifted, Carroll toured the town and reported there was a concentration of tanks and troops around Mossadeq's house, and other security forces on the move. Then Colonel ███████ called the office to say that things had gone badly, and that he, himself, was on the run toward the Embassy in search of refuge. At 0600 hours he appeared, gave a summary of the situation, which was like that of the government communique, and was rushed

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into hiding. The station was now suddenly faced with the task of rescuing the operation from total failure, and decisions of far-reaching effect were quickly taken. The first need was to establish contact with Ardeshir Zahedi, son of General Zahedi. At 0800 hours he sent word to the station of his whereabouts, and Roosevelt drove up to Shimran--the summer resort section north of Tehran--to hear that Ardeshir and his father felt that there was still hope in the situation. It was immediately decided that a strong effort must be made to convince the Iranian public that Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq was the usurper who had staged a coup. (It should be noted that all action taken from this time on corresponded to the basic estimate of the operational plan that the army would respond to the Shah if they were forced to a choice between the ruler and Mossadeq.) This action was initiated by employing station communications facilities to relay a message to the New York Associated Press (AP) office stating that: "Unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadeq and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him." In order to get an authoritative statement that could be distributed for local consumption, the station planned to send General McClure, head of the American

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Military Mission, to see the Shah and ask him whether the alleged firmans were valid. Later in the day it was learned that the Shah had fled.

By 0930 hours the city was calm, with shops opening and people going about their normal business. However, tanks, extra soldiers, and police were stationed at key points, including the royal palaces which were sealed off from outside contact. Rumors began to circulate. The one that gained early attention was to the effect that the alleged coup had been inspired by the government in order to give Mossadeq an excuse to move against the Shah. At about this time Roosevelt sent General McClure to see General Riahi, Chief of Staff, to ask whether the US Military Mission was still accredited to Mossadeq or to someone else, as the Embassy had heard that an imperial firman had been issued naming Zahedi as Prime Minister. Riahi denied that the firman had been "authentically signed" and stated that: "Iran and its people are more important than the Shah or any particular government," and that the army was "of the people and would support the people." It was not until a number of hours later that McClure reported to Roosevelt on this meeting, and from the time of the meeting on, McClure seemed disposed to go along with Riahi in the hope that Riahi himself might eventually try to overthrow Mossadeq.

It was now well into the morning, after the papers had been out for some time. _Shojat_, the substitute for the principal Tudeh paper, _Besuye Ayandeh_, had been predicting a coup since 13 August. It now stated that the plans for the alleged coup had been made after a meeting between the Shah and General Schwarzkopf on 9 August, but that Mossadeq had been tipped off on the 14th. It should be noted that the Tudeh appeared to be at least as well posted on the coup plans as the government--how is not known. The station principal agent team of ███████████████████ working on their own and with singular shrewdness, had put out a special broadsheet which documented the current rumor but twisted it to read that the alleged coup was arranged to force out the Shah. The morning issue of _Mellat-i-Ma_ told this same story, while a first mention of the _firman_ naming Zahedi was given on an inner page of the large circulation daily _Keyhan_.

At 1000 hours another communique added a few details to the earlier one. By this time the Tudeh Party members, organized in small groups, were making speeches in many parts of the city, while smaller groups of pro-Mossadeq nationalists were also out in the streets. Then a fresh rumor made the rounds: that a plot had existed but that, when it had failed to materialize, Mossadeq had staged a fake coup. At 1100 hours two correspondents of the _New_

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York Times were taken to Shimran, by station arrangement, to see Zahedi. Instead, they saw his son, Ardeshir, who showed them the original of the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minister and gave them photostatic copies. These photostats had been made by Iranian participants in the plan. Following this meeting the station took charge of the firman, had its own photostats made, and kept the original locked up in the station safe until final victory. At noon Radio Tehran put out a very brief statement signed by Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq (without his title of Prime Minister being used) stating that: "According to the will of the people, expressed by referendum, the 17th Majlis is dissolved. Elections for the 18th session will be held soon." It was this statement, together with the following violently anti-Shah remarks of Fatemi and the undisguised and freely-preached republican propaganda of the Tudeh Party, that was instrumental in persuading the general public that Mossadeq was on the verge of eliminating the monarchy.

At 1400 hours Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi held a press conference. He stated that for some time past the government had received reports from several sources to the effect that the Imperial Guards were planning a coup and, hence, measures were taken to counteract any such coup. He then went on to review the incidents of the coup, as already

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stated by the government communiques. In reply to a question, he said that Abul Ghassem Amini, Acting Minister of Court, had been arrested since it could not be considered that the court was not a part of the conspiracy. He added that his own views would be found in his editorial in Bakhtar Emruz: this editorial, as printed and as read in full, over Radio Tehran at 1730 hours, was a savage, lengthy, malicious attack upon the Shah and upon Reza Shah--a man for whom the general public still feels a large measure of respect and awe. It may be said that this editorial did a great deal to arouse public resentment against the government of Mossadeq.

During the afternoon the station was at work preparing a public statement from General Zahedi which was prepared with the direct advice of Ardeshir Zahedi, the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel ██████████ When it was ready the agents were unable to find a press in town which was not watched by the government. Therefore, one of the Rashidians did ten copies on a Persian typewriter. These were rushed to General Zahedi for his signature and then given out to the foreign correspondents, to local pressmen and to two key army officers. By the time they were distributed, it was too late to catch the press for the morning of the 17th. However, station agents, ██████████████████ although not

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in touch with the station, the Rashidians, or ████████
went ahead on their own. They composed a fabricated inter-
view with Zahedi and had it printed on the 17th, along with
a copy of the firman. In this instance, as in a number of
others, the high-level agents of the station demonstrated
a most satisfying ability to go ahead on their own and do
just the right thing. During the day the station was
securing the persons of key individuals and sending them
to safety. Some were concealed in the house of a station
clerk in the Embassy compound and some in the houses of US
personnel of the station outside the compound. Thus,
Ardeshir Zahedi was in station hands from the morning of
the 16th on, General Zahedi from the morning of the 17th
on, the Rashidian brothers from the 16th on with the excep-
tion of a venture out on the 18th, Colonel ████████ from
the morning of the 16th on, and General ████████ from the
morning of the 16th. These people had to be concealed by
the station, both in order to secure them from arrest and
also to have them in places to which Americans could logi-
cally and easily go.

That evening about 1930 hours crowds massed in the
Majlis Square to hear speeches, and the proceedings were
rebroadcast over Radio Tehran. The speakers included pro-
Mossadeq ex-Majlis deputies Mosavi, Dr. Szyyid Ali Shayegan,
Engineer Zirakzadeh, Engineer Razavi, and Foreign Minister

Fatemi. All the speakers attacked the Shah and demanded that he abdicate. During the course of these speeches, the public was informed for the first time that the Shah had fled to Baghdad. The station had learned several hours earlier that the Shah had left. By 1600 hours the two principal US Embassy political officers had given up hope, while Roosevelt was insisting there was still a "slight remaining chance of success" if the Shah would use the Baghdad radio and if Zahedi took an aggressive stand. Additional station messages to Headquarters contained the texts of the type of statements the Shah could make over Baghdad radio.

Allowing for the seven hour difference in time, Headquarters received the first message from the station on the non-success of the coup at 0130 hours on the 16th, and a few hours thereafter was working on the station's request to get the Shah to broadcast from Baghdad. As the working day ended, they had to report to the station that the State Department was firmly opposed to any American effort to contact the Shah and suggested the British do it. At Nicosia they responded enthusiastically to the station's suggestion, and the SIS attempted to get permission from London to have Leavitt and Darbyshire flown to Baghdad by RAF jet fighter early in the morning of the 17th, for the

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SECRET

purpose of exerting pressure on the Shah. London refused
permission.

As the station personnel entered on another day after
a second sleepless night, some real encouragement came from
word that, in breaking up Tudeh groups late the night before,
the soldiers had beaten them with rifle butts and made them
shout, "Long live the Shah." The station continued to feel
that the "project was not quite dead" since General Zahedi,
General ███████████ the Rashidian brothers, and Colonel
███████████ were still determined to press action.

Now, on the morning of 17 August, the press was again
on the streets. Niruye Sevum stated that Schwarzkopf
engineered the plot with the Shah and that "simple-minded
Americans thought the Shah was a trump card." Dad and Shahed
both blamed the so-called coup on the government, and Keyhan
carried the text of an alleged Radio London statement quoting
Zahedi to the effect that he had a firman from the Shah and
that the Shah had left because his life was threatened.
Throughout the morning Iranians with good radios were able
to get word from foreign stations of statements that the
Shah had made in Baghdad. He said: "What has taken place
in Iran cannot be considered a coup d'etat in the real sense."
The Shah said he had issued his orders for the dismissal of
Dr. Mossadeq under the prerogatives given to him by the

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constitution, and had appointed General Zahedi in his
place.   He went on to say that he had not abdicated and
that he was confident of the loyalty of the Iranian people
to him.   This line was what the station had in mind, if
less strong than desired; and the Baghdad papers hinted
that painful, bloody events were still to come in Iran.
The station suggested that Imam Khalasi, religious divine
at Baghdad, and the Agha Khan be enlisted to give the Shah
moral backing, while Headquarters, on State Department
instructions, continued to refuse permission for direct
US contact with the Shah.   In the meantime the US Ambassa-
dor to Iraq, Burton Berry, reported on his conversation
with the Shah on the evening of the 16th.   His statements,
made on his own initiative, were quite in line with sugges-
tions reaching him after the event.

About 1000 hours a considerable body of the troops
that had been dispersed throughout the city were called
back to their barracks, as the government was certain the
situation was well in hand.   At 1030 hours Radio Tehran
called upon General Zahedi to surrender to the authorities,
and then began broadcasting lists of those arrested as
having taken part in the abortive coup or having had some
connection with those events.   The separate lists, includ-
ing those of the next day, contained the following names

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(those underlined indicate the individuals who were known to the station to be engaged in the coup attempt):

Rumors circulated to the effect that the arrested officers were to be hanged on 20 August, and throughout the unit commands of the Tehran garrison, the police, and the gendarmerie, officers met to discuss the situation. Several of them resolved to risk all to attempt to rescue their friends.

The station devoted a great deal of effort during the day to circulating photostatic copies of the firman-- particularly among the army--and in trying to arrange for more and more press coverage. It was now obvious that public knowledge of the existence of the firmans was having an effect. Everyone was asking questions: "Was it true that the Shah had issued firmans? If so, why was Mossadeq lying about it? Wasn't that a most reprehensible thing to do?"

At 1325 hours Fatemi held a press conference at which he dealt with the flight of the Shah to Iraq, read the abjectly pleading letter from arrested Acting Minister of Court Amini, and stated that 14 officers had been arrested. His more detailed views on the current situation were ex- pressed in an editorial in Bakhtar Emruz and were in the main a repetition of his previous scurrilous attacks against the Shah. He wrote such words as, "O traitor Shah, you shameless person, you have completed the criminal history of the Pahlevi reign. The people...want to drag you from behind your desk to the gallows."

Early in the afternoon, Ambassador Henderson arrived in Tehran from Beirut. On the way out to the airport to meet him, members of the Embassy passed the site of the bronze statue of Reza Shah at the end of the avenue of

that name. Only the boots of the figure remained on the
pedestal. A passing truck was dragging behind it the horse
from the equestrian statue of the same ruler that had stood
in Sepah Square. In the crowds engaged in this activity,
the Tudeh were obviously in the majority.

On behalf of the government, Henderson was welcomed
by Dr. Gholam Hosein Mossadeq, son of the Prime Minister,
and by Dr. Alemi, Minister of Labor. At 1630 hours the
station sent off a cable giving a general survey of the
local situation which, although it foresaw Mossadeq's
position strengthened for the next few weeks, did insist
that a policy of opposition to him be continued. Near the
end of the afternoon, the government used the voice of a
religious leader, Sadr Balaghi, to attack the Shah over
Radio Tehran.

The evening was a most active and trying time for the
station. Principal agents ████████████████ were reached
and given instructions. Within the Embassy compound,
Roosevelt and Carroll held a prolonged council of war with
the heads of their team: General Zahedi and Ardeshir
Zahedi, General ████████ the three Rashidian brothers,
and Colonel ████████. These teammates were, when re-
quired, smuggled in and out of the compound in the bottom
of cars and in closed jeeps. A few hundred yards away

Ambassador Henderson and General McClure were out in the garden in front of the residency, and Roosevelt wore a path back and forth to reassure them that no Persians were hidden out in the compound, so that they could in all honesty so inform Mossadeq if the question were asked. The council of war went on for about four hours, and in the end it was decided that some action would be taken on Wednesday the 19th. As preparation for this effort, several specific activities were to be undertaken. In the field of political action, it was planned to send the Tehran cleric ████████████████████ to Qum to try to persuade the supreme cleric, Ayatollah Borujerdi, to issue a *fatwa* (religious decree) calling for a holy war against Communism, and also to build up a great demonstration on Wednesday on the theme that it was time for loyal army officers and soldiers and the people to rally to the support of religion and the throne. In the field of military action, support from outside of Tehran seemed essential. Colonel ████████ was sent off in a car driven by a station agent (US national Gerald Towne) to ████████████████████ to persuade Colonel ████████████ commanding officer of the ████████ garrison, to declare for the Shah. Zahedi, with Carroll, was sent to Brigadier General ██████ at ██████ with a similar request. Through station facilities these

messengers were provided with identification papers and travel papers which stood up under inspection. All those leaving the compound were also given station-prepared curfew passes.

Throughout the long hours of 17 August, there seemed little that Headquarters could do to ease the pangs of despair. A wire sent to the station in the afternoon expressed the strong feeling that Roosevelt, in the interest of safety, should leave at the earliest moment, and it went on to express distress over the bad luck. At about the same time, an operational immediate cable went out to Ambassador Berry in Baghdad with guidance concerning his future meetings with the Shah. Propaganda guidance was sent to the stations at Karachi, New Delhi, Cairo, Damascus, Istanbul, and Beirut to the effect that the Zahedi government was the only legal one. Just after midnight Headquarters urged a Paris Station officer in southern France to get in touch with the Agha Khan at once, in order to urge the latter to send a wire to the Shah expressing his strongest moral support. Much later, Headquarters learned that contact had been established, but there was not the hoped-for outcome. The Agha Khan had at once stated that a ruler who left his throne and country would never return, and after this statement no effort was made to sell him on the idea of backing

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the Shah. Of course, he was later delighted to hear that
the Shah did get his throne back after all.

At Nicosia the SIS refused to give up hope, and bucked
against their own office in London and against the Foreign
Office. Darbyshire continued to try to get permission to
go to Baghdad. While the persistence and apparent faith
shown by the SIS station at Nicosia was altogether admira-
ble, it should be remembered that they had nothing to lose
if the cause had been pressed to ultimate failure and dis-
closure.

The 18th was to be the most trying day for every person
in every country who was aware of the project. At 0730 hours
that morning the Shah left Baghdad for Rome on a regular BOAC
commercial flight. It would be some hours before this news
reached Tehran. In Tehran the day opened with small bands
roaming the streets. The Tudeh managed to ransack the Pan-
Iranist Party headquarters (███████████ claim credit
for this incident) located near the Majlis Square, and then
there were minor clashes between gangs of the Tudeh and the
Third Force (a Marxist, non-Tudeh opposition group).

Morning papers appeared about as usual, although very
few opposition sheets were available since secret police
were posted at all printing shops. Those papers supporting
Mossadeq announced that the Pahlevi dynasty had come to an

end, while ████████████████████████████████
████████████████████████████ wrote that the nation ex-
pressed its violent disapproval of the coup which was in
foreign interests. ███████████████████████████████████
██
████ Shahed ran a copy of the firman, and Keyhan ran
two brief notes on Zahedi's claims. Shojat, replacement
for Besuye Ayandeh and, hence, the leading organ of the
Tudeh Party, printed a statement by the Central Committee
of the Tudeh Party--the first such statement to appear for
some weeks. In this statement the party blamed the recent
events on Anglo-American intrigue, and added that the watch-
word for the day must be: "...Down with the monarchy! Long
live the democratic republic!" During the morning the AP
correspondent wired out a story, destined to get consider-
able play abroad, which included Zahedi's statement to the
officers of the Iranian Army: "Be ready for sacrifice and
loss of your lives for the maintenance of independence and
of the monarchy of Iran and of the holy religion of Islam
which is now being threatened by infidel Communists."

Military communiques read over Radio Tehran indicated
that continuing efforts were being made by the government to
firm up its control. One announcement offered a reward of
100,000 rials for information as to the whereabouts of

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General Zahedi; ███████████████████████████████
██

████ and a third was a reminder that all demonstrations
were forbidden by the government. At 1030 hours General
Riahi, Chief of Staff, met with the high ranking officers
of the army in the lecture hall of the Military School and
read them the riot act, stressing that they must be faith-
ful to the government.

Personnel at the Tehran Station, while continuing to
make every effort to carry out its decision of the 16th,
were also planning for eventualities. One message to
Headquarters asked that the means for a clandestine evacu-
ation of up to 15 people from Iran be prepared. Another
cited local military opinion that officers would carry out
instructions broadcast by the Shah, and then went on to
put it up to Headquarters as to whether the station should
continue with TPAJAX or withdraw. Nicosia commiserated
over the initial failure and stated that they, personally,
were continuing to do all they could to induce London to
continue to support station efforts. This message was
followed by a report on the Shah's statements at Baghdad,
and by still another to the effect that SIS Nicosia was
asking London's assent to urge the Shah's return on pil-
grimage to the holy shrines in Iraq where he would be in

direct contact with Iranian divines resident there.

During the afternoon most of the news was not of action but of statements from various sources. At his press conference Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi asserted that there had been serious anti-Shah riots in Baghdad—a complete lie. At 1500 hours the Shah arrived in Rome, where he was to make statements to the press which followed a middle ground. These statements did not dash the hopes of his supporters, but neither were they a call to action. Also, in the afternoon, Radio Moscow carried the text of the appeal of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party as it had been printed that morning in Shojat.

In the evening, violence flared in the streets of Tehran. Just what was the major motivating force is impossible to say, but it is possible to isolate the factors behind the disturbances. First, the flight of the Shah brought home to the populace in a dramatic way how far Mossadeq had gone, and galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force. Second, it seems clear that the Tudeh Party overestimated its strength in the situation. This fault may have been that of the Soviet liaison people, or the leaders of the Tudeh Party, or of the rank and file. During the day the Party not only had defiled statues of the monarchy, but also had erected their own flags at

certain points. Party members had also torn down street signs in which the Pahlevi dynasty was mentioned or which commemorated events in the reign of Reza Shah, and had replaced them with "popular" names. The party seemed ready for an all-out effort to bring in a peoples' democracy, believing either that Mossadeq would not challenge them or that they could outfight him in the streets. Third, the Mossadeq government was at last beginning to feel very uneasy about its alliance with the Tudeh Party. The Pan-Iranists were infuriated and the Third Force was most unhappy about the situation. Fourth, the climax was now approaching of the ███████████ campaign of alleged Tudeh terrorism. (Details of this campaign have been given on earlier pages.) On this evening ████████████ had gangs of alleged Tudehites on the streets with orders to loot and smash shops on Lalezar and Amirieh streets whenever possible, and to make it clear that this was the Tudeh in action.

During the evening all these factors came together in ferment. Security forces were given orders to clear the streets and serious fighting resulted. Friends of Colonel ██████ in the Police Department exceeded instructions in preventing Tudeh vandalism by beating up Tudehites and shouting for the Shah.

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The Tudeh did seem to take rapid cognizance of the facts that a covert action was being staged, and that their members were not strong enough to fight the police. They brought people out who tried to argue demonstrators into going home.

Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair. The immediate direction of the project moved from the Branch and Division to the highest level. At the end of the morning a handful of people worked on the draft of a message which was to call off the operation. As the message finally was sent, in the evening, it was based on the Department of State's tentative stand: "that the operation has been tried and failed," the position of the United Kingdom that: "we must regret that we cannot consider going on fighting" and Headquarters' position that, in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary from Roosevelt and Henderson, operations against Mossadeq should be discontinued.

VIII. "THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS"

While on the 18th only ████████████████████ had
published the imperial firman naming Zahedi as Prime Minis-
ter, on 19 August, as soon as the city was awake, early
risers could see photostats or type-set copies of the
firman in the papers Setareh Islam, Asia Javanan, Aram,
Mard-i-Asia, Mellat-i-Ma and the Journal de Tehran. The
first four of these papers, and Shahed and Dad in addition,
ran an alleged interview with Zahedi which stressed that his
government was the only legal one in existence--an interview
that had been fabricated by ████████ Somewhat later in the
morning the first of many thousand broadsheets which carried
a photostatic copy of the firman and the text of the Zahedi
statement appeared on the streets. Although each of these
newspapers had a normal circulation of restricted size, the
news they carried was undoubtedly flashed through the city by
word of mouth, for before 0900 hours pro-Shah groups were
assembling in the bazaar area. Members of these groups had
not only made their personal choice between Mossadeq and the
Shah, but they were stirred up by the Tudeh activity of the
preceding day and were ready to move. They needed only
leadership.

Even before the day had dawned ████████████████
having been informed that a pro-Shah statement by the

ranking religious leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, might be
forthcoming during the day, had made definite preparations
to utilize any such statement. ████████ and two of their
most energetic sub-agents, ████████████████████ were
down at the bazaar section with a jeep and trucks ready
to set out for Qazvin. Their plan was to print broadsheets
at this town some 85 miles west of Tehran should it appear
that the Mossadeq government had increased its attempted
stranglehold on the urban press. As soon as they noticed
that the pro-Shah groups were gathering, ████████████
████████████████████████████ rushed to supply the needed
leadership. ██████████ accompanied one group in its progress
toward the Majlis, and on the way incited them to set fire
to the offices of Bakhtar-i-Emruz, the semi-official paper
owned by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatemi, which on the
17th and 18th had printed most bitter and scurrilous attacks
on the person of the Shah. About the same time ████████ led
other elements toward the offices of the Tudeh papers
Shahbaz, Bezuya Ayandeh, and Javanan-i-Democrat, all of
which were thoroughly sacked.

The news that something quite startling was happening
spread at great speed throughout the city. Just when it
reached Mossadeq, who was meeting with members of his
cabinet, is not known. By 0900 hours the station did have

this news, and by 1000 hours word had come in that both
the Bakhtar-i-Emruz office and the headquarters of the
Iran Party had been ransacked. Also about 1000 hours
contact was established with the Rashidian brothers who
seemed full of glee. Their instructions, as well as orders
directed to ███████████████ were now to attempt to
swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators
and to encourage action for the capture of Radio Tehran. To
what extent the resulting activity stemmed from the specific
efforts of all our agents will never be known, although
many more details of the excitement of the day may slowly
come to light.

Fairly early in the morning Colonel ████████ one of
those involved in the staff planning, appeared in the square
before the Majlis with a tank which he had secured from the
Second Battalion of the Second Armored Brigade, ███████
██████████████████████████████████ Lt. Col. ███████
████ and Captain ██████ were on hand and were joined
by two trucks from the same battalion, while members of
the disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove
through the streets. By 1015 hours there were pro-Shah
truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares.

While small groups had penetrated to the north of
the city by 0930 hours, the really large groups, armed

with sticks and stones, came from south Tehran and merged
as they reached Sepah Square in their progress north toward
the center of the city. There the troops held in readiness
fired hundreds of shots over the heads of the crowd, but
apparently were not willing to fire at these partisans of
the Shah. As a result the crowds were able to fan out
toward key points. Just up Lalezar, a main shopping street,
the Saadi theater, long sponsored by the Tudeh Party, was
burned. The surging crowds of men, women, and children
were shouting, "Shah piruz ast," (The Shah is victorious).
Determined as they seemed, a gay holiday atmosphere pre-
vailed, and it was as if exterior pressures had been
released so that the true sentiments of the people showed
through. The crowds were not, as in earlier weeks, made
up of hoodlums, but included people of all classes--many
well dressed--led or encouraged by other civilians. Trucks
and busloads of cheering civilians streamed by and when,
about noon, five tanks and 20 truckloads of soldiers joined
it, the movement took on a somewhat different aspect. As
usual, word spread like lightning and in other parts of the
city pictures of the Shah were eagerly displayed. Cars went
by with headlights burning as a tangible indication of
loyalty to the ruler.

At about 1030 hours, General Riahi informed Mossadeq

that he no longer controlled the army and asked for relief, but Mossadeq visited his office and told him to hold firm. Colonel Momtaz was able to assemble only one battalion and disposed that force around Mossadeq's house.

About noon separate elements composing the crowds began to receive direct leadership from the military and police. Those army officers previously alerted to take part in the military operations provided by TPAJAX were now taking separate but proper individual action. By 1300 hours the central headquarters of the telegraph office on Sepah Square had fallen into royalist hands. The AP man filed a cable there shortly after 1300 hours giving a brief report on the fighting. Then fighting moved a few hundred yards away to the police headquarters and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building just across the wide avenue from it. Defenders of the police station held out until nearly 1600 hours.

Also about noon, Roosevelt went to the houses where Generals Zahedi and ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ were in hiding. They were both fully informed of the events of the morning and told to wait for instructions. An hour later Carroll and Persian-speaking Major William R. Keyser (Assistant US Military Attache) reported on the military situation. By early afternoon more of the important objectives in the

center of the city, such as the press and propaganda offices, had been taken over by the royalists. With important facilities under control, it was possible to begin the dispatch of streams of telegrams to the provinces urging them to rise in support of the Shah. Even during the greatest heat of the day there was no slackening of activity. Station agent ███████ was still on the streets and, finding a crowd on Firdausi Avenue, urged them to go to military police headquarters and demand the release of Colonel ██████ and General ██████████ This they did. The soldiers on guard put up no resistance. Meanwhile agent General ██████████████████ was touring the city in his car attempting to round up members of the Imperial Guard, soldiers who later took part in the attack on Mossadeq's house. Early in the afternoon the crowds did collect around the approaches to Mossadeq's residence. By this time he had probably already left.

Radio Tehran was a most important target, for its capture not only sealed the success at the capital, but was effective in bringing the provincial cities quickly into line with the new government. During the heat of activity, it broadcast dull discussions of cotton prices, and finally music only. Already at 1030 hours there had been an interruption of its schedule, but it was not until

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early afternoon that people began streaming up the broad
avenue toward their goal, some three miles to the north.
Buses and trucks bore full loads of civilians, army offi-
cers and policemen. Sheer weight of numbers seemed to
have overwhelmed the defenders of the radio station, and
after a brief struggle in which three deaths were reported,
at 1412 hours the station was in royalist hands. At 1420
hours it broadcast the first word of the success of the
royalist effort, including a reading of the _firman_. A
stream of eager speakers came to the microphone. Some
represented elements upon whom reliance had been placed
in TPAJAX planning, while others were quite unknown to the
station. Among the former elements were opposition papers
██████████████████ one of ████████████████████ and
████████████████ Among spontaneous supporters of the
Shah to come to the microphone were Colonel Ali Pahlevan
and Major Husand Mirzadian; their presence was the proof--
no longer required--of the truth of the TPAJAX assumption
that the army would rally to the Shah under just such
circumstances. For some period of time, Radio Tehran was
alternately on and off the air. It may have been finally
put into good operating condition by those engineers who,
as one speaker said, had come along for just such a purpose.
Here, as in so many other phases, chance served the cause

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very well, for, had the original defenders of the radio station managed to damage its facilities, the firm control of the capital might have been delayed.

At the Embassy, station personnel were following the broadcasts of Radio Tehran, and were elated when it suddenly fell into royalist hands. Once again Roosevelt set off toward the hiding place of his valuable charges, meeting them a little before 1600 hours. Told it was time for them to play an active role, both promptly dressed for the occasion. It was agreed that General Zahedi should meet General ▇▇▇▇▇ at 1630 hours on a certain street corner with a tank, and should proceed with this vehicle to Radio Tehran where Zahedi would speak to the nation. General ▇▇▇▇▇ was taken from the house by Major ▇▇▇ in a jeep, and then along the way, when he spied two Air Force officers, he asked to be let out, saying he would take care of everything. Right on the street these officers greeted him warmly and when he said he would like a tank, they soon rounded one up. Asked if he knew where Zahedi was, he said he did and that he had an appointment to meet him at 1630 hours. His comrades pressured him to make immediate rendezvous with Zahedi, so he directed the tank toward the compound in which the house sheltering Zahedi was situated. Zahedi emerged and the tank set off

again. At 1725 hours Zahedi spoke over Radio Tehran, and
this speech was repeated a little after 2100 hours that
evening.

However, Zahedi had been proceded on the air by ██████
██████████████████ In the dash back from ████████
████████ car had broken down completely at about the
halfway mark, but he was able to get an uncomfortable ride
the rest of the way in an oil tank truck. He arrived in
Tehran by morning and contacted the station. At the latter's
urgent instructions, ████████ sent a telegram to Colonel
████████ which message contained a code phrase* signalling
████ to lead his division on forced march to Tehran.
An interesting sidelight concerning ████████ march to
Tehran** occurred en route at Hamadan. The division entered
Hamadan just as the local Tudeh Party was holding a large
pro-Mossadeq demonstration. ████████ quelled the demon-
stration in short order. The astonishment of the Tudeh
on seeing the ████████ division enter Hamadan was ex-
ceeded only by that of the town mayor.

Within Tehran proper the last nests of resistance were
being subdued. The Chief of Staff headquarters gave in at

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*   "Am coming today to see my sick sister."
**   The division actually arrived after Tehran was
      already in Royalist hands.

the end of the afternoon, and before 1900 hours Mossadeq's
house was taken and soon turned into a shambles. Its
belongings were dragged out into the street and sold to
passersby. Reactions were also being reported from the
provinces. At 1450 hours the regional station at Sanandaj
in Kurdestan suddenly went off the air. At 1555 hours
Radio Tabriz reported the capture of the station itself
by forces loyal to the Shah, and stated that all of Azer-
baijan was in the hands of the army. As it continued
broadcasting, it became apparent that one of the speakers,
██ and
an effective sub-agent of station assets had played an
important role in events at Tabriz. By 1800 hours the
station at Isfahan was on the air with strong statements
in favor of the Shah and Zahedi by such elements as local
editors, a member of Baghai's Toiler's Party, religious
leaders, and staff officers--all groups which we had hoped
would react in this fashion. Not until 2000 hours did the
radio station at Kerman proclaim loyalty to the new govern-
ment. Meshed Radio was not heard from at all, but the
religious-minded town turned Loyalist almost immediately
after the news of the change had been sent out over Radio
Tehran. Known Tudehites were pursued and shops of Tudeh
sympathizers looted.

Colonel ███████████ following Zahedi's instructions,
and Carroll now closed up the operation. While ███████████
had ████████████████████████████████——at that office——
kept in touch by phone and placed known supporters of
TPAJAX in command of all units of the Tehran garrison,
seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists.

As the afternoon drew to its close, Radio Tehran seemed
to get down to a less haphazard schedule. From 1800 hours
on, it made short announcements of government appointees.
At 1845 hours the Associated Press representative and the
New York Times man made fairly brief statements on the
events of the day, intended for their home offices. Brief
government communiques dealt with curfew hours, contained
warnings against demonstrations, etc. A general news sum-
mary at 2100 hours was followed by a statement from Zahedi,
installed in the office of the Chief of Police, and before
2200 hours the station had signed off for the night. The
hectic day was over and curfew now in effect. Lives had
been lost, but not nearly as many as stated in the white
heat of the actual events. The security forces were
firmly in control and well prepared to destroy any counter-
effort.

How had other interested parties weathered the exciting
day? One such must have felt real anguish. This was the

USSR and its people in Iran. Radio Moscow lagged far
behind the rest of the world and did not put out a sum-
mary of the day's events at Tehran until 2300 hours GMT.
Its Persian program that reached Iran early in the after-
noon was built around the text of the earlier Pravda
article entitled "The Failure of the American Adventure
in Iran," and this program was repeated early in the
evening. The same Pravda article was broadcast through-
out the late afternoon and early evening from Moscow in
English, Arabic, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, German,
Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and Turkish, although by that
time nearly everyone of its listeners must have known that
this material was no longer applicable.

The other parties to the original plan felt elated,
and possibly even self-satisfied. While the reactions of
the Shah at Rome are rather beyond the scope of this account,
one or two of his remarks are worth citing as they bear
upon some of the original assumptions of the TPAJAX plan.
He said, "It was my people who have shown me that they were
faithful to the monarchy and that two and a half years of
false propaganda were not enough," and again, "My country
didn't want the Communists and therefore has been faithful
to me."

At Nicosia the earliest FBIS intercepts had not been

translated and distributed until nearly mid-afternoon local
time. As word passed from Leavitt to Darbyshire, the latter
became so excited that he drove his friend right to his
office outside of the town, something he and his associates
had always avoided doing in earlier weeks.

Headquarters had its first word of what the day was
to bring just before 0900 hours when someone burst in from
the hall pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke--
in view of the depression that still hung on from the day
before--the news that Mossadeq was on the way out. Through-
out the morning, the afternoon, and until late that night
people hurried down the corridors with fresh slips of ticker
tape. During the entire day only two TPAJAX cables were
received from the station. However, it was a day that should
never have ended for it carried with it such a sense of ex-
citement, of satisfaction, and of jubilation that it is
doubtful whether any other can come up to it. Our trump card
had prevailed and the Shah was victorious.

IX. REPORT TO LONDON

Roosevelt arrived in London the afternoon of 25 August.
He had been smuggled out of Tehran in Naval Attache Eric
Pollard's plane and picked up by a Military Air Transport
Service (MATS) plane (the pilot and crew of which were not
aware of his identity) at Bahrein. In London Roosevelt was
met by Firth and taken to see Maj. General J. Alexander
Sinclair and others in SIS that evening. From the very
beginning it was made plain to him that SIS was grateful
not only because of the success of the operation per se, but
because of the effect its success had already had and would
continue to have upon SIS's reputation and relations with
its superiors. In turn he expressed gratitude for the fine
support the station had received and recognition of the fact
that such weaknesses as had existed in the support given us
were attributable to the paucity of reporting from Tehran,
which had resulted in a justifiable lack of hope both in
London and Washington. Roosevelt went to some pains to
explain the reason for the lack of reporting. He pointed
out that if they had simply reported what they were doing,
London and Washington would have thought they were crazy
and told them to stop immediately; if they had reported
the reasons why they felt justified in taking such action

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they would have had no time to take action; accordingly, they followed the third course which was to act, and report practically nothing. This decision was initially made on the assumption that they had very little more to lose by following up the last hopes, and everything to win. As the hours passed, evidence that the action had great hopes of success increased rapidly, but they still had no time or energy to prepare and present the evidence. Sinclair and members of his staff said that they fully understood the situation and were glad that Roosevelt had taken what was in their opinion the best and most constructive decision. We all recognized, however, that if the outcome had been different, a substantially different attitude toward that action might have been found in many quarters. Sinclair commented that it was recognition of the probability that such grave decisions would have to be taken speedily and could only be taken in the field that had led him to request the appointment of a combined theatre commander. He also requested that in Roosevelt's briefing of senior members of the British Foreign Office he should emphasize this aspect of the story. The following days Roosevelt did so, and, without exception, from Churchill through Lord Salisbury all down the line, the decision taken in Tehran was enthusiastically endorsed. (Sir Winston

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made reference to Lord Nelson's blind eye.)

On 26 August Roosevelt was shepherded through a round of appointments at the Foreign Office by the Foreign Office representative attached to SIS. He first saw Sir (Reginald) James Bowker (Byroade's British opposite number--responsible for NEA) and two members of his staff, and gave them an account of developments and the psychological climate in Iran, without giving much in the way of operational detail. He got the impression that SIS was glad to take advantage of any opportunity of selling themselves to this level of the Foreign Office. It appeared that their relationships, at least in this area, were neither close nor cordial at this level. Later in the morning he spent an hour alone with the Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury. As requested by Sinclair, Roosevelt gave Lord Salisbury the full treat- ment, and he appeared to be absolutely fascinated. His attitude seemed to be very much more flexible and progressive than that of Bowker. He seemed genuinely anxious to help the new Iranian Government and very conscious of the problems which the relations with the United Kingdom presented to that government. He recognized the importance of immediate short- term economic aid which would produce quick and obvious re- sults, but remarked that perhaps long-range aid could be worked out with an "oil settlement in mind."

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Roosevelt reported fully to Salisbury, as he had to
Bowker, on the assurances which he had given on behalf of
Her Majesty's Government (HMG) to the Shah and Zahedi.
Salisbury assured him, as did everyone else, that these
statements were justified and properly presented, that the
British fully appreciated the necessity of reaching agree-
ment on an oil settlement with the Iran Government as
rapidly as possible, and that they were fully prepared to
do so.

At 1400 hours Roosevelt was received by the Prime
Minister who was in bed at 10 Downing Street. This was
a most touching occasion. The Prime Minister seemed to
be in bad shape physically. He had great difficulty in
hearing: occasional difficulty in articulating; and appar-
ent difficulty in seeing to his left. In spite of this
he could not have been more kind personally nor more
enthusiastic about the operation. He was good enough to
express envy of Roosevelt's role and a wish that he had
been "some years" younger and might have served under his
command. He repeated the statement that he had already
made to Sinclair, that if the success of this operation
could be maintained it would be the finest operation since
the end of the war. He emphasized his strong feeling that
everything possible to help the new government should be

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done. Economic aid to Iran should not wait either for
the restoration of diplomatic relations with the British
or for an oil settlement. He went so far as to proclaim
that if it were necessary he, himself, would provide eco-
nomic aid to Iran before the restoration of diplomatic
relations, although he did not explain how this might be
accomplished. He commented that the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC) had really "fouled things up" in the past
few years and that he was determined that they should not
be allowed to foul things up any further. Our operation
had given us a wonderful and unexpected opportunity which
might change the whole picture in the Middle East. In
closing he asked Roosevelt to tell the President that
he was feeling much better and could "hang on as long as
may be necessary." He also asked that Roosevelt write to
him after his meeting with the President, and that he keep
in touch with him in the future.

The Prime Minister made several references which
indicated that he regarded SIS as _his_ service, and that
it was very close to his heart. Perhaps due to his
physical condition at the time, however, he appeared a bit
hazy as to its jurisdiction and the distinction between
MI-5 and MI-6. He was definitely hazy on Sinclair and
upon the American setup. The initials CIA meant nothing

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to him, but he had a vague idea that Roosevelt must be
connected in some way with his old friend Bedell Smith.

At the outset Sinclair had said that he thought it
might make a better impression if neither he nor any mem-
ber of his service were present during Roosevelt's reports
to other members of HMG, and although he knew that Roose-
velt was to see the Prime Minister and the Acting Foreign
Secretary, he suggested only one exception to this pro-
cedure. He asked if Roosevelt would have any objection
to his sitting in on the discussions with Sir William
Strang, the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs. He explained that Strang was the source of his
political guidance and such authorizations as were required
from the Foreign Office, and said that he was anxious to
see the impact of certain portions of this briefing upon
Strang. In the course of the conversation it became
apparent that the portion of particular interest to Sinclair
was the reason why the station had not reported more fully
from Tehran between 15 and 19 August. Sinclair is not a
demonstrative person, but there was a definite glow emanat-
ing from him when Strang with apparent heartiness responded
to the explanations, remarking that Roosevelt had done the
only possible thing and that in matters of that sort deci-
sions could only be made on the spot. As they came out of

Strang's office, one of Sinclair's staff came up to him
in great glee with a folder covered with red ribbons,
sealing wax, and other objets d'art. Sinclair told
Roosevelt that this represented approval of a project
on which they had previously been turned down by the
Foreign Office and that this reversal of the Foreign
Office was due to the success in Iran.

X. WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERATION *

Two elements lending support to the operation seemed unable to meet the sudden demand for utmost speed and accomplishment. These were Communications and the Psychological Warfare (PW) Senior Staff. Many individual communications officers--at Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran--worked many extra hours and displayed commendable zeal and initiative in dealing with a great volume of traffic. Between 14 May and 1 September a total of 990 TPAJAX messages entered or left Headquarters. The unsatisfactory phase of communications was the three-way link between Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran by which MECA facilities were made available for almost simultaneous transmission from any one of the three stations named to the other two. Until near the end of the period of the operation, there was considerable delay in Tehran messages destined for Nicosia and for those in the opposite direction. It may also be suggested that transmission time was not as rapid as had been hoped. Very few "operational immediate" messages were originated by any of the three stations, but when Tehran sent such a message it took from three to four hours to get to Headquarters measured from the time the enciphered message was filed for transmission until the deciphered

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*For a military critique of the operation, see Appendix E.

message reached the branch desk.

In July support was sought from the PW Staff. Both the branch and higher levels were anxious to have certain items, including the texts of news articles, commentaries and editorials, appear in papers in this country. The texts themselves were prepared by NE/4 Branch on themes agreed upon by Headquarters and the station. It was planned to cable summaries of such planted material to the station for distribution to the friendly local press and, hence, to backstop the active propaganda campaign against Mossadeq. This support was not forthcoming. It appeared to the branch as if the staff lacked contacts capable of placing material so that the American publisher was unwitting as to its source, as well as being able to see that no changes in theme or emphasis were made. In contrast to this relatively ineffective venture, the Iran desk of the State Department was able to place a CIA study in Newsweek, using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist. Recognizing the fact that the Agency is not able to employ such a channel as just described, it does appear that some improvement of capabilities might be desirable. Either those contacts used to secure the unwitting publication of material should be expanded and improved, or else there should be a provision made for

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passing material directly to cleared editors and owners of press media.

Throughout the course of the operation, members of the Agency were in touch with members of SIS in Washington, Nicosia, London, and--incidentally--Cairo. In all but one of these places, we were on their home ground and, hence, in a position to penetrate their organization, particularly with regard to building up personal histories of its personnel. The apparent fact that this organization was quite ready to act as the junior partner in this operation has been covered in an earlier paragraph, as has the indication that individual SIS officers made a definite effort to win the friendship and confidence of their contacts. The existence of friction between SIS headquarters and the station at Nicosia was also of interest to us. However, of greatest interest from an operational point of view was the very limited number of personnel engaged in Middle East operations. At Nicosia there were only two officers and two typists to deal both with Iran and with several other countries of the Middle East. At London headquarters no individual was exclusively concerned with Iran, and the one specialist in the field appeared to be spread out over the Middle and Far East. This shortage of personnel was directly reflected in a number of ways

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which seemed quite surprising at first glance. An example
of this is the fact that the representative in Washington
had to spend a good part of his time in enciphering and
deciphering. The character of this limited personnel was
also of interest for we were informed that all the old
colonial hands and all the veterans of the India Office
had been dispensed with. Certainly the two Nicosia offi-
cers who were dealing with the Agency were both young and
had a very sound foundation. The one in charge has had six
years in the country and is extremely fluent in the language,
while the younger, still a probationer, also knows the lan-
guage well.

Other lessons learned from the operation relate to
Headquarters and station capacities for planning, and to
the capabilities of the local agents to execute general and
specific directives. First, we may make a brief critique
of Headquarters planning.

As had been pointed out in some detail in earlier
pages, the operational plan grew directly from a series of
basic assumptions, established by CIA in collaboration with
SIS. In briefest review, the principal assumptions were:

1. The Shah could be persuaded to take desired
   action if all-out pressure were applied.

2. Assurance that the Shah was behind him would

both cause Zahedi to act and would win him

the support of many officers in key positions.

3. Forced with a choice between following the

orders of the Shah and those of Mossadeq,

the rank and file of the army and its

officers would obey the Shah.

These assumptions, whether presented as such within

the operational plan, or discussed in some unwitting survey

of the current situation, were challenged. The American

Ambassador and the State Department desk officer for Iran,

as well as the Chief of GTI office at State, insisted that

assumption number one above was completely unsound. Ambas-

sador Henderson stated that the premise that the Shah would

cooperate actively was fallacious.

The station at one point expressed a similar opinion

in these words: "it (is) unrealistic (to) expect Shah (to)

sponsor a coup supported by army." The Office of Intelli-

gence and Research of the State Department, in a special

study, dated 29 July 1953 and entitled "Estimate of the

likelihood and possible consequences of Mossadeq's removal

as Prime Minister," indicated a positive belief that the

opposition to Mossadeq was weak, lacked a plan, and was

composed of heterogeneous elements incapable of unified

action. How was it that the Headquarters planners could

be so at odds with every other well informed opinion?
This was because the plan had of necessity to avoid
acceptance of the status quo and could take a bolder stand
because it was based upon the principle of strong, positive
action to make the assumptions come true. It should be
noted that during the conversations at Beirut and in the
later exchange of messages, representatives of the field
station accepted the assumptions to which they had objected
earlier. Thus, as the time for action approached, complete
harmony prevailed.

Not only did the basic assumptions stand their test,
but other factors of the plan which had been determined by
a detailed estimate of the psychology of the Persians, as
discussed at Nicosia and Beirut, worked out about as antici-
pated. Specifically, it had been realized that not all the
Persians involved in the plan would take the action required
of them, that even those who took it might not follow through
exactly as required and, therefore, that the operational
aspect of the plan called for repetitive efforts on the
targets. This analysis was correct. That the initial mili-
tary aspect went astray may be charged directly to the
Persians who at the very end refused to continue to accept
the guidance which the station felt was so essential.

With regard to the fact that the military aspect of

the plan was balanced, or complemented, by action designed
to result in publicly expressed hostility to the govern-
ment of Mossadeq, it was in this field that those in charge
of executing the plan had to deviate the most from its de-
tails. The plan placed emphasis upon a program for a mas-
sive bast, or political sanctuary movement, against the
government; but it was found impossible to bring this into
being because of the dissolution of the Majlis and because
the most influential religious leaders were not willing to
make the commitments required of them. This unwillingness
of the leaders had been foreseen by the planners, but they
had been assured by the principal agents of SIS that these
leaders would take whatever action was required of them.
Failing in this respect, public hostility was fanned in a
number of other ways, some suggested by the station to its
agents and others thought up by agents. This activity has
been covered in the earlier pages dealing with events in
Tehran, and here it is necessary to repeat only one con-
clusion concerning what was learned during the operation
as to the influence of the press in Iran. It must be ad-
mitted that in the years and months of working with a sub-
sidized press and its venal (or patriotic) journalists in
Tehran, the station was still not sure whether it was
achieving results comparable to the sums so spent. In July

and early August every segment of the press with which we or the United Kingdom had working relations went all out against Mossadeq. As judged by the public reactions on the days following 16 August, there can be no doubt whatsoever that this campaign had reached a very large audience and had directly influenced their thinking in a most positive way. A separate analysis of this press operation should be made to serve as basic guidance in mounting future campaigns.

The operation was a time of testing for the US principal agents and for those of the station agents who were committed to the effort. All these agents did a superb job. It is easy to say that they did such a good job because they were not merely carrying out orders but were heart and soul in favor of the operation. This is true, but the fact must not be overlooked that in recruiting these individuals over a considerable period of time the station wittingly selected people whose basic ideologies were in accord with US policy toward Iran and the USSR. This factor should not be overlooked in future recruitment in Iran. A word should be said about the fact that the high caliber of the agents was reflected in their performances. In one of the most critical periods station principal agents ███████████████████ were out of touch with the station, but on their own initiative took actions

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of just the type the station would have assigned to them.

The performance of the indigenous agents is just one factor in the demonstration of the values received from long-term station planning. Another such factor of real importance was the capability of the station to produce indigenous documents on short order, documents which stood serious scrutiny shortly after they had been manufactured. This program had been long under development.

The operation did reveal a need for the development of other long-term assets. Important in this field is the procurement of safehouses, at least two of which should be kept completely uncontaminated until time of real emergency. While the executors of the plan made brilliant use of the grounds of the Embassy and of houses occupied by US personnel, this effort could have been nullified by a careful watch of the Embassy by agents of the government.

Among the other long-term assets which the station feels should be developed are independent printing and reproduction facilities. The station believes that these facilities should be within the Embassy. This matter is now under discussion as it would appear that the movement of supplies into the Embassy and the removal of the finished products for distribution would create a serious security problem.

The major role in the execution of the operational plan was assumed by US assets. This does not mean, however, that the operation could have been carried through without the active cooperation of the United Kingdom and their assets. For one thing, it would have been impossible to get the Shah to move had he not been finally convinced that both the US and the UK were ready to support him. For another, had not the UK assets been cut in on the operation, they would either have exposed whatever they learned about it to the government or tried actively to see that it failed. The lesson here is clear. As in the larger world picture, US-UK interests and activities must be coordinated. A great deal is to be gained by direct coordination in special fields of activity once both parties have recognized that their aims are really identical.

A final subject of interest concerns the security problem connected with such an operation. From the moment the project got underway, the NEA Division made a serious effort to put special security measures into effect; within the NEA Division and even within the NE/4 Branch the rule of "need to know" came into effect. However, by the time the operation had been concluded, a considerable number of people--British and Americans--were aware of what was going on. From the viewpoint of NE/4 Branch,

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which has listed all the individuals whom it knows were aware of the project and its purpose, the number was excessive--it totaled 89. How many others were told by people without the NE/4 Branch being aware of this, there is no way of knowing. It is true that the knowledge that there was direct US-UK collaboration on the project was kept to a more restricted number. It is, however, suggested that in the future when an operation of similar magnitude and sensitivity is contemplated a special security officer be brought into the operation at its inception and be given the responsibility for keeping track of exactly who knows what about the project.

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APPENDIX A

Initial Operational Plan for TPAJAX

as Cabled from Nicosia to Headquarters

on 1 June 1953

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PLAN PREPARED BY SIS AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES IN CYPRUS

I. Preliminary Action

A. Interim Financing of Opposition

1. CIA will supply $35,000 to Zahedi.

2. SIS will supply $25,000 to Zahedi.

3. SIS indigenous channels Iran will be used to supply above funds to Zahedi.

4. CIA will attempt subsidize key military leaders if this necessary.

B. Acquisition Shah Cooperation

1. Stage 1: Convince the Shah that UK and US have joint aim and remove pathological fear of British intrigues against him.

   a. Ambassador Henderson call on the Shah to assure him of US-UK common aid and British supporting him not Mossadeq.

   b. Henderson to say to the Shah that special US representative will soon be introduced to him for presentation joint US-UK plan.

2. Stage 2: Special US representative will visit the Shah and present following:

a. <u>Presentation to the Shah</u>

    (1)   Both governments consider oil
            question secondary.

    (2)   Major issue is to maintain indepen-
            dence Iran and keep from the Soviet
            orbit. To do this Mossadeq must be
            removed.

    (3)   Present dynasty best bulwark national
            sovereignty.

    (4)   While Mossadeq in power no aid for
            Iran from United States.

    (5)   Mossadeq must go.

    (6)   US-UK financial aid will be forth-
            coming to successor government.

    (7)   Acceptable oil settlement will be
            offered but successor government
            will not be rushed into it.

b. <u>Demands on the Shah</u>

    (1)   You must take leadership in over-
            throw Mossadeq.

    (2)   If not, you bear responsibility for
            collapse of country.

(3) If not, Shah's dynasty will fall
and US-UK backing of you will cease.

(4) Who do you want to head successor
government? (Try and maneuver Shah
into naming Zahedi.)

(5) Warning not to discuss approach.

(6) Plan of operation with Zahedi will
be discussed with you.

II. Arrangement with Zahedi

A. After agreement with Shah per above, inform
Zahedi he chosen to head successor government
with US-UK support.

B. Agree on specific plan for action and timetable
for action. There are two ways to put Zahedi in
office.

1. Quasi-legally, whereby the Shah names Zahedi
Prime Minister by royal firman.

2. Military coup.

Quasi-legal method to be tried first. If success-
ful at least part of machinery for military coup
will be brought into action. If it fails, mili-
tary coup will follow in matter of hours.

III. <u>Relations with Majlis</u>

Important for quasi-legal effort. To prepare for
such effort deputies must be purchased.

A. Basic aim is to secure 41 votes against Mossadeq
and assure quorum for quasi-legal move by being
able to depend on 53 deputies in Majlis. (SIS
considers 20 deputies now not controlled must be
purchased.)

B. Approach to deputies to be done by SIS indigenous
agent group. CIA will backstop where necessary
by pressures on Majlis deputies and will provide
part of the funds.

IV. <u>Relations with Religious Leaders</u>

Religious leaders should:

A. Spread word of their disapproval Mossadeq.

B. As required, stage political demonstrations
under religious cover.

C. Reinforce backbone of the Shah.

D. Make strong assurances over radio and in mosques
after coup that new government faithful Moslem
principles.

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Possibly as quid pro quo prominent cleric
Borujerdi would be offered ministry without
portfolio or consider implementing neglected
article constitution providing body five
✓ mullas (religious leaders) to pass on ortho-
doxy of legislation.

E.

should be encouraged to
threaten direct action against pro-Mossadeq
deputies.

V. Relations with Bazaar

Bazaar contacts to be used to spread anti-government
rumors and possibly close bazaar as anti-government
expression.

VI. Tudeh

Zahedi must expect violent reaction from Tudeh and
be prepared to meet with superior violence.

A. Arrest at least 100 Party and Front Group leaders.

B. Seal off South Tehran to prevent influx Tudeh
demonstrations.

C. Via black leaflets direct Tudeh members not to take any action.

VII. <u>Press and Propaganda Program</u>

A. Prior coup intensify anti-Mossadeq propaganda.

B. Zahedi should quickly appoint effective chief of government press and propaganda who will:
1. Brief all foreign correspondents.
2. Release advance prepared US and UK official statements.
3. Make maximum use Radio Tehran.

VIII. <u>Relations with Tribes</u>

A. Coup will provoke no action from Bakhtiari, Lurs, Kurds, Baluchi, Zolfaghari, Mamassani, Boer Ahmadi, and Khamseh tribal groups.

B. Major problem is neutralization of Qashqa'i tribal leaders.

IX. <u>Mechanics of Quasi-Legal Overthrow</u>

A. At this moment the view with most favor is the so-called   plan" — whereby mass demonstrators seek religious refuge

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in Majlis grounds. Elements available to reli-
gious leaders would be joined by those supplied
by bazaar merchants, up to 4,000 supplied by
SIS controlled group, and additional elements
supplied through CIA.

B. Would be widely publicized that this refuge move-
ment on basis two grounds popular dissatisfac-
tion with Mossadeq government as follows:

1. Ground one that Mossadeq government basically
anti-religious as most clearly demonstrated
ties between Mossadeq and Tudeh; and Mossadeq
and USSR. Just prior to movement CIA would
give widest publicity to all fabricated docu-
ments proving secret agreement between
Mossadeq and Tudeh.

2. Ground two that Mossadeq is leading the
country into complete economic collapse
through his unsympathetic dictatorship.
Just prior to movement CIA would give
widest publicity to the evidence of ille-
gally issued paper money. CIA might have
capability to print masses excellent
imitation currency which would be over-
printed by this message.

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C. Religious refuge to take place at the dawn of
the coup day. Immediately followed by effort
have Majlis pass a motion to censure the
government. This is to be followed by the dis-
missal of Mossadeq and the appointment of Zahedi
as successor. If successful, the coup would be
completed by early afternoon. Failing success,
the coup would be mounted later that evening.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

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APPENDIX B

"London" Draft

of the

TPAJAX Operational Plan

SECRET

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SECRET

"LONDON" DRAFT OF THE TPAJAX OPERATIONAL PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

The policy of both the US and UK governments requires
replacement of Mossadeq as the alternative to certain eco-
nomic collapse in Iran and the eventual loss of the area to
the Soviet orbit. Only through a planned and controlled
replacement can the integrity and independence of the coun-
try be ensured.

General Zahedi is the only figure in Iran currently
capable of heading a new government who could be relied upon
to repress Soviet-Communist penetration and carry out basic
reforms.

The plan which follows is comprised of three successive
stages. The first two stages precede action of a military
nature. They include the present preliminary support period
and the mass propaganda campaign. (See paragraphs below.)
These stages will be of real value to the mutual interests
of US and UK even if final military action is not carried
out in that they will make the position of Mossadeq increas-
ingly vulnerable and unsteady.

The total estimated expenditure required to implement
this plan will be the equivalent of $285,000 of which
$147,500 will be provided by the US Service and $137,500
by the UK Service.

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II. OPERATIONAL PLAN

A. Preliminary Support of Opposition to Mossadeq Government

For a period of several months both the US field sta-
tion and the British group (the Rashidian brothers) have
been in close touch with Zahedi. The British group has
supplied the equivalent of $50,000 (four to five million
rials) for this support.

During this preliminary period beginning 1 June 1953,
and for an estimated two months maximum thereafter, the
United States will provide $35,000 and the United Kingdom
the equivalent of $25,000. Initial payments under this
allocation have already been made by the US field station.

British funds will continue to be paid through present
channels for purposes as directed by the UK or by the US
field station on UK behalf.

US funds are to be distributed through direct US field
station contacts for the specific purpose of extending
and strengthening military and political contacts of Zahedi.

Early in this period Zahedi will be made fully aware
of this dual support and of the joint intention that it
should lead to even more concrete support.

During this period the impression will continue to
be given in the circle of Zahedi's contacts that the Shah

is supporting him by the provision of funds.

The coordination of UK-US field station activity on the developing plan will be achieved through direct contact between US field personnel and the British group with the former acting on behalf of the United Kingdom by relaying instructions and acting as a secure communications link, to augment that already existing.

Appropriate steps will be taken to ensure that overt US policy will conform as closely as possible with the purpose of this plan.

B. Role of the Shah as Focal Point of Opposition

This plan is based on the assumption that the cooperation of the Shah will be obtained. Such cooperation will give a military coup the best chance of success. However, it also envisages the same type of operation through the involuntary involvement of the Shah in this plan.

To play his role the Shah requires special preparation. By nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears, he must be induced to play his role, and this role must require a minimum of affirmative action and cover as brief a period as possible.

We consider Princess Ashraf, his forceful and scheming twin sister, to be the person most likely to be able to

induce the Shah to play his role. We are certain that
Ashraf will eagerly cooperate to bring about the fall
of Mossadeq. Therefore, Ashraf must be approached at
her present location, briefed on the task and sent back
to Iran. Contact will have to be maintained between
Ashraf and the US field station.

The role of the Shah is to be played in three stages,
and Ashraf will be preparing him in advance for each suc-
cessive stage. The first stage will be to convince the
Shah that the United States and the United Kingdom have
a joint aim in Iran, and at the same time to remove his
pathological fear of the "hidden UK hand"; the second
stage will be to inform him in specific terms of what the
immediate future holds for him. The third stage will be
to obtain specific items from him. These stages are
detailed below:

1. **First Stage:**

With prior advice from Princess Ashraf, the leader
of the British group will visit the Shah to assure him
that the United States and the United Kingdom have com-
mon aims towards Iran, and that both want to support
him to the utmost in opposing Mossadeq. The leader
of the British group will say that he is in a position
to prove that the British are supporting the Shah and

that he, the leader, is authorized to speak for the
United Kingdom by stating that any key phrase selected
by the Shah out of several proposed will be given on
successive dates in the Persian language broadcasts
over the BBC.

2.   Second Stage:

With advance warning from Princess Ashraf, General
Schwarzkopf (former head of the US Military Mission
to the Iranian Gendarmerie) is introduced as the US
special representative. This representative is already
well known to and admired by the Shah as a result of
his successful tour of duty in Iran some years ago.

His remarks to the Shah will comprise two parts.
The first part covers the following points:

a. Both governments consider the oil issue of
secondary importance at this time, since the major
issue is the resolve of both governments to maintain
the independence of Iran. Both governments are now
determined to help the Iranians to help themselves
to keep their country from falling into Soviet hands.
If Mossadeq remains in power economic collapse is
certain, and since Mossadeq is permitting extensive
Communist penetration, the economic collapse would
be followed by a Communist takeover of the country.

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b. Both governments feel that the continued existence of the Pahlevi dynasty should be the best bulwark of national sovereignty.

c. As long as Mossadeq is in power the country will get no new financial aid from the United States and indeed present aid may be slashed.

d. Mossadeq must go.

e. His successor will have the strong support of both governments through the same forces that bring him into power.

f. An acceptable oil settlement will be offered, but there is no intention of either rushing this issue or of forcing it on the country.

The second part will cover the following points:

a. The Shah is now, and inevitably will remain, the focal point of all forces opposing Mossadeq.

b. If the Shah fails to go along with these forces he will be solely responsible for the collapse of the country and its loss of independence.

c. If the Shah fails to go along his dynasty is bound to come to an end soon. In spite of the Shah's previous misconceptions, the United States and the United Kingdom have been and are supporting him, but if the Shah fails now, this support will be

withdrawn. The representative will discuss the implications of this.

d. The Shah has stated that Zahedi is acceptable to him as a successor to Mossadeq. Furthermore, the Shah has asked that funds for Zahedi's support given by the United States and United Kingdom governments should be given out in his name.

e. The US and UK governments agree fully that Zahedi is the only effective candidate. Zahedi will be ready to take over in the near future, aided in every way to achieve success by the United States and United Kingdom. The Shah will be kept fully informed of Zahedi's plans and a minimum of action will be required from him. As soon as possible after the visit of the US representative to the Shah, the leader of the British group will make a visit of identical type to reinforce the above statements.

3. Third Stage:

This stage will be the sole responsibility of Princess Ashraf. Immediately following the visits as described above and while the Shah is still under their effects Princess Ashraf will obtain his signature on three documents. The first of these documents will be

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dated, the second and the third undated.

They will be:

a. An open letter calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer of the letter in any efforts he feels are necessary to reestablish the prestige of the Army, to restore their own self respect and to show their devotion to the Shah and country.

b. A royal decree naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff.

c. A royal decree appealing to all ranks of the Army to carry out faithfully the orders of the Chief of Staff whom the Shah has named.

These documents will then be taken out of the palace at once; the first to be delivered to Zahedi and the other two to be held by the US station against time of need.

Following the effort required of him to produce these documents the Shah may be in a period of elation for some time. Sooner or later he will begin to brood and to doubt, and at this time he must be removed from the capital to make some kind of tour. Preferably he would make a religious retreat to the Meshed shrine. He would remain at this shrine until after Zahedi obtains control and would return to the capital only to give his official

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approval to the new Prime Minister.

C. Arrangement with Zahedi

Continuing contacts by US personnel and British agents with Zahedi or his representatives have helped to bring into increasingly clear focus the picture of his tentative plans and of those elements from which he expects support. This material and related intelligence reports have been used in the preparation of later paragraphs which follow under the subtitle "Organization to mount coup," with its supporting material in the annexes.

Following the phased contacts with the Shah as given above, both the United States and the United Kingdom will inform Zahedi directly that they have secured a firm commitment from the Shah on his behalf and that the time has come to move to a detailed plan of action.

General Zahedi will be given the letter signed by the Shah calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer. He will be instructed to recruit, with the aid of this letter, military aides. Zahedi will also be shown the US-UK proposal for action entitled "Organization to overthrow Mossadeq." It will be discussed with Zahedi who will have the opportunity to amend or modify this proposal should this be necessary to meet his desires and

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capabilities. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the plan provides for full US-UK coordinated covert support prior to the time of the coup. Every element of the potential opposition to Mossadeq will be mustered so that on coup day it may be possible to overthrow the Mossadeq government by legal means. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the future character and reputation of the successor government would be better if military action could be limited to assuring control of the city coincident with this legal success.

However, should the Shah fail to go along with the US representative or fail to produce the documents for General Zahedi, Zahedi would be informed that the United States and United Kingdom would be ready to go ahead without the Shah's active cooperation if Zahedi agrees. We would continue to make every effort to associate the Shah with the undertaking involuntarily and so hope to achieve the same result as if he had actively participated.

D. Organization to Mount Overthrow

The material which follows under this heading is that which is to be presented to Zahedi by the US field station for the purpose of discussion and modification.

Under the headings which follow, elements of existing

or potential strength are assigned their specific roles. This approach omits any consideration of the strength of the pro-Mossadeq forces.

1. Organization to Mount Coup

    a. Military secretariat. This secretariat, headed by an officer named by Zahedi but acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom will be composed of a very limited number of capable senior officers. This secretariat will be in contact with the US field station which will hand over a preliminary staff plan jointly prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom for securing Tehran. A sum equivalent to $75,000 will be required for the military secretariat to carry out its functions.

    b. Duties of the secretariat. Its most urgent duty will be the selection of key officers in Tehran who can be counted upon or won over for action against the Mossadeq government. For security reasons, such officers will be informed of their own actual role at the latest possible date.

This secretariat will make a detailed examination of the US and the UK staff plan with special attention to every action to be carried out on coup day. Some of these actions will be immediate seizure of general

staff headquarters, army radio station, Radio Tehran,
the houses of Mossadeq and his entourage, police and
gendarmerie headquarters, post and telegraph offices,
telephone exchange, the Majlis and its printing press,
and the National Bank and its printing press. Arrests
will include the key figures of the Mossadeq govern-
ment, key army officers cooperating with Mossadeq,
and selected newspaper editors.

Special attention will also be given to preparing
measures to be taken against the Tudeh Party. Zahedi
must expect a violent reaction from the Tudeh Party,
and must be fully prepared to meet it with superior
violence. There is no possibility of neutralizing
the party until after the Mossadeq government has been
replaced. However, there will be a breathing spell of
several hours after the change of government before
the Tudeh Party will be able to get out on the streets
in force. At the time of the coup at least 100 party
and front group leaders and journalists must be arrested:
these names will come from a list of approximately 80
such leaders recently prepared by the United Kingdom,
plus US station additions, plus Zahedi's own additions.
Control of the Tehran streets will prevent the massing
of Tudeh or other mob elements. Mass distribution of

black pamphlets, notionally issued by the Central
Committee of the Party, will be made with the purpose
of confusing Tudeh members and of preventing them
from assembling in an effective manner. It may be
possible for the United States to supply by air in
advance stocks of tear gas, indelible ink, or other
materials suitable for the control of mobs. Local
air force planes may drop warnings to the public to
stay off the streets or take the consequences.

    c. Action on coup day. This action will follow
basically similar lines although it may be carried
out relative to as many as three different situations.
These three situations are:

Situation A: The climax of a massive religious protest
against the Mossadeq government which is followed
immediately by military action.

Situation B: The moment when the Shah is being forced
by Mossadeq to leave the country. This action by
Mossadeq will have resulted from either the growing
strength of the opposition as knowingly led by the
Shah or because of its growing strength with the Shah
as its involuntary figurehead.

Situation C: The moment when Mossadeq attempts to
present his resignation. Such an action might result

from his real concern over the growing strength of
the opposition and might take the form, on past show-
ing, of calling on the Shah for personal support.
Failing to win the support of the Shah he might summon
the mobs into the streets.

Action to be taken with regard to Situation A
will be as follows:

At the climax of Situation A, Zahedi will assume
office as Chief of the General Staff by a limited
military action against the headquarters of the general
staff. He will at once name the selected person as his
deputy, and the arrests of Mossadeq and the others will
be made at once. The Majlis will be called into session
and the opposition will attempt to pass a vote of cen-
sure against Mossadeq, and will follow this with a
vote of support for Zahedi. However, with or without
the possession of a royal decree naming him as prime
minister, Zahedi will take over the government and will
execute the various requirements of coup day (see above).
Once he has firmly established his control, he will have
no trouble in obtaining the formal vote of support from
the Majlis. Only then will the Shah return to Tehran.

Action to be taken with regard to Situations B and
C will be as follows:

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The only change in plan will be the necessary advancement of the timetable for coup day to the day of actual crisis and the necessity of putting all the military aspects of the coup machinery into operation at once.

2. <u>Organization to Create a Maximum Public Opposition to Mossadeq Prior to Coup</u>

a. <u>General Program</u>. The purpose will be to create, extend, and enhance public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq and his government. A sum equivalent to $150,000 will be budgeted for this program. This will be a phased operation, with the phases as follows:

Phase 1. This is the current preliminary support stage wherein the receipt of US and UK funds permits Zahedi to win additional friends and to influence key people.

Phase 2. A massive propaganda campaign against Mossadeq and his government but with Mossadeq himself as the principal target. This will begin only a week or two before the climax of Situation A so as not to offer too much time for a sharp reaction by Mossadeq and so that the impact will not be dispersed by being long drawn out.

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Phase 3. This is Situation A which is described in full in a following paragraph.

b. Duties of Specific Elements

(1) Press and publicity. In the preliminary support period the British group will continue to use its numerous smaller papers to push an anti-Mossadeq line. At Headquarters and at the field station US personnel will draft and put into Persian the texts for articles, broadsheets and pamphlets, some pro-Shah and some anti-Mossadeq. The material designed to discredit Mossadeq will hammer the following themes:

(a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR. (This will be supported by black documents.)

(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he associates with the Tudeh and advances their aims.

(c) Mossadeq is deliberately destroying the morale of the Army and its ability to maintain order.

(d) Mossadeq is deliberately fostering the growth of regional separatist elements through his removal of Army control over

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tribal areas. One of the aims of the re-
moval of control by the Army is to make it
easier for the Soviets to take over the
Northern Provinces.

(e) Mossadeq is deliberately leading
the country into economic collapse.

(f) Mossadeq has been corrupted by power
to such an extent that no trace is left of
the fine man of earlier years, and he now
has all the repressive instincts of the
dictator.

(g) Consistent with these themes will be
the persistent slant that Mossadeq has been
the unwitting victim of his unscrupulous,
personally ambitious advisers.

It is considered essential that Zahedi make an
early choice of the man who will be his director
of press and propaganda and who may be deputy
prime minister as well. The US field station
will obtain from Zahedi the name of the man he
has in mind who must be acceptable to the United
States and the United Kingdom. One or two weeks
before the date set for Situation A, the intensive
propaganda effort will begin. The details relative

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to the execution of this campaign will be the primary responsibility of the US field station.

Immediately after the change of government, Zahedi's director of press and propaganda must be prepared to:

(a) Make maximum use of Radio Tehran.

(b) Through Radio Tehran, posters, special news sheets, etc. spread the program of the new government, including elements of broadcast appeal presented in simplest terms, such as immediate slashes in living costs, increased pay for government officials and Army personnel, etc.

(c) Give maximum local publicity to US and UK statements which will have been prepared in advance.

(d) Brief all foreign correspondents.

(2) The Majlis. If the Majlis is in session at the time of the coup, an effort will be made to have the change of government formalized. If it is not in session it will be called into session by one of its elected officers who will have to be a member of the anti-Mossadeq opposition.

To prepare for the change of government, a

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number of the deputies will be approached and
purchased. It is yet to be decided whether
the purchases are to be made by the British
group or directly by Zahedi himself who, as long
as he enjoys the sanctuary of the Majlis build-
ing, is in an excellent position to achieve such
an aim. Following the receipt from one or both
of the above elements of a list of deputies with
the amounts required for the purchase of each
one, a special funding operation will be es-
tablished within the framework of the joint
authorization for the execution of this plan.
The US field station will also employ various
agents and contacts to support this operation.

Its basic aim will be to secure a majority
plus one vote against Mossadeq as required in
Situation A. At the present time it is esti-
mated that at least 30 deputies are prepared
to vote against Mossadeq if they think there is
a good chance that they will be in a majority.
It is to be noted that all Majlis elected mem-
bers would not normally be present at any one
session. However, it will also be necessary
to attempt to ensure that a quorum can be

maintained in the Majlis at the moment when
the anti-Mossadeq vote is to be taken. The
minimum quorum requirement is that two-thirds
of the deputies present in Tehran must be in
the Chamber before a vote can be taken. Thus
an effort will be made to purchase additional
deputies solely to have them remain in the
Chamber to ensure the quorum and not for the
more sensitive role of voting against Mossadeq.

(3) Political elements other than the Tudeh.
Political parties or groups now opposed to Mossadeq
will play only a very minor role in this campaign.
Such parties as the Toilers Party, the Sumka and
sections of the Pan-Iranists could supply only
limited and probably ineffectual street gangs.
The Toilers Party will, however, play a fairly
important role in the publicity described above.

It is to be noted that while these parties
command only ineffectual street gangs, the British
group can muster up to approximately 3,000 street
activists to be committed in Situation A.

(4) Religious leaders. It is our belief that
nearly all the important religious leaders with
large followings are firmly opposed to Mossadeq.

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Both the US field station and the British group
have firm contacts with such leaders. The pro-
Zahedi capabilities in this field are very great.

These leaders include such assorted and some-
times inimical elements as the non-political
leaders   and   , as well as
          and   and his terrorist gang,
          . During the period of intensive anti-
Mossadeq publicity before coup day the leaders
and their henchmen will:

(a) Spread word of their disapproval of
Mossadeq.

(b) Give open support to the symbol of
the throne and give moral backing to the
Shah through direct contact with him at
the shrine.

(c) As required, stage small pro-religious
anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in widely
scattered sections of Tehran.

(d) The terrorist group to threaten that
they are ready to take direct action against
pro-Mossadeq deputies and members of Mossadeq's
entourage and government.

(e) Ensure full participation of themselves

and followers in Situation A.

(f) After the change of government, give
the strongest assurances over Radio Tehran
and in the mosques that the new government
is faithful to religious principles.

(5) Bazaar Merchants. These are defined as a
relatively small number of long established promi-
nent merchants with a semi-religious outlook and
with strong influence over the lower social orders
in the bazaar section. Contacts with these mer-
chants exist both through the British group and
through the US field station.

These merchants are anti-Mossadeq because the
government harms them directly through the stag-
nation of business, the cutting off of imports,
the strenuous collection of taxes, and the
general tightness of money.

In the period of intensive publicity pre-
ceding Situation A, these merchants will be
used to:

(a) Spread anti-Government rumors in the
bazaar.

(b) Stage limited protests in the south of
Tehran against the economic policies of the

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Mossadeq government. Then, at the time of
Situation A, they will:

(c) Close all or part of the bazaar.

c. <u>Final Action Immediately Preceding the Coup</u>.
As noted above, the military action can result
from Situations A, B, or C. However, the pre-
coup activities of the organization as described
above will be primarily for the purpose of creating
Situation A which is described below.

(1) On the appointed day, staged attacks
will be made against respected religious
leaders in Tehran.

(2) Other religious leaders will at once
say that these attacks were ordered by Mossadeq
as his reaction to the disfavor in which his
government is held by the religious leaders of
the entire country.

(3) A number of the more important leaders
will at once take sanctuary in the Majlis
grounds.

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(4) At this time, these religious leaders will release statements through their followers denouncing in the strongest terms the anti-religious attitude and behavior of Mossadeq.

(5) At the same time as 2.b.(4) (d) above, the fullest publicity will be given to the US station fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a secret agreement between Mossadeq and the Tudeh, with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mossadeq and against the religious leaders, the Army, and the police.

(6) Simultaneously, these leaders will call on their followers to take sanctuary all over Tehran in mosques, telegraph and post offices, banks, etc. The British group and the US station will supply all the demonstrators they can to swell their ranks, and at the same time the merchants will attempt to close the bazaar. (This mass sanctuary is designed to interrupt all normal life and activity in the city and to illustrate dramatically the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the government. It is the local version of passive resistance

and by long established tradition the military
and police are unable to take action against
people who take sanctuary.)

(7) In the presence of this increasingly
hostile and abnormal atmosphere, Zahedi will
take over as chief of staff and make those
arrests which are an essential part of the
military phase of the coup.

(8) Just after Zahedi moves, the Majlis
will be called into session to formalize the
change of government and complete the coup.

II. ESTIMATE OF CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF OPERATIONAL PLAN

The preceding material represents a Western-type plan offered for execution by Orientals. However, it was drafted by authors with an intensive knowledge of the country and its people who endeavored to examine and evaluate all the details from the Iranian point of view. Given the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner, we would never expect such a plan to be restudied and executed in the local atmosphere like a Western staff operation.

However, we feel that the plan is broad enough and sufficiently comprehensive to offer a reasonable chance of success even if not carried out 100 percent.

Security among all local elements involved is a serious weakness inherent in the Persian character. We must be aware of the fact that security breaches might lead to repressive measures by Mossadeq.

No precedent for this proposed operation exists in Iran in recent years. The Reza Shah coup was of an entirely different nature. Recent coups in other Near Eastern countries were far easier to carry out since they were not complicated by a large pro-Communist opposition or hampered by the presence of a head of government having

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powerful popular following.

Prior to an estimate of the chances of success, the following points in connection with the general concept of the coup are vital:

A. The failure of the coup would result in:

1. A strong tide of Government-directed hostility toward the United States and the possibility of the United States being expelled from Iran.

2. Loss to the United Kingdom only of operational machinery represented by the group which is intended mainly for the overthrow of Mossadeq.

B. Should the coup be attempted and fail, but the United States is not expelled from Iran and should Mossadeq then fall at a subsequent date, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would be in a position to take advantage of that opportunity since the British group and certain US assets may be destroyed by the failure of the coup.

C. If the coup is not undertaken, the United States still stands to be expelled from Iran as the certain economic collapse under the present Mossadeq government would probably be accompanied by internal chaos and a subsequent takeover by the Tudeh under USSR direction.

D. If the coup plan is rejected at this time, then another
plan should be prepared against the time of economic col-
lapse and internal chaos.

Conclusion: Subject to the Shah's support, Zahedi's
acceptance of the basic features of this plan, our ap-
proval of his modifications, and to our feeling certain
that he will act according to an established timetable,
the authors of this plan believe that the coup will
succeed.

V. ANNEXES

These proposed annexes are not included in this draft
as they must be based upon a great mass of intelligence
and information which is still being specifically collected
for this purpose.

Annexes would include very detailed listing of all
support available or probably available to Zahedi such as
names and positions of Army officers backing him, critical
examination of the position of the Majlis deputies, apprais-
al of size and cohesion of religious leaders supporting
Zahedi, the proposed cabinet of Zahedi, etc.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a
nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account
of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached.
The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction
and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not
to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent
historians who believed there might be serious risk that some
of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in
Iran.

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the
document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers
may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the
Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not
published here. In addition, certain names and identifying
descriptions have been removed from the documents available
on the Web.]

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APPENDIX C

Foreign Office Memorandum
of 23 July 1953
from British Ambassador Makins
to
Assistant Under Secretary of State Smith

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

"Her Majesty's Government have noted the State
Department's views as got out in a report on the con-
versation between Mr. Byroade and Mr. Bealey on 7 July,
and have much sympathy for them.

"The overriding consideration is that the whole
question of compensation must be left to the impartial
arbitration of an international tribunal. Furthermore
the terms of any future arrangements must be such as not
to appear to provide a reward for the tearing up of con-
tractual obligations or to disturb the pattern of world
oil prices. Subject to this Her Majesty's Government are
prepared to go to the utmost to help...with the problem
of presenting an agreement to the public' locally. They
are also convinced that the Company, who have not been
consulted, will adopt a generous attitude as regards
methods and duration of payments as regards any compen-
sation awarded to them.

"The answers therefore to the specific questions
raised in the report from Washington Embassy are as follows:

"(a) The United Kingdom can do without this oil,
although it would be an advantage to have it flowing
into its traditional markets [the UK] once more.

Her Majesty's Government are, however, anxious to dispose of the dispute which poisons their relations with the country concerned and is a disturbing element in the area as a whole. They would therefore 'be ready to cooperate' with a new government in trying to reach an agreement, provided that the principles referred to in paragraph 2 above are safeguarded.

"(b) Her Majesty's Government take the wording of the plan to mean that the initiative would be left to the future Prime Minister both as to the priority of an oil agreement in relation to his general programme and as to the nature of it. They hope he would agree to look at the February proposals, and they would of course 'help him in regard to the presentation of the agreement.' If he had any alternative proposals, Her Majesty's Government would consider them with equal sympathy, subject always to the principles mentioned above being safeguarded."

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.

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APPENDIX D

Report on

Military Planning Aspect

of TPAJAX

Military Aspects Operation TPAJAX

In early summer 1953 Carroll was assigned the task of planning military aspects of TPAJAX. Several assumptions first had to be taken into account:

A. Operation would be joint operation with SIS.

B. Operation would rely heavily upon military willingness to fight for Shah.

C. Armed forces in Iran under Mossadeq very strongly led by pro-Mossadeq officers.

D. Operational assets within armed forces controlled by SIS or CIA were not at the outset capable of executing the military objectives of TPAJAX.

Planning Tasks which had to be accomplished:

E. Detailed study of the leading military personalities in Iran.

F. Detailed study of order of battle of the Iranian Army with emphasis on the Tehran garrison.

G. Detailed military study of communications, supply dumps, ammunition depots, command structure Iranian armed forces, time and distance factors within Tehran and throughout Iran, including road and rail nets.

H. Detailed study military assets possessed by SIS.

I. Operational assets to be developed by CIA; almost no military assets were then under CIA control.

George Carroll in Washington began a staff study pre-
liminary to drafting a military plan. Persons who were
particularly helpful in the preparation of this study were
Jerome F. Begert, William Fowlkes, Jr., Eugene E. Cilsdorf,
Elizabeth E. McNeill, Betty J. Caldwell, and Arthur W.
Dubois. This group constituted a branch task force.

Throughout the summer cables were exchanged with the
Tehran Station in an effort to procure the latest informa-
tion on the order of battle of Iranian armed forces. The
Iranian desk, G-2, Pentagon, was queried in an effort to
obtain whatever information they could get which might help
accomplish the above tasks. Information available in G-2
was almost non-existent. Biographical information on
leading Army figures was extremely scanty. G-2 did not
possess a tactical map showing the military situation in
the city of Tehran. It must also be admitted that CIA
too was unprepared for this type of operational plan and
a heavy burden had to be laid upon the field at a time
when the Tehran Station was already occupied with the
opening phases of TPAJAX.

The primary difficulty in staff planning at this time
was the fact that neither the field nor Headquarters pos-
sessed detailed information on military figures in Iran.
CIA had heretofore never placed particular emphasis on

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that type of operational reporting, and we learned as
the days went by how extremely important, indeed vital,
that type of reporting is.

Throughout the month of June, the branch task force
gradually was supplied information from the field which
made it possible to begin thinking about the use of the
forces within the Tehran garrison. The field reported
that Tehran was garrisoned by five brigades, three infan-
try mountain brigades, and two armored brigades. In
addition, four other military forces existed: the Gen-
darmerie, the police, the armed customs guard, and the
forces under the military governor. It was also learned
that the young Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Taghi
Riahi, and his staff had been drawn primarily from members
of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party. It had to be assumed that
the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his
staff were under control of Mossadeq. It also had to be
assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade
commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's
control. These assumptions proved to be correct. SIS
reported that Colonel ███████████████████████████████
███ could
be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but
for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed

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correct. It was disappointing to learn that Major General Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under TPAJAX, possessed almost no military assets. General Zahedi, therefore, could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan.

In the early part of July, the branch task force was able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran. It appeared at that time that only a very small force could be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Third Mountain Brigade in Tehran. Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces in the city of Tehran.

Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any military assets capable at that time of helping TPAJAX, it was suggested that Station agent Colonel ████████████ be given special training. ███████ was trained in a safehouse in Washington with the assistance of instructors from the training division. ███████ had no idea what lay before him. He had never previously participated in any military action, although he had been superbly trained ███

████████████████████████████████████

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▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

before that had been the ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓

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▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ Because of

the extreme sensitivity of TPAJAX, ▓▓▓▓▓ was given

the lie detector test. In early July, ▓▓▓▓▓ was

directed to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old

contacts within the Iranian Army.

In June, Carroll was assigned TDY to Cyprus to work
with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS. Carroll
concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and
ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran
military assets. Headquarters was extremely concerned
because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a firman
dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his Army
officers and men were well organized enough to force
Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey
the firman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military
assets capable of being organized into an effective fight-
ing force and it was feared that the development of new
military assets and their organization into a fighting
force could not be accomplished in time.

SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important

friends among the military, but the only officer among their
friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was
Colonel ██████. SIS agreed that our preliminary military
plan must be based upon the assumption that Colonel ██████
would cooperate. Military Planner Carroll doubted whether
one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow
Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be
viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped
upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to
Colonel ██████. From the military point of view the dis-
cussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they
made it clear that we wanted to accomplish much but had very
little with which to accomplish it. It also made it clear
that Carroll and ████████████ should arrive in Tehran
as soon as possible where the military plan would of neces-
sity have to be completed.

On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied
the military plan for two days and approved it with little
comment. They agreed that, if TPAJAX were to succeed, CIA
must start from scratch and work quickly to find powerful
friends among Iranian Army troop commanders. In London,
Carroll with Major Keen and two other British Army officers
on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had
been drawn by the branch task force.

Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists

for military and civilian persons in Tehran. These lists
were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq
Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent cor-
rect. The British approved the arrest lists after their CE
expert and their biographical section had studied them. A
third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very
carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved with-
out addition. It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians
must have been based upon approximately the same information.

While these arrests lists were farmed out to SIS ex-
perts, Carroll sat down to study the two military plans
with Major Keen and with the British major. The first plan
was based upon the assumption that ███████████ was a con-
trolled British agent ████████████████████████████
███████████████ After a detailed examination of the
Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine
gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the
Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had
listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we
had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain
Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest.

We next turned to an examination of our second military
plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able
to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three
brigades. We all agreed that it would be extremely

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hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out
of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should
attempt to develop additional forces. SIS approved this
plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier
who returned them the next day without comment.

During these discussions a cable arrived in London
via Cyprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported
General Zahedi's "military assets." This message con-
firmed all of our fears. For some time the Station had
been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his
military assets and to indicate how he hoped to use them.
At last General Zahedi reported. He claimed none of the
five brigades in Tehran. His military plan assumed that he
might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from
the Department of Army Transport, components from the De-
partment of Police, and components of the Armed Customs
Guard. He also hoped that Colonel ████████ might
be able to bring troops to Tehran from ████████. SIS
asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's
plan. In that appraisal it was stated that he did not
believe the Shah would sign a firman dismissing Mossadeq
until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff
Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken;
further, he felt that if TPAJAX were to succeed military

assets must be developed within the five brigades in Tehran.

SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take the following priority:

1. Seizure and occupation of designated points.

2. Execution of arrest and detention lists.

3. Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military forces in Tehran.

4. Neutralization of the city of Tehran.

5. Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in Tehran by forces outside of the city.

These priorities were laid down because it was desired that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from communicating with each other.

Carroll left London on the first available aircraft following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July, and got in touch with ███████.

Sifting through ████████ operational contact reports covering all of his important conversations in Tehran ██████████████████████, two offi-cers were noted as being of special promise. These were contact reports of conversations with Major General ██████ ████████ and with Colonel ████████████, both of whom

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were old and good friends of ███████. These two officers reflected the fear of the Tudeh Party that was becoming general after the Tudeh showing of 21 July. Goiran, Goodwin, and Carroll agreed that it was imperative that Carroll meet as soon as possible with an officer appointed by Zahedi to work on our military scheme. Zahedi never did designate a military secretariat, and it was necessary for us to develop our own.

Because of General Zahedi's manifestly weak position among the military then on active duty, and because it became apparent that it would be necessary for CIA to seize the initiative and to furnish him with a military plan and military forces, the development of Colonel ████████ was stepped up. ████████ was directed to determine what assets Colonel ████████ might be able to lead us to. Colonel ███████ first offered a "Plan A" which called for a military coup d'etat without explaining how it was to be accomplished. Then ████████ was pressed to persuade Colonel █████ to be more realistic, and on 30 July he received from Colonel ████████ a plan which was more specific but still pitifully inadequate. Colonel █████ said he could execute arrests and target lists, neutralize military installations and non-cooperating forces within two hours; this was nonsense. The most important thing Colonel █████ reported was that he was in touch with three young colonels who might possess

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important strength within the Tehran garrison. Colonel ███ also told ███████ that General ████████ lacked courage but would stiffen his back should the Shah appoint him chief of staff. Colonel ████ did not mention General Zahedi and did not seem to be in touch with him. ████████ told Colonel ████ that he could put Colonel ██████ in touch with one or two Americans whom he had met in the United States.

At this time the Shah also indicated that he did not have control of important military assets.

Carroll met ██████ and ████████ on 2 and 3 August and began staff planning. Colonel ████ was full of desire to do something, but had no idea of how to go about it. He said that he had friends who could control the Second and Third Mountain Brigades but did not trust either Colonel ████████████████████████████, or Colonel Momtaz, Commanding Officer of the Second Mountain Brigade. Colonel ████ reported that General ████████ had told him the day before that if the Shah acted he was ready to perform any service whatsoever and to die for the Shah if necessary. After these early meetings with Colonel ████, it became apparent that he, himself, was not in a position to command anything and was only hoping that he might persuade his

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friends to do so.

Carroll then met directly with Colonel ▓▓▓▓ and his friend. The latter turned out to be Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓▓, ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓. Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓▓ reported a long list of assets within the Tehran garrison, principally among deputy commanders of brigades and regimental commanders. On 6, 7, and 8 August, Colonels ▓▓▓▓▓, ▓▓▓▓▓▓, and Mr. Carroll carried on staff planning based upon the units commanded by friends whom ▓▓▓▓ claimed. Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓ stated that his primary friends were ▓▓▓▓▓▓, of the Tehran police; ▓▓▓▓ ▓▓▓▓, of the Tehran Gendarmerie District; and ▓▓▓▓ ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓. He felt certain that ultimate victory would be ours through these friends, and through his friends who were regimental and battalion commanders, among whom were these important unit commanders in the Tehran garrison: ▓▓. Through these officers Colonel ▓▓▓▓ ▓▓▓▓ was in touch with every infantry battalion commander in Tehran and with most of the company commanders; however,

these officers had not been formed into an organization and were not ready to overthrow Chief of Staff General Riahi's firm control of the Tehran garrison which he exercised through the Brigade Commanders in Tehran. For instance, if we were to succeed we must arrest Colonel Sharokh, Commanding Officer First Armored Brigade; Colonel Parsa, Commanding Officer First Mountain Brigade; Colonel Momtaz, Commanding Officer Second Mountain Brigade; and probably Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade. Colonel Novzari, Commanding Officer of the Second Armored Brigade would probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested.

It therefore became clear from the military point of view that success might depend upon whether or not General Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning team.

It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable of carrying on our operations in the event our first platoon of young officers was arrested. Carroll therefore worked for two nights with Colonels ████████████████████

devising a system which would work in the event our first team was arrested. The danger signal we adopted to alert battalion and company commanders to take independent action was the arrest of Colonel █████████ and of his closest friends. The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the station would not be in a position to contact battalion and company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel █████████ to do the job. While discussing this subject, Colonel █████████ stated that he would be able to contact lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the Shah's _firman_.

The hesitation of the Shah in signing the _firman_ worked to our advantage for it gave us several more important days' in which to discuss with Colonel █████████ the development of our final staff plan which was based upon the use of the units which his friends commanded. This problem was complicated by the fact that Colonel █████ became violently ill and was later forced to retire to his bed. As the climax approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel █████████ illness. Colonel █████ did remain on his feet long enough to speak to the Shah on 3 August in an interview which later proved vital to the success of the military phase of TPAJAX. Until Colonel █████ saw the Shah, he was not

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certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act without the Shah's approval. However, after talking with the Shah, Colonel ███ was able to tell Colonel ███ ███ that the Shah did desire military support in the event he should decide to sign the firman.

Colonel ███ was asked by the Shah whether or not the Army would back a firman dismissing Mossadeq. Colonel ███ told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one that assured victory if it were carried out properly. The Shah then asked ███ for the names of the officers who would cooperate, and Colonel ███ reported the same names which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah Rashidian. He asked ███ to meet General Zahedi.

In reporting the substance of his audience with the Shah, Colonel ███ asked the station if the United States would support General Zahedi. He was told that it would. Colonel ███ also accepted General Zahedi. Both officers stated that they had not been in touch with General Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good leader.

During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff planning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders within the Tehran garrison. Colonel ███ met General

Zahedi who agreed that General ▓▓▓▓▓▓ might be chief
of staff. General ▓▓▓▓▓▓ expressed the desire to
meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan,
Colonel ▓▓▓, and Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓. This meeting
was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete
enough for General ▓▓▓▓▓ to act upon it.

On 11 August Zahedi asked ▓▓▓ to have ▓▓▓▓▓
come to see him. General Zahedi and ▓▓▓▓ talked
for three hours. ▓▓▓▓▓ reported that General Zahedi
was extremely appreciative of American assistance and
asked ▓▓▓▓ to act as a liaison officer between him-
self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked
him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau
which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week.

On 12 August Farzanegan took General ▓▓▓▓▓ to
see Zahedi, and General ▓▓▓▓ pledged General Zahedi
all assistance. ▓▓▓▓ also took Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓
to see Zahedi and the latter reported to General Zahedi
progress of military staff planning. In retrospect it
would appear that under more favorable conditions we should
have spent more time going over the staff plan with Zahedi
and General ▓▓▓▓, for it was at this moment that
the military phase of TPAJAX passed into Zahedi's hands,
although Zahedi did not know any of the young officers

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involved and General ▓▓▓▓▓▓ knew only a few of them.

During the afternoon of 13 August, Carroll met with General ▓▓▓▓▓ and the Military Secretariat composed of ▓▓▓▓ Colonel ▓▓▓ and Colonel ▓▓▓▓. The firmans were expected momentarily and much of the conversation revolved around the question of how long it would take Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓ to contact our friendly forty line commanders. After a long discussion everyone agreed action should commence within 48 hours of the receipt of the firman. It was also agreed that Colonel ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓, would deliver the firman to Mossadeq after he had sent the station a radio set attuned to Colonel ▓▓▓▓ command net.

Colonel ▓▓▓ flew to Ramsar with the unsigned firmans on 13 August.

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APPENDIX E

Military Critique

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

re Military Planning Aspects of Coup d'Etat

MILITARY CRITIQUE/TPAJAX

Lessons Learned from TPAJAX

Re: Military Planning Aspects of <u>Coup d'etat</u>

I. The Problem of Personnel Assessment

    A. If CIA desires to overthrow a hostile government by employing armed forces against that government, then CIA must identify friendly forces, make contact with them, and successfully employ them.

    B. The decision to attempt a military <u>coup d'etat</u> should only be made after it has been determined that potentially useful forces do exist. Distinction must be made in making this estimate of the situation between "grousers" and "activists." When attempting to estimate potential assets, experience has shown that it is vital to have as detailed biographical information as possible on all military personnel whose presence might bear upon the problem, including possible enemies as well as friends.

    C. Biographical information cannot be collected in a short period of time. It must be reported on a basis of continuity and must include everything known about individual officers, no matter how trivial. Military

attaches are the normal channels for these reports,
but Military Advisory Assistance Groups, where present,
are the best source of this type of information because
they work and take recreation side by side with indig-
enous officers. It has been our experience that too
little emphasis is being placed upon this requirement;
too often the files of officers contain only short refer-
ences to an officer's assignments, promotions, decorations,
omitting all personalia which could indicate who an
officer really is, what makes him tick, who his friends
are, etc.

D. Biographical files on CIA agents in the armed forces
are more complete but often these agents are found in
G-2 sections and other staffs, and not among troop
commanders.

E. Assuming that sufficient biographical information exists
concerning military personnel and their motivations, our
next task is to assess the character of each military
person under review. The assessment of officers should
be done with a clear appreciation of the traditions of
the indigenous service in mind. For instance, the Army
in Iran has a modern tradition of defeat. The Iranian
officer is usually indecisive and covers his inferiority
with bombast and chest beating. Therefore the location

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of leaders who are willing to lead and to die is a
hazardous occupation. Perhaps the Shah is a good
example of the "typical" Iranian officer; his weak-
nesses are reflected throughout his Officer Corps.

On the other hand, a true leader in the Army is
worth his weight in gold for he truly will count for
far more in Iran than in other countries where valor
is traditional.

F. After personal assessment of officers has been completed,
CIA will find good and bad officers within all factions
or groups. Here political and patriotic motivations
must be assessed as well as possible. The political
milieu will underlay assessment of officers, and non-
military operations (KUGOWN) might have to be prevailed
upon to create conditions capable of intensifying or
weakening motivations in such a way as to create poten-
tial assets which at the time of assessments do not yet
exist.

G. Friendship toward "the free world," "the United States,"
"the United Nations," "white colonialism," and many other
political motivations will be found in all countries. In
Iran CIA found that officers were generally "pro-Shah,"
"pro-Mossadeq," or "fence-sitters." The intensity of
individual political motivations was different in each

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case, and was often less important than _personal_ moti-
vations such as ambition, jealousy, young officers'
resentments of old officers and vice versa. There is
no tradition of military revolutions, but Reza Shah did
seize control of the government by using military posi-
tion as the springboard. Hence, the political motivation
of officers and personal motivations within the political
milieu have been and are factors to be considered in
assessment of military personnel.

H. Of equal importance in Iran was the assessment of the
Commander-in-Chief, the Shah, who also is the head of
State. From the military point of view, assessment had
to be made of the Shah as Commander-in-Chief, including
his depth of influence, command ability, and courage under
fire. His use as a focal point or fusing point around
which military persons and groups might rally also had
to be assessed.

Without stating reasons, our assessment of his
usefulness was positive in these fields:

1. Head of State to dismiss hostile government.

2. Commander-in-Chief as rallying symbol.

Our assessment was negative in these fields:

1. Commander-in-Chief as planner and participant
   in military action.

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I. Turning from our assessment of the Shah, we concluded that the Shah as a symbol could be used to incite action on the part of important military personnel.

J. Our assessments of individual military persons led us to the conclusion that Major General Zahedi was the best suited officer available to lead forces for the Shah against the hostile government for these reasons:

    1. He was the only man in Iran openly bidding for the prime ministership.

    2. He thus displayed unique courage in that action.

    3. He had displayed courage in the past, for as a soldier of 25 years he had been made a Brigadier General in recognition of combat leadership against the Bolsheviki.

    4. His life had been saved by an American doctor after four of Zahedi's ribs had been removed.

    5. He was known to be pro-American and had permitted his son, Ardeshir, to study in the United States for six years. He was a senior Major General and had won the respect of many senior and junior officers.

6. His negative qualifications were as follows:

    a. He had been out of the Army for several years and did not know young junior officers.

    b. He was identified in some quarters as venal. His capacity for leading a <u>coup d'etat</u> was unknown; he had never distinguished himself as a staff officer, but primarily as a commander.

    c. Most of his friends were drawn from among the civilian population--few were Army officers.

L. Specific assessment of line commanders in the Tehran garrison could not go forward in Washington until intelligence directives had been laid upon the field station. For instance, Headquarters did not know the

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names of any of the Brigade Commanders in Tehran, and
to our surprise, neither did the G-2 Section, Pentagon!
Headquarters did not possess any idea of the order of
battle in Iran nor did G-2, Pentagon. Before specific
assessment of line commanders could be made, therefore,
Tehran Station had to report to Headquarters military
information which should have been collected by military
attaches on a day-to-day basis.

M. While assessment of individual officers was being made
in Headquarters, the actual decision had been taken by
the Department of State to do everything possible to
turn out Mossadeq. This decision to proceed found us
with no clear picture of the military situation in Iran,
without even a list of officers and their assignments,
and with no operational assets among those officers in
command positions. It must be understood, therefore,
that swifter movement was required in all phases of our
military action to such an extent that assessments were
made and decisions taken on a much less secure basis
than would otherwise have been the case.

N. Our assessment of Mossadeq's Chief of Staff, Brigadier
General Taghi Riahi, was done with care. We studied
him in the light of his total personal environment,
including a study of the persons with whom he lived,

the persons he had removed from office, the persons
he appointed to office, persons he had gathered in
his staff, the political persons with whom he associ-
ated. From the political point of view, there was no
doubt that Mossadeq had chosen his chief of staff very
well. (We felt certain that Riahi would follow Mossadeq
in a showdown, and not the Shah.) But from the military
point of view, Brigadier General Riahi had several weak-
nesses. We could not be sure, but we had good ground
to hope that Riahi's lack of command and combat experience
would prove important if a test of military strength could
be brought about. We did not question his personal cour-
age and integrity. We found that he was residing with
three of the outstanding members of the pro-Mossadeq
Iranian Party and that he actually had led a pro-Mossadeq
faction within the Army. He and most of his staff had
been French-trained and were very thorough in staff work
and very green in the field.

O. As the field began to report personalia concerning
brigadier commanders, brigade deputy commanders, regi-
mental and battalion commanders in Tehran and in other
parts of Iran, we were able to assess the situation with
much greater clarity. It became evident that it would
be necessary to arrest or remove most of the brigade

commanders and to develop operational assets, for the most part, beneath that echelon of command. This assessment later proved to be correct and saved us much time and kept us from harm--from the security point of view. Because of the all-pervading necessity of drum-tight security, we could see from the beginning the necessity for approaching and developing only those persons with whom we stood a very good chance of success.

p. From all the above it can readily be seen that the possession of all-inclusive biographical information is vital to the success of any operation which includes large-scale use of military personnel. Failure can easily depend upon a mistake in the assessment of one officer and victory hinge upon it.

II. A. Military Intelligence as a Basis for Action Intended to Overthrow Hostile Governments:

1. A war map should be kept by paramilitary officers in each station where revolutionary action may be required. Maps should be assembled of every scale of possible use. The complete order of battle should be posted on a current basis. The supply situation as regards ammunition, gasoline and petrol, clothing and

equipment, etc., must be watched very carefully. There
may be no use sending a brigade into action against a
hostile government when that brigade possesses only six
rounds of ammunition per man.

2. Defensive measures taken by hostile governments
should be watched very carefully. In Iran, Mossadeq's
government assembled most of the motor transport into
one motor pool; his government permitted only enough
petrol for tanks to permit them to operate for one hour;
the issuance of ammunition was reduced to an absolute
minimum; and ammunition supply dumps were heavily re-
inforced (guarded). The signal code for the Iranian
Army was changed only three weeks prior to the Mossadeq
overthrow.

At two critical moments, Chief of
Staff General Riahi assembled all officers in the Tehran
garrison and made emotional appeals to their patriotism,
equated by him with support for Mossadeq. Lists of offi-
cers' license plates on vehicles were called for by
General Riahi, and in some cases officers were followed.
Also, spot telephone checks were made to officers' homes

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in an attempt to learn which officers were spending their evenings away from their homes.

B. It is also necessary to study all military installations which must be seized or protected. For that purpose it is necessary to have detailed drawings of important head-quarters, of important communication centers, etc. In the beginning of TPAJAX we possessed none of this informa-tion, except for a few excellent sabotage studies made of civilian installations.

C. In an action of this sort it must also be appreciated well in advance that key civilian personnel and civilian installations must be seized. It should be possible to call upon many sources of information for assessment of political figures, but the collection of information concerning physical characteristics of telephone offices, radio stations, airports, etc., is a matter that can greatly be assisted when collected under the guidance of a paramilitary officer who understands what he is looking for; that is not to say that an excellent intelligence officer could not do the same but his intelligence directives should be carefully drawn.

D. Weather conditions may be absolutely vital to success and should be noted at least well in advance. Should fog exist, for instance, time and distance factors in

staff planning may be thrown off entirely. Rain and
storms might do the same. The question of whether or
not to begin action by daylight or at night is a vital
decision, and it must be made on the ground. In places
where curfews exist, conditions may be radically altered
by that fact. In other locations the habits of the
people may be of extremely important military signifi-
cance; for instance, the siesta habit, including the
closing of most of the shops in business areas, may be
important. Also, the day in the week observed as the
religious day should be studied for possible usefulness
as well as important holidays. Days which neutralize or
tend to neutralize opposition groups should be studied
with care; for instance, training of military units in
some locations is rotated and it might be found that a
hostile unit will be sent out of the area of action on
a day upon which it may be possible to act.

E. Military information concerning G-1 sections may prove
extremely useful. In some cases it is possible to
arrange for the replacement or reassignment of officers
who are in the wrong position from our point of view.
The placing of the right man in the right spot at the
right time is of course the most important factor in
all military operations and should under no circumstances

be overlooked in operations of this kind.

F. Actions which might be taken against you should be
studied very carefully and you should receive well
in advance notice of measures of this kind before
they are actually effected. It will also be under-
stood that G-2 sections may be used in various ways.
The feeding by you of diversionary information con-
cerning the existence of military cabals to G-2 sec-
tions may possibly be used in places where panic may
result in the hostile camp. In Iran we were greatly
assisted by the fact that many groups of officers
were suspected of planning a coup. As tension increased,
reports of this sort also increased. Although they
served to alert the hostile government, they also
served to smokescreen our activities and the activi-
ties of our friends. This whole matter is naturally
a matter of study under local conditions, but our ex-
perience may be of some assistance in places where
similar circumstances exist.

G. It may also be entirely possible that other military
groups are being formed to combat the hostile govern-
ment, and in that case we should know who they are and
what they intend to do. It may be necessary to split
some of these groups, or it may be necessary to fuse

14

them with our forces. In both cases our action must
be delicately taken on the basis of very good informa-
tion. Provocation must be carefully watched for, and
remedial steps planned for and taken in the event any
of our friends nibbles at the bait.

H. Information concerning our own friends is perhaps the
most important field for collection. The appraisal of
our own security situation on a continuous basis is a
paramount consideration for current decision-making.
In Iran we developed and recruited young colonels
after very quick assessment, fully understanding the
risk we were taking; at the same time, we attempted
to probe and to delve in an effort to find out as much
about our new recruits as possible.

I. If it is at all possible to develop secretly assets
which can check upon the actions of our friends, it
will be found extremely useful to have them, for it
will be found that the military situation can become
extremely fluid and it is absolutely vital to know
who has been wounded, arrested, doubled, etc. Early
warning of a security break should be provided for and
a warning then established capable of reaching and
warning other assets. This is particularly true during
action phases.

J. Security controls may change from day to day and we
    should have information concerning that entire field.
    For instance, in the middle of an extremely fluid mili-
    tary situation it was necessary for one of our officers
    and for one of our principal agents to make hasty trips
    after curfew hours to cities eight and ten hours away
    from the capital. We were able to provide them with
    forged documents which proved absolutely necessary to
    the success of their missions.

K. Information concerning the available radio and telegraphic
    nets is extremely important. In Iran there is an Air
    Force radio net, gendarmerie radio net, Army radio net,
    railroad net, and an oil company telegraphic net. The
    number and extent of telegraphic nets is often surprising
    in any country and they must be studied very carefully
    for obvious reasons. At one stage in operation TPAJAX
    we used the overt governmental telegraphic system, using
    simple phrases for operational meaning (over-writing).
    Telephone systems are easy means for both hostile and
    friendly forces to communicate with each other, and infor-
    mation should be gathered on the extent to which central
    tapping services exist and, if possible, targets under
    tap should be identified. In Iran it was known that the
    Tudeh Party had penetrated the governmental communication

system and, despite that fact, we relied upon that
system because at one point all other means of communi-
cation broke down. The insecurity of that practice was
realized but had to be accepted under the circumstances.
In the signal center in the office of the chief of staff,
or the signal center used by the Army Chief of Staff, is
the single most important communication base available
to a hostile opposition. If this center cannot be pene-
trated it should be neutralized and alternate means of
communications established for friendly forces.

L. Information gathering can sometimes be of use during
occasions in which it is necessary to fabricate "excuses
for action." Good penetrations of the hostile government
might possibly turn up actions taken by the hostile
government which have not been revealed to the public.
In attempting to recruit personnel to your cause, it
will always be necessary to provoke them to action when
their motivation is insufficient to cause them to act
under their own steam.

III. Military Planning as a Basis of Coup d'etat

A. The science of military planning is too deep and well known to be covered in this paper. Needless to say, those officers who are responsible for military planning should have had qualified experience in the armed forces in preparation for this assignment.

B. In addition to a background in military planning, officers should also be experienced in clandestine operations. The basis of a coup d'etat is security which permits us to exercise operational surprise. The basis of security is good operational tradecraft which can only come from experience.

C. It may be assumed that a military bureau composed of indigenous officers will be available for specific local planning, either from within the target country or from without. This military bureau can operate only when it possesses current and complete military intelligence.

D. The military bureau may be designated by the leader-to-be of the new friendly government or may be composed independently of the leader-designee. In either case, clandestine tradecraft is a vital necessity.

E. Whether or not a CIA officer shall be exposed to this

military bureau will depend upon the local situation. In Iran we found it necessary to commit the CIA planner, who later found it necessary to participate in the operation itself on an equal basis with indigenous officers. It is obvious that this practice is an additional security risk which should be avoided if possible.

F. Political arrest lists should be furnished the CIA military planner, and it is his job to designate forces to execute such lists. Military and civilian targets for neutralizing and seizure by friendly forces should be drawn up by the CIA military officer and the military bureau.

G. If possible, a CIA radio net should be created specifically for the coup d'etat tying in our CIA field officer with the military bureau which in turn should be tied in to the headquarters and command units for friendly forces. Where this practice is not feasible, other means of communications should primarily be relied upon. But in all situations a primary and alternate means of communication among these elements should be created.

H. Military planning should be based upon the principle that some elements within our friendly forces will be exposed, and that our operation must not collapse on that account. Therefore, danger signals should be

included which automatically call for movement from one phase to the other depending upon who or what units have been exposed to the hostile government. In Iran there was good reason to believe that danger signals so noted prior to the change of government were instrumental in keeping alive an operation which, to an outsider, appeared to have failed.

I. The possibility of civil war must be accepted by our military planners and measures taken within the plan for that eventuality. Such an eventuality might possibly include the necessity for establishing a safebase for the new friendly government. Possibilities and eventualities stemming from civil war can only be seen upon the analysis of each local situation, but they are not difficult to foresee and should certainly be planned for.

J. The creation of safehouse bases for operational contacts must be planned for and executed well in advance of the commitment of our friendly forces. Several safehouses or safebases should be found in order to maintain contact with friendly elements in the event one or more of our safehouses are blown. In cases where CIA personnel are all stationed within an embassy the operational situation demands that safehouses and safebases be

established. These safehouses should ideally include radio, independent telephone, or other means of communications, depending upon the local situation. In situations in which it is necessary to cache money, ammunition, arms, clothing, food, and documents, safehouses should be found with secure keepers capable of securing those items.

K. Support items such as automobiles, taxicabs, and other vehicles should be procured and kept sterile well in advance of the operational situation.

L. Compartmentation of persons and units who compose our friendly forces should be made wherever possible. In the event a part of our operation be exposed, it is vital that interrogation not disclose our entire assets.

M. Members of the military bureau should under no circumstances actively participate in the operation because under interrogation they would be in a position to disclose too much.

N. The military board should include both staff officers and line officers, and as many functional specialists as may be necessary under local conditions. A communications staff officer will be found very useful.

O. Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of all CIA

officers involved in this type of operation. Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type. This fact makes it imperative that the best trained and experienced officers who can be found be assigned.

P. Military planning should include the possibilities of complete failure and, therefore, should include an evacuation scheme for CIA and indigenous personnel who might be exposed. Aircraft of American military attaches, evasion and escape nets, and other operational assets might have to be employed. If none of these assets exists then hiding places should be created in advance of the operation which are kept sterile throughout.

Q. Commitments to friendly persons should be kept well within our ability to make good. In Iran we did not rely upon bribery because we felt that those officers who would accept bribes would probably betray the operation in the event of extreme difficulty, i.e., torture. In Iran we did not spend one cent in the purchase of officers.

R. Forethought should also be given to the problem of care and keep of wives and families of friendly officers.

S. The possibility of using weapons of foreign make should be kept well in mind in cases where American arms are not indigenous to the local area.

way as to neutralize entire cities through the use of
road blocks, strong points, traffic control, curfews,
new documentation, etc.

X. Needless to say, a complete roster of officer assign-
ments in the new army should be drawn well in advance
in order that there be no confusion.

Y. Wherever possible it is much better to use the local
army supply system than it is to create a new clan-
destine one. It also follows that it is much better
to conduct the operation from within the country than
it is to attempt a cross-border operation. It is also
much easier to execute the operation when CIA officers
are present than it is when CIA officers are outside
the country. Deep cover personnel should be used in
order to prevent severe blowback whenever it is possible
to do so.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a
nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account
of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached.
The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction
and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not
to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent
historians who believed there might be serious risk that some
of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in
Iran.

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the
document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers
may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the
Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not
published here. In addition, certain names and identifying
descriptions have been removed from the documents available
on the Web.]

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Appendix C: A COMMUNICATIONS MANUAL PRODUCED BY THE ISRAEL PROJECT (2009) AND AUTHORED BY FRANK LUNTZ, OFFERING PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDANCE ON LANGUAGE AND FRAMING INTENDED TO SHAPE AUDIENCE INTERPRETATION

(Sources: https://archive.org/details/TheIsraelProjectTheGlobalLanguageDictionary2009HasbaraManual/mode/2up)

The Israel Project
for security, freedom and peace

The Israel Project's 2009
GLOBAL LANGUAGE DICTIONARY

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A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE AUTHOR

I wrote my first Language Dictionary for The Israel Project in 2003. Since that time, Israel has had three Prime Ministers, several stalled peace initiatives, found itself the victim of attack from its northern and southern borders, and has suffered greatly in the court of public opinion.

On the other hand, the daily suicide bombings have stopped, and Hamas & Hezbollah have shown themselves to be the brutal terrorist organizations that Israel has warned about. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

All of the material in this document is new or updated based on research conducted in 2008 and 2009. Some of the language will be familiar; most of the *"Words That Work"* boxes come from Israeli representatives and spokespeople. But, the polling, strategic recommendations and guidance are all based on the current situation. I hope that advocates for Israel will benefit from the massive amount of work that went into the creation of this booklet. I also hope that this will be the last Israel Language Dictionary I ever have to craft.

And remember, it's not what you say that counts. It's what people hear.

Dr. Frank Luntz

April 2009

FROM THE ISRAEL PROJECT

On behalf of our board and team, we offer this guide to visionary leaders who are on the front lines of fighting the media war for Israel. We want you to succeed in winning the hearts and minds of the public.

We know that when you achieve your mission that you are helping both Israel and our global Jewish family. Thus, we offer these words with our sincerest wishes for your every success. May your words help bring peace and security to Israel and the Jewish people!

Sincerely,

Jennifer Laszlo Mizrahi

Founder & President

www.theisraelproject.org

CHAPTER 1:

THE 25 RULES FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

This manual will provide you with many specific words and phrases to help you communicate effectively in support of Israel. But what is the big picture? What are some general guidelines that can help you in your future efforts? Here are the 25 points that matter most:

1) <u>**Persuadables won't care how much you know until they know how much you care.**</u> <u>**Show Empathy for BOTH sides!**</u> The goal of pro-Israel communications is not simply to make people who already love Israel feel good about that decision. The goal is to win new hearts and minds for Israel without losing the support Israel already has. To do this you have to understand that the frame from which most Americans view Israel is one of "cycle of violence that has been going on for thousands of years." Thus, you have to disarm them from their suspicions before they will be open to learning new facts about Israel.

   The first step to winning trust and friends for Israel is showing that you care about peace for BOTH Israelis and Palestinians and, in particular, a better future for every child. Indeed, the sequence of your conversation is critical and you must start with empathy for BOTH sides first. Open your conversation with strong proven messages such as:

   > *"Israel is committed to a better future for everyone – Israelis and Palestinians alike. Israel wants the pain and suffering to end, and is committed to working with the Palestinians toward a peaceful, diplomatic solution where both sides can have a better future. Let this be a time of hope and opportunity for both the Israeli and the Palestinian people."*

   <u>**Use Empathy:**</u> Even the toughest questions can be turned around if you are willing to accept the notion that the other side has at least some validity. If you begin your response with *"I understand and I sympathize with those who…"* you are already building the credibility you will need for your audience to empathize and agree with you.

   Indeed, if the heart of your communications is a chorus of finger pointing of "Israel is right, they are wrong" then you will lose more support for Israel than you will gain. Some people who ALREADY support Israel may nod their heads and say "way to go," but people who are not already supportive of Israel will be turned off.

2) **Explain your principles.** All too often both Arab and Israeli spokespeople go right into an attack against the other, and virtually no one on either side explains the principles behind their actions. **Americans respond much better to facts, actions, and results when they know why—not just how**.   For example, why is there a security fence? Because more than 250 times terrorists have come through that area killing innocent people. Israel is forced to defend its citizens from terrorism, and the fence is a part of this defense.

> *"As a matter of principle, we believe that it is a basic right of children to be raised without hate. We ask the Palestinian leadership to end the culture of hate in Palestinian schools, 300 of which are named for suicide bombers. Palestinian leaders should take textbooks out of classrooms that show maps of the Middle East without Israel and that glorify terrorism."*
>
> *"As a matter of principle, children should not be raised to want to kill others or themselves. Yet, day after day, Palestinian leadership pushes a culture of hate that encourages even small children to become suicide bombers.   Iran-backed Hamas's public television in Gaza uses Sesame Street–type programming to glorify suicide bombers.*
>
> *As a matter of principle, no child should be abused in such a way. Palestinian children deserve better."*

3) **Clearly differentiate between the Palestinian people and Hamas.** There is an immediate and clear distinction between the empathy Americans feel for the Palestinians and the scorn they direct at Palestinian leadership. Hamas is a terrorist organization – Americans get that already. But if it sounds like you are attacking the Palestinian people (even though they elected Hamas) rather than their leadership, you will lose public support. Right now, many Americans sympathize with the plight of the Palestinians, and that sympathy will increase if you fail to differentiate the people from their leaders.

World view is especially important to the Left as they see a world where basically all people are good and with education and communication we can all get along. This is stark contrast to most conservatives who believe that there are good people (i.e. Israel) and bad people (i.e. Iran) and that good people need to be protected from the bad people.


"World view" attitudes differ dramatically by both partisanship and ideology.

The most effective way to build support for Israel is to talk about *"working toward a lasting peace"* that *"respects the rights of everyone in the region."* Notice there is no explicit mention of either Israel or the Palestinians. To much of the Left, both sides are equally at fault, and because the Israelis are more powerful, sophisticated and Western, it is they who should compromise first.

4) **There is NEVER, EVER, any justification for the deliberate slaughter of innocent women and children. NEVER.** The primary Palestinian public relations goal is to demonstrate that the so-called "hopelessness of the oppressed Palestinians" is what causes them to go out and kill children. **This must be challenged immediately, aggressively, and directly.**

> *"We may disagree about politics and we may disagree about economics. But there is one fundamental principle that all peoples from all parts of the globe will agree on: civilized people do not target innocent women and children for death."*

5) **Don't pretend that Israel is without mistakes or fault. It's not true and no one believes it.** Pretending Israel is free from errors does not pass the smell test. It will only make your listeners question the veracity of everything else you say. **Admitting that Israel has and continues to make mistakes does not undermine the overall justice of Israel's goals: peace and security and a better quality of life for BOTH sides**.

Use humility. *"I know that in trying to defend its children and citizens from terrorists that Israel has accidentally hurt innocent people. I know it, and I'm sorry for it. But what can Israel do to defend itself? If America had given up land for peace – and that land had been used for launching rockets at America, what would America do? Israel was attacked with thousands of rockets from Iran-backed Palestinian terrorists in Gaza. What should Israel have done to protect her children? "*

WORDS THAT WORK

"Are Israelis perfect? No. Do we make mistakes? Yes. But we want a better future, and we are working towards it.

And we want Palestinians to have a better future as well. They deserve a government that will eliminate the terror not only because it will make my children safer—but also because it will make their children more prosperous. When the terror ends, Israel will no longer need to have challenging checkpoints to inspect goods and people. When the terror ends we will no longer need a security fence."

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6) **Be careful of your tone.** A patronizing, parental tone will turn Americans and Europeans off. We're at a time in history when Jews in general (and Israelis in particular) are no longer perceived as the persecuted people. In fact, among American

and European audiences—sophisticated, educated, opinionated, non-Jewish audiences—Israelis are often seen as the occupiers and the aggressors. With that kind of baggage, it is critical that messages from the pro-Israel spokespeople not come across as supercilious or condescending.

WORDS THAT <u>DON'T</u> WORK

"We are prepared to <u>allow</u> them to build…..."

Israelis cannot *"allow"* the Palestinians to move forward. They cannot *"permit"* or *"control"* or *"instruct"* the Palestinians to establish commerce, transportation, or a government. If the Palestinians are to be seen as a trusted partner on the path to peace, they must not be subordinated, in perception or in practice, by the Israelis. There is anxiety around activity in the Middle East. The way you talk about it should not add fuel to the fire.

7) <u>Stop. Stop. Stop.</u> Most of this document is written in a positive, hopeful, instructive tone. But there is one aspect of Palestinian behavior that you have every right to demand an end – and will win points by doing so. The more you talk about the militaristic tone and jihadist goals of Iran-backed terrorists – by using their own words -- the more empathy you will create for Israel.

WORDS THAT <u>DO</u> WORK

"Achieving peaceful relationships requires the leadership—political, business, and military—of both sides. And so we ask the Palestinians … Stop using the language of incitement. Stop using the language of violence. Stop using the language of threats. You won't achieve peace if your military leadership talks about war. You won't achieve peace if people talk about pushing others to the sea or to the desert."

MORE WORDS THAT WORK

"Israelis know what it is like to live their lives with the daily threat of terrorism. They know what it is like to send their children off to school one day and bury them the next. For them, terrorism isn't something they read about in the newspaper. It's something they see with their eyes far too often."

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8) <u>Remind people – again and again – that Israel wants peace.</u> Reason One: If Americans see no hope for peace—if they only see a continuation of a 2,000-year-long episode of "Family Feud"—Americans will not want their government to spend tax dollars or their President's clout on helping Israel.

Reason Two: **The speaker that is perceived as being most for PEACE will win the debate.** Every time someone makes the plea for peace, the reaction is positive. If you

want to regain the public relations advantage, peace should be at the core of whatever message you wish to convey.

For Americans to have hope regarding the Middle East conflict, they need to be reminded that:

- **Israel has a long-term commitment to peace**. When courageous Arab leaders, such as Egypt's President Sadat and Jordan's King Hussein, reached out their hands to Israel, peace was achieved.

WORDS THAT WORK

"Israel made painful sacrifices and took a risk to give peace a chance. They voluntarily removed over 9,000 settlers from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, abandoning homes, schools, businesses, and places of worship in the hopes of renewing the peace process."

"Despite making an overture for peace by withdrawing from Gaza, Israel continues to face terrorist attacks, including rocket attacks and drive-by shootings of innocent Israelis. Israel knows that for a lasting peace, they must be free from terrorism and live with defensible borders."

---

9) <u>**Americans want a team to cheer for. Let the public know GOOD things about Israel.**</u>
Once you have established that you care about both Israelis and Palestinians and that Israel wants peace, you can begin the process of establishing a strong connection between Americans and Israel based on shared values and interests, including:

   -- Israel's cooperative efforts with Jewish and Muslim citizens working together to create jobs, cutting edge technology, science and research;

   -- Israel's remarkable advances in alternative energy;

   -- The work Israel has done in Arab neighborhoods and communities to raise health and living standards, including access, as full Israeli citizens, to Israel's world-class national health care system.

Information about the cooperation of Israeli doctors and scientists – Jews, Muslims, Christians and others alike - in solving important health and technological challenges can be helpful. So can demonstrating that Israel and America share a commitment to freedom of religion, press, speech as well as human rights, women's issues, and the environment

10) **Draw direct parallels between Israel and America—including the need to defend against terrorism.** From history to culture to values, **the more you focus on the similarities between Israel and America, the more likely you are to win the support of those who are neutral**. Indeed, Israel is an important American ally in the war against terrorism, and faces many of the same challenges as America in protecting their citizens. For example, on September 11th, nineteen suicide terrorists hijacked American planes and killed our citizens. Today, when we go to the airport, we are screened and checked. Following an attempted "Shoe Bombing" we now have to take off our shoes. It slows travel down, is expensive, and invades our privacy. But imagine what we would do if more than 250 times terrorists had crossed into our land and killed our children while they were riding buses or eating pizza? What would America do? What would America do if America's neighbors in Canada or Mexico were firing rockets into America?

The language of Israel is the language of America: "democracy," "freedom," "security," and "peace."

These four words are at the core of the American political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and they should be repeated as often as possible because they resonate with virtually every American. **This is not rhetoric. It is fact**. Despite the non-stop coverage of Israel in the press, the **positive** news about Israel remains untold.

It's our job to "wear white hats in public"—to remind Americans that Israel is a team for whom they can feel good about cheering. After all:

- **Israel, America's ally, is a democracy in the Middle East.** In Israel, Christians, Muslims, and Jews all have freedom of speech, religion, and a right to vote. Indeed, more than a million Arabs are citizens of Israel, representing almost 20% of the population. Furthermore, 12 Arabs and 21 women serve in Israel's 120-member Parliament, and an Arab judge sits on the Israeli Supreme Court. On a cultural level, a recent Miss Israel was an Israeli Arab and Israel is sending an Arab-Israeli and a Jewish-Israel to sing together in the upcoming Eurovision contest. As the following chart shows, female membership in the Knesset is even on the rise:

- **In contrast to those in the Middle East who indoctrinate their children to become hate-mongers and suicide bombers**, Israel educates their children to strive for progress and peace. Israel is the one place in the Middle East where a young girl can grow up to be anything she wants—from a doctor to a mommy, to a businessperson and even to be prime minister!

- **Israel is a key American ally:**

# Voters feel that "Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East."

And, thinking about the United States and its relationship with Israel… Which TWO of the following are the best reasons for the United States to stand with Israel?

	Combined Choices	November 2008
Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East	39%	N/A
Israel shares our values including the freedom of speech, religion, press and the right to vote	33%	46%
Israel is a partner with the US in our fight against terrorism	29%	N/A
Israel is under threat from Iran, a country that wants to wipe Israel off the map	17%	33%
God gave the land to the Jews who had lived there for thousands of years	16%	N/A
Israeli citizens are vulnerable to terrorist attacks	12%	22%
Israel is working for peace for both sides	12%	22%
Israel works with America for alternative energy solutions that can help to reduce America's dependency on foreign oil	8%	18%
Israel uses innovation to help solve problems in the health care and technology industries	6%	9%

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Some positive news comes from the following question, which has been tracked for seven years and shows that Israel continues to receive strong support from Americans:

Voters believe the U.S. SHOULD support Israel.

Thinking about the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East, please tell me whether, in general, do you think America should be...

11) **Don't talk about religion.** Americans who see the bible as their sourcebook on foreign affairs are already supporters of Israel. Religious fundamentalists are Israel's "Amen Choir" and they make up approximately one-fourth of the American public and Israel's strongest friends in the world. However, some of those who are most likely to believe that Israel is a religious state are most hostile towards Israel (*"they're just as extreme as those religious Arab countries they criticize"*). Unfortunately, virtually any discussion of religion will only reinforce this perception.

Therefore, even the mention of the word *"Jew"* is many Israel contexts is going to elicit a negative reaction—and the defense of Israel as a *"Jewish State"* or *"Zionist State"* will be received quite poorly. This may be hard for the Jewish community to accept but this is how most Americans and Europeans feel.

The exceptions are amongst the Orthodox Jewish and Evangelical Christian communities. The fact is that Evangelical Christians are more supportive of Israel and Israeli policy than almost any other subgroup in America—and sometimes even more supportive than liberal Jews. The primary reason for this is that their religion tells them to do so. You can speak about God to these groups (approximately one fourth of America) but do not extend your comments about religion beyond that.

12) **No matter what you are asked, bridge to a productive pro-Israel message. When asked a direct question, you don't have to answer it directly. You are in control of what you say and how you say it.** Remember, your goal in doing interviews is not only to answer questions—it is to bring persuadable members of the audience to Israel's side in the conflict. Start by acknowledging their question and agreeing that both sides –

Israelis and Palestinians – deserve a better future. Remind your audience that Israel wants peace. Then focus on shared values. Once you have done this you will have built enough support for you to say what Israel really wants: for the Palestinians to end the violence and the culture of hate so that fences and checkpoints are no longer needed and both sides can live in peace. And for Iran for Iran-backed terrorists in Gaza to stop shooting rockets into Israel so that both sides can have a better future.

A simple rule of thumb is that once you get to the point of repeating the same message over and over again so many times that you think you might get sick—that is just about the time the public will wake up and say "Hey—this person just might be saying something interesting to me!" But don't confuse messages with facts. All messages must be factually accurate, but the point is to bridge back to your message—for example, to show that Israel is a democracy that wants peace.

13) **Talk about the future, not the past.** Spending time giving the public a history lesson on the maps of Israel will put your audience to sleep -- at best. At worst, if you spend your communications capital (time and money) on history lessons of who got what land when and who promised what to whom, it will be viewed by Americans and Europeans as a game of gotcha and not a vision for a better future. Remember—communications is _**not**_ a test for who can remember the most facts. Listeners want simple messages that will answer their simple, silent question: **"What is in it for my country and for me to support Israel?"**

14) **Hope.** The expectations for peace are about as low as they can go. But the side that presents a more hopeful future – and the willingness to work hard to make it happen – will win hearts and minds going forward. This is the language people want to hear:

> *"The day will come when Israeli children and Palestinian children will grow up together, play together, and eventually work together side-by-side not just because they have to but because they want to."*

Words That Work

"We must measure each other's commitment to peace by actions, not words. Let us come together and bring about a new era of openness and tolerance. Let us declare that violence and bloodshed will not prevail. We must provide hope for all the people of the Middle East. We must provide hope for those who have none. It is my hope that we may all live in prosperity and peace—now and forever."

---

15) **Use rhetorical questions.** Avoid head on attacks of your opponents. Use a soft tone. Show regret that the Palestinians have been led so poorly. Ask:

> **WORDS THAT WORK**
>
> **"How can the current Palestinian leadership honestly say it will pursue peace when previous leaders rejected an offer to create a Palestinian state just a few short years ago and now refuse to live up to their responsibilities as outlined in the Road Map?"**
>
> **"How can you call it a "cycle of violence" when in reality, if Israel stopped fighting terror, the violence would not end? If the Palestinians stopped terror, Israel would have no reason for curfews, fences, checkpoints, and other defensive measures."**
>
> **"Is it too much to ask that the Hamas leadership condemn all terrorist activities, including suicide bombers? Is it unreasonable to insist that they stop killing innocent children before Israelis jeopardize their security and make concessions for peace?"**

And here is a simpler batch of questions to keep in mind:

> -- *"How do I make peace with a government who wants me dead?"*
>
> -- *"How do I make peace with a population who is taught these words – taught to hate Jews, not just Israelis – from the moment they are born?"*
>
> -- *"Why is the world so silent about the written, vocal, stated aims of Hamas?"*

16) **Go where the people are.** According to Nielsen ratings, on average, Americans now watch 4.3 hours of television a day. Youth groups, Hillel, AIPAC, and others can be terrific leadership training grounds. They are very important for educating some Jews about Israel. Peer to peer communications can also make a highly positive difference from campus to the Capitol. But, don't waste time and money fooling yourself that newspaper ads and campus lectures alone will bring large numbers of new supporters to Israel. Research repeatedly shows that the people who come to these events have largely made up their minds, pro and con, so they are about leadership development, not mass communications.

Most voters get their Middle East news from television coverage.

And, which TWO of the following information sources are the most significant in shaping your views on the Middle East?

Combined Choices

Source	Percentage
TV news	62%
The Internet	32%
Newspapers	29%
Your own religious beliefs	24%
Radio News	18%
Family and friends	14%
Schools or universities	4%
Lectures or events	3%
Community or political leaders	3%

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As these results from The Israel Project's polling clearly show, the media is the top source of information on the Middle East for the vast majority of Americans. Television, followed by newspapers and radio dominate the other sources that many believe are critical. One lecture simply can't compete with 4.3 hours of television per day. Pro-Israel leaders need to make sure that solid and "TV-worthy" stories are pitched and delivered to the media on a regular basis. If you want to persuade, you need to go where the people are—and that is on television and in other media. **Don't hesitate to reach out to your local reporters and media outlets to speak with them about Israel.**

17) **K.I.S.S. and tell and tell again and again.** A key rule of successful communications is "**Keep It Simple, Stupid**". Successful communications is not about being able to recite every fact from the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is about pointing out a few core principles of shared values—such as democracy and freedom—and repeating them over and over again.

Have I written often enough yet that **you need to start with empathy for both sides, remind your audience that Israel wants peace and then repeat the messages of democracy, freedom, and peace** over and over again? For those not already pro-Israel, but who belong to the category of persuadables, we need to repeat the message, on average, ten times to be effective. Go back to the message triangle and practice bridging to your message on Israel.

18) **Avoid "analysis paralysis" and be pro-active.** This is the tendency to blame everything and anything bad that happens to Israel's cause on the media… and then to do nothing

else. It is a terrible disease that can cripple pro-Israel organizations with a thousand meetings and no results.

Instead, Focus on the Persuadables. Of course, as pro-Israel leaders and activists you must spend considerable time and energy in what we in politics call "the care and feeding of the base." But, you must recognize that there are three kinds of people in how they view Israel—those who are with us and will always be with us, those who are against us and who will always be against us, and those who are "persuadable."

Your communications efforts should always focus on transporting the "persuadables" from a less favorable position on Israel to a more favorable position on Israel.

19) **It's not just what you're against – it's what you're FOR that matters.** The public demands *progress*. It doesn't have to move at light speed. One day doesn't always have to be better than the next. But the public turns off immediately whenever they perceive that one side has dug its heels in and refuses to remain committed to the overall mission of making progress towards peace. There are no excuses – no matter what is happening in the Middle East, you have to advocate how you remain committed to peace. If you're only ever *against* things – even if they are things like suicide attacks, rocket firings, or inequality of rights – then you'll never have the public *for* you.

   Similarly, avoid putting things in terms of "not." Tell the people what you are *for*. Use positive, active terms. Don't say your goal is *not* to do this or *to avoid* that.

20) **Start your message, press release, sound bite, or debate segment with your best, positive message.** Credibility is so difficult to achieve but so easy to lose in debates about these issues. This is especially true in the first words you say or write. People make snap decisions about whether they find you to be credible, authentic, empathetic, or sincere. Time after time in group after group, we see good words go without impact because a speaker puts his foot in his mouth at the outset, rather than his best face forward.

   Start with positive themes like *peace, mutual respect, empathy for the plight of Palestinians and their children,* and the like.

21) **Concede a point**. Look for opportunities in every TV debate or interview to concede a point to the interviewer or debate partner. It doesn't have to be a major point. The point isn't to undermine some essential plank of Israel's foreign policy platform. But the simple words "*you make a good point*" do wonders among an audience.

22) **Never, never, NEVER speak in declarative statements. Never.** Americans and Europeans think in shades of gray – especially when it comes to conflict in the Middle East. They believe both sides are to blame, both sides are responsible for making sacrifices for peace, and both sides do have a positive story to tell. So every time you say *"every," totally," "always," "never,"* or the like, the reaction is immediate and negative. Soften the tone just a little bit and you'll keep them tuned in.

23) <u>**Acknowledge the complexities of the situation and attempt to simplify and clarify.**</u> The public believes that the issues that cause conflict between Israelis and Palestinians are complex and date back hundreds or thousands of years. They agree that there are many different sticking points that need to be negotiated.

Yet while the *problems* are complex, they want the *solutions* to be simple: ***Peace. Mutual respect. Two nations living side by side. Children growing up without fear for their safety.*** These are all simple concepts that Americans want all sides to agree on as central goals.

WORDS THAT WORK
The situation in the Middle East may be complicated, but all parties should adopt a simple approach: peace first, political boundaries second.

24) <u>**Don't try to stack your credibility up against the media's.**</u> Yes, the press almost never gets the story completely right – and they often get it mostly wrong. And yes, many in the media have an agenda against Israel. However, many more do not. Also, Americans have no love lost for their own media's lack of bias. Nevertheless, Americans trust the media to report the situation in the Middle East more accurately than *either* Israel or the Palestinian government. Do not attempt to impeach the credibility of a media report head on. You'll just end up undermining you own. Here's an example of what *not* to do:

WORDS THAT <u>DO NOT</u> WORK
With all due respect, check your data. And, you know, don't write a story that doesn't hold water.
– Actual answer by an Israeli politician on live television

25) <u>**Also, don't try to stack your credibility up against the global community's**</u>. Yes, much of the world and many influential members of the United Nations are hostile to Israel's existence. But the public doesn't want to hear Israeli politicians complain about

this fact. The Israel-against-the-world, woe-are-we approach comes across as divisive. While you should be making the case for why a stable Israel is *good* for the world, messages like this just isolate you more:

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

WORDS THAT <u>DO NOT</u> WORK

If we were to listen to all of what the world says, I'm not sure that we would be a sovereign state or where we are today.

</div>

26) ***Mutuality* is a key concept.** We close with one more plea to humanize, empathize, and stress the equal needs for a better life for two equal peoples. The world sees Israel and the Palestinians on completely different plains – and this is why they allow/ignore Palestinian crimes against Israel. It's David vs. Goliath – only this time the Palestinians are seen as David. Using the "mutual" context puts both parties on the same level – and that is important in communicating the Israeli position. Here are the phrases to use:

-- ***"Mutual respect"*** is even better than *"tolerance."*

-- ***"Living together, side by side, in peace"***

-- ***"Israelis and Palestinians both have <u>a RIGHT to</u>…"*** The more you stress that *both* sides have *equal* rights, the better.

-- ***"Cooperation, Collaboration, and Compromise."*** All three words work to describe the relationship that Europe and America want Israelis and Palestinians to have. We recommend you use all three because the sound repetition drives the point home with three times the effectiveness.

<u>Bottom line:</u> What will happen if we fail to get the world to care about the fact that Israeli parents in southern Israel need to literally dodge rockets when they drive their children to kindergarten in the morning? What will happen if the world allows Iran, the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, to get nuclear weapons? What will Israel do if bad press causes American citizens to ask our government to turn its back on Israel?

Why do I care so much about the success of your communications efforts? I care because I never want our children to live through what my family and yours lived through in the Holocaust.

<div style="background-color:#d3d3d3; padding:10px;">

People in Israel depend on us.

Together, we can use strategic communications to make Israel and all Jews safer and more secure.

</div>

CHAPTER 2: A GLOSSARY OF WORDS THAT WORK

"What the world cannot remember the Israelis cannot forget."

-- Mort Zuckerman

For the first time in our communication effort, we have provided an A-Z glossary of specific words, phrases, and concepts that should form the core of any pro-Israeli communication effort.

- *"Accountability."* It is surprising that the value Americans want most in their own government has not been used by Israeli spokespeople to describe what's needed in the current dialogue. Stop using *"confidence-building measures"* and start using *"accountability"* to describe what's needed most within the Palestinian government(s).

- *"Building"*: Never talk about *"giving"* the Palestinians something. It sounds too paternalistic. Instead, talk about *"building"* because it suggests a step-by-step, layer-by-layer improvement in conditions. *Giving* reminds people that you're in the stronger position and that creates more sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians.

- **Children:** As often as possible, make the stakes of achieving peace about providing a future for *both* Palestinian and Israeli children in which they can live, learn, and grow up without the constant fear of attack.

- **"Come to Jerusalem to work for peace"**: The visual symbolism isn't lost on American ears. It's an active challenge to turn words into deeds.

- *"Cooperation, collaboration, and compromise"*: This is how Americans believe the conflict must be solved. When you give a little, you get a lot.

- *"Deliberately firing rockets into civilian communities"*: Combine terrorist motive with civilian visuals and you have the perfect illustration of what Israel faced in Gaza and Lebanon. Especially with regard to rocket attacks but useful for any kind of terrorist attack, **deliberate** is the right word to use to call out the *intent* behind the attacks. This is far more powerful than describing the attacks as *"random."*

- *"Economic Diplomacy"*: This is a much more embracing and popular term than the current lexicon of *"sanctions."* It has appeal across the political spectrum: the tough economic approach appeals to Republicans, and the diplomacy component satisfies Democrats.

- *"Economic Prosperity"*: Whenever Israel talks about the *"economic prosperity"* of the Palestinians, it puts Israel in the most positive light possible. After all, who can disagree?

- **Examples of Peace Efforts:** Constantly cite Israel's past efforts and sacrifices for peace with moderate Arab leaders also willing to work for peace. But don't dwell on the past.

Simply present these past examples as the best reasons why Israel remains committed to making peace in the future.

- **_"Equal rights"_:** Emphasize that Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis enjoy equal rights and equal protections under the law in Israel. But don't stop there: **_The tragedy is that Palestinians have far less rights under their government than Israeli Arabs have under ours._**

- **Human to Human:** Appealing directly to the Palestinian people on behalf of the Israeli people takes the issue out of the political realm and humanizes it. _"We know that the average Palestinian and the average Israeli want to come together and make peace. They want to live in peace. Israeli leaders have come together with Arab leaders to make peace in the past. But how do you make peace with Hamas and Hezbollah?"_

- **Humanize Rockets:** Paint a vivid picture of what life is like in Israeli communities that are vulnerable to attack. Yes, cite the number of rocket attacks that have occurred. But immediately follow that up with what it is like to make the nightly trek to the bomb shelter.

- **_"If… If… If…Then."_:** Put the burden on Hamas to make the first move for peace by using If's (and don't forget to finish with a hard then to show Israel is a willing peace partner). _"If Hamas reforms… If Hamas recognize our right to exist… If Hamas renounces terrorism… If Hamas supports international peace agreements… then we are willing to make peace today."_

- **_"Living together, side by side._** This is the best way to describe the ultimate vision of a two-state solution without using the phrase.

- **_"Militant Islam"_:** This is the best term to describe the terrorist movement. Avoid Bush-era sounding terms like _"Islamo-fascism."_

- **_"Mutual respect"_:** You want to put the conflict in perspective. _"The best way, the only way, to achieve lasting peace is to achieve mutual respect."_ This relieves the pressure on Israel and places it squarely on Hamas and Hezbollah. In fact, the fastest way to demonstrate an open-minded approach and differentiate Israel's aims from Hamas and, frankly, Fatah, is to talk about your respect for the Palestinian people. _"We do not have the right to tell the Palestinians whom to elect to represent them. We hope they will choose leaders that will listen and truly care about them. We respect their right to live in peace and prosperity. All we ask is for them to respect the same for us."_

- **_"Nobody has to leave their homes"_:** This is the most winning phrase in the lexicon of settlements. Use the principle of _mutuality_ to explain that just as Arab Israelis are not expected to move out of their homes in Israel, Jews in a new Palestinian state should be allowed to stay in their homes, too.

- **_"One step at a time, one day at a time":_** It is essential to lower expectations and reduce the pressure on Israel to rush into an agreement that is either not in its interests or jeopardizes its security. The _"one step at a time"_ language will be accepted as a common sense approach to the land-for-peace equation.

- **_"Peace before political boundaries"_:** This is the best phrase for talking about why a two-state solution isn't realistic right now. First the rockets and the war need to stop. Then both peoples can talk about political boundaries.

- **_"Persistence" and "perseverance"_ :** It is not just the effort that matters. It's the intensity of that effort. The fact that against great odds and obvious provocations Israel still seeks peace will be appreciated by all audiences.

- **_"Prevention"_:** With respect to Iran, this is your best word for the overall approach to their quest for nuclear weapons. Not _"preemption."_

- **_"The RIGHT to"_:** This is a stronger phrase than "deserves." Use the phrase frequently, including: the rights that both Israelis and Arabs enjoy in Israel, the right to peace that Israelis and Palestinians are entitled to, and Israel's right to defend its civilians against rocket attacks.

- **_"Societal Progress"_:** This is a dangerous term unless used to address the aspirations of the Palestinian people. First talk about how "the Palestinians have the right to the same societal progress that is happening in Europe and Asia." Then address the freedoms they lack – and the freedoms they deserve. Americans and Europeans see _"societal progress"_ as a moral imperative and a fundamental necessity for eliminating the root causes of terrorism.

- **_"Specific Plan of Action"_:** Even if the plan will take time, Americans want to know that there is a specific plan of action to which both sides can and will be held _accountable._ Whether you're talking about the peace process with the Palestinians or the process of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, use this phrase to describe your approach.

- **_"We have all made mistakes."_** People do not expect Israel to be 100 percent successful in all their efforts to stop terrorism. Admitting that Israel has and continues to make mistakes does not undermine the overall justice of Israel's goals: peace and security and a better quality of life for everyone. It _does_ gain you much needed credibility.

- **_"We're all in this together."_** One of the most powerful phrases of 2009 in America can easily be adapted to the situation in the Middle East. Acknowledging a common condition not only communicates a realistic approach from the Israeli perspective but also builds a sense of empathy.

- **_"Working toward a solution"_:** Americans don't expect the dispute between Israel and the Arabs to end overnight, but they absolutely need to know that _"Israel is working to find a solution that is acceptable to everyone involved."_ This suggests positive intent. This suggests progress. This suggests hope. And all three are important components of a successful communication effort.

CHAPTER 3:

HOW TO TALK ABOUT PALESTINIAN SELF GOVERNMENT
&
PROSPERITY

We have divided this chapter into two important subsections:

- Section 1 is specifically about the perfect language for talking about Palestinian self-government and calls by others for a two-state solution.

- Section 2 focuses on building credibility by expressing support for improving conditions for the Palestinian people.

- *Both* sections are vitally important to understand and use in concert.

SECTION 1: TALKING ABOUT PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

We asked American opinion elites a simple question:

"*Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose a two-state solution in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians, where both have independent nations?"* **(Luntz National Survey, January 2009)**

We received a very clear answer:

Fully and exactly 50% of Americans _strongly support_ a two-state solution. Combine this with the 28.2% who somewhat support it and you have the formula for a landslide in support of giving the Palestinians their own land and their own government. Again…

Over 78% of Americans support a two-state solution.

So when you're talking to Americans, you need to know that when you don't support a two-state solution you risk having a major public relations challenge in America and Europe. The new Israeli government knows this but feel so strongly about security concerns that they are willing to take this risk for the long-term security of their people. They feel (and were elected by voters who agree) that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has made Israel LESS and not MORE safe. Thus, at least for now, the new Israeli leaders have not articulated support for a two-state solution outside of the context of supporting the Road Map for peace which gives a step-by-step performance based plan for reaching a two state solution.

That said, it is important to note that there are effective ways to uphold the ultimate goal of a Palestinian self-government while legitimately questioning how soon the solution can be reached. This is the rhetorical area in which you need to operate.

(1) **Identify the goal, and be authentic.** Given the overwhelming American support for a two-state solution, it will make support much easier and faster if you if set the tone for all discussions by articulating Israel's shared vision for the ultimate goal of two peoples, living side by side in a lasting and secure peace.   In the name of gaining credibility for why you might later say that *a two-state solution isn't achievable overnight*, you should start with language like the following to signal how your goals align with the public's.

> **WORDS THAT WORK**
>
> **Two homelands for two peoples living side-by-side in peace and security is not a fake slogan, but a real necessity for the stability in the entire region. Each homeland should provide a solution to the national aspiration of its people – Israel, as a homeland for the Jewish people, and the creation of a Palestinian homeland, as a fulfillment of their national desire.**

Saying *"is not a fake slogan, but a real necessity"* sets the tone for the entire paragraph. It conveys authenticity and will keep the listener tuned in to what else you have to say. This is a perfect example of Language Rule #19 in Chapter 1. Start off with a strong, positive message. And particularly now that a "two-state solution" has been bandied about for years, people want to hear that you support Palestinian rights.

(2) **Peace first. Political boundaries second.** One solution that would clearly be welcomed by the majority of Americans is, after articulating the long-term goal of a two-state solution, giving examples of why a two-state solution can't happen overnight. While these are essentially "anti" two-state arguments, you can and must still frame them positively if you want support of the majority of Americans.

And the most positive, powerful message you have in Israel's language arsenal is *peace.* It's the trump card. Peace <u>today</u> is the *most* important thing, because every day there is war. Second most important is <u>long-term</u> peace, which most Europeans and Americans equate with a two-state solution. But it's up to you to remind them that Israel gave up Gaza with hopes of peace and a two-state solution – and got only rockets from Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas in return.

The following paragraph works because it is all about *PEACE*. They accept the idea that a peace – if only in the form of a ceasefire that actually lasts – *can* occur before boundaries are established, and in fact *must* occur in order *for* boundaries to be established.

WORDS THAT WORK

The situation in the Middle East may be complicated, but all parties should adopt a simple approach: peace first, political boundaries second. All sides must remain committed to the ideal of two homelands for two peoples, peacefully living side by side in mutual respect. But we cannot hope to achieve that final solution until there is lasting peace between both peoples. There is military conflict on a daily basis. How can we expect good faith dealing for a two state solution in such a climate? A ceasefire and a peace that lasts long enough to engender honest discussions should be the immediate objective.

A few more things to pull out of this paragraph:

-- "*Peace before <u>political boundaries</u>*" sets up the perfect dynamic for you. It elevates the need to stop the rockets, stop the bombings, and create a ceasefire, while subtly downplaying the importance of a two-state solution by calling it "political boundaries." *Peace* always beats *politics* in the opinion elite's mind. Always.

-- This passage invokes several of the Rules of Effective Communication n Chapter 1:

1) Acknowledge the complexities of the problem, but simplify the solution.

2) Emphasize "the ideal of two peoples peacefully living side by side in mutual respect.

3) Use rhetorical questions.

Yes, we have repeated these concepts over… and over… and over… throughout this dictionary, but that's just our way of obeying yet another Rule of Effective Communication – Keep It Simple Stupid and *REPEAT!*

(3) <u>**Emphasize the need to follow a "specific, step-by-step *process*" and a *"plan of action."***</u> This communicates a serious approach to the conflict rather than the typical empty rhetoric.   The public understands that the conflict is complicated, and they believe that all sides are guilty of mistakes in judgment and behavior. But by using this language, by focusing on plans and the step-by-step process, you have shifted the debate from what has happened in the past to what *could* happen in the future. It is not enough to say peace, peace, peace. It's not credible without saying plan and/or process.

Don't forget:

-- **When talking about a Palestinian partner, it is essential to distinguish between Hamas and everyone else.** Only the most anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian American expects Israel to negotiate with Hamas, so you have to be clear that you are seeking a *"moderate Palestinian partner."*

-- **Explain what you are trying to prevent at the same time you are talking about what you are for.** This is something many pro-Israel spokespeople do not do. Either they attack the Palestinians without giving any alternative, hopeful vision, or they talk about peace without reminding Americans that it is the Palestinian behavior that has prevented progress for decades. Both are wrong

(4) Link the political plan to the economic plan. The economic argument is so powerful that it will allow you to talk about the delay in implementing a political solution without losing public support – as long as you raise the two components at the same time. The words of the Prime Minister work effectively here:

The key concept here is the balanced construction. He has balanced the economic and the political. He has balanced removal of the Israeli roadblocks with greater Palestinian movement with Israeli security. Every positive action – starting with jobs – leads to another positive action, and another, and another. And in our words …

"So instead of the cycle of violence, we now have a cycle of hope."

(5) **The fight is over IDEOLOGY – not land; terror, not territory.** Thus, you must avoid using Israel's religious claims to land as a reason why Israel should not give up land. Such claims only make Israel look extremist to people who are not religious Christians or Jews.

The belief among voters that this conflict "is about ideology and religion" is on the rise.

And, which statement do you agree with more...
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is really about land. Once agreements are reached on dividing Jerusalem and establishing borders, the two sides will live side-by-side in peace.
...or...
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is about ideology and religion. The two sides will live in peace only when they acknowledge each other's right to exist.

March 2008	January 2009
24% Conflict is about land — 69% Conflict is about Ideology and religion	19% Conflict is about land — 73% Conflict is about Ideology and religion

TIP – January, 2009   35

(6) <u>**Although Americans support a two-state solution, they are aware that such a solution might create more problems for them and for the world.**</u> As the survey results below show, Americans don't believe that they will be safer or that gas will cost less if the Palestinian state is established.

Do you believe that the establishment of an Independent Palestinian state would... (Luntz National Survey, January 2009)

Question A

Lead to a reduction in the threat of terrorist attacks on US soil by Islamic extremists?

Question B

Lead to a reduction in gas prices Americans pay at the pump?

Section 2: BUILDING ECONOMIC PROSPERITY FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

The Palestinian people get something of a free pass from opinion elites for their inability to hold their leaders accountable for undermining the peace process. Why? Because they believe they are an impoverished, unrepresented people without much reason for hope.

Moreover, elites expect Israel and the global community to solve this problem. They reject the idea that it is up to the Palestinian people to fend for themselves. If we are all interested in achieving peace, then we must all be interesting in spreading prosperity to the Palestinian people.

Do not underestimate the power of these arguments. They were consistently among the highest testing language in all of our research effort. You simply *must* talk about improving the plight of the Palestinian people as part of your overall approach to achieving peace.

Here's the best news: virtually *all* of the language in this chapter comes directly from Prime Minister Netanyahu himself. These words are both in line with the Israeli administration's policy *and* highly effective. That's what we call a homerun in America. The challenge now is to get all of Israel's spokespersons hitting the same notes.

(1)   <u>**Advocate the need for "ECONOMIC PROSPERITY" and "SOCIAL PROGRESS" as a better alternative for the Palestinian people than support for terrorism.**</u> This is the single most powerful message in shifting public sentiment among left-of-center Americans towards Israel. Especially among Democrats, the pervasive belief is that Palestinians turn to terrorism because they have no hope (and then they blame Israel for that lack of hope). Until there is a movement towards prosperity – or at least opportunity – among those people, Americans and Europeans believe that terrorism will always have a home among the Palestinians.

The language below originates from Prime Minister Netanyahu, and it scored as high as anything we tested:

WORDS THAT WORK

Prosperity breeds a partial agreement, which breeds more prosperity, which then breeds additional agreements – and it creates hope.

If you build thousands of jobs in the Palestinian Authority, real jobs, and people bring food to the table, wages are rising, and investments are made, it is worth a thousand international conferences and a thousand shelf agreements.

So that's what we must do, and Israel is ready to be a partner. But it's also time for someone to ask Hamas: What exactly are YOU doing to bring prosperity to your people?

-- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

What's more, you can perfect this argument by making it about *more* than just preventing terrorism. The public believes that the economic crisis in Palestinian territories is among the most important issues to solve in the Middle East because *of humanitarian* reasons, not just security. You *gain* credibility by offering to improve their lives *because* it's the right thing to do; this moves the needle far more than just doing it to protect your own safety.

As for specific word choice:

     --   "***Prosperity***" works particularly well at this time because Europeans and Americans want it for themselves, not just for the people of the Middle East.

-- 　Never talk about *"giving"* the Palestinians something. It sounds too paternalistic. Instead, talk about **"providing"** or **"building."** Giving reminds people that you're in the stronger position and that creates more sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians.

-- 　Keep reminding people that you are seeking a **"safe, stable society"** for the Palestinians. The words flow together smoothly and the message is one that not only everyone agrees with but will promote appreciation for the Israeli spokesperson who articulates it.

In fact, an expression of Israeli willingness to **"participate"** in the revitalization process in whatever way the Palestinians ask is a very powerful offer. Interestingly, the public believes that is it *not* the sole responsibility of the Palestinian leadership to build an economy for their people. They expect Israel and the international community to help. However, the words you describe that help need to be about **empowerment** not **patronage.**

(2) **An effective second step to the above paragraph is to promote *societal progress* for the Palestinians, too.** The economic argument is stronger on its own, but combining the economic and the social component – particularly **"reform of government institutions"** that include **"accountability, transparency, the right to criticize and measurable results"** – delivers a powerful comprehensive message that it's really up to the Palestinians and their leaders to bring about the changes their people deserve and that peace requires.

WORDS THAT WORK

The international community has to ask and demand that the Palestinians develop institutions of law and order, judicial institutions, and financial integrity. If you just have an economic growth, money can flow back to terrorism. It's essential to build foundations for a safe, stable society over the long haul.

The way to do this is to provide security to the Israelis and the Palestinians – not just external security but internal as well. We advocate the process of promoting prosperity and institution building to the Palestinians. If we start now, we can soon proceed through this corridor to political negotiations.

-- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu

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(3) **Once again, turn the issue back to peace.** It's not enough to simply call for economic rebuilding among the Palestinians and then call it a day. You must next articulate exactly *what all this economic aid is in aid of*: It

is about creating the conditions necessary to build a lasting peace.   Here's
the perfect way to tie it together:

WORDS THAT WORK

We welcome and we support international efforts to help the Palestinians. So, once again, the Palestinian people are not our enemy. On the contrary, we want peace with the Palestinians.

We're interested in a historical reconciliation. Enough violence. Enough war. And we support international efforts to help the Palestinians both on the humanitarian level and to build a more successful democratic society. That's in everyone's interest.   – Mark Regev

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(4)   <u>**Be positive about world forces.**</u> Americans don't hear enough positive messages from Israeli spokespersons. Yes, usually Israeli leaders are on TV to talk about truly terrible things, like rocket attacks and defensive actions. But you should still look for opportunities to talk about how Israel is optimistic about the world's future, and its role within it. Israel spends too much time being the international outsider. Find times to show how Israel is part of something bigger, too.

WORDS THAT WORK

The positive changes the global evolution in information and technology make freedom and choice available to hundreds of millions, if not billions of people. It allows them to take part in the world economy. This is a great hope for mankind and it's happening in our time.

It is an even greater impact than that of the industrial revolution in the 19th century. What has been taking place in the latter part of the 20th century and the 21st century is of monumental proportions. It will improve the material of and general law of mankind and womankind and children-kind of people everywhere.

Next, emphasize how Israel wants to make sure these new bountiful opportunities are available to the Palestinian people, too. State clearly that Israel wants its Palestinian neighbors to be a part of global progress, not left in the stone age.

THINK "PRO-PALESTINIAN"

"While I have spoken about Israeli casualties, I want to recognize those Palestinians that have been killed or wounded, because they are suffering as well. I particularly want to reach out to Palestinian mothers who have lost their children. No parent should have to bury their child.

And so I say to my Palestinian colleagues … you can stop the bloodshed. You can stop the suicide bombings and rocket attacks. If you really want to, you can put an end to this cycle of violence. If you won't do it for our children, do it for your children."
-- Effective Israeli Sound bite

Just because you are pro-Israel does NOT mean you need to get painted as anti-Palestinian – and you shouldn't**. The most effective advocates for Israel are also pro-Palestinian**. This may be an anathema to some readers but it's exactly what Europeans, Americans in general and the American Left in particular want to hear. Many on the Left have much more sympathy for the plight of Palestinians than do mainstream Americans, and they can see Palestinian efforts – even the suicide bombings – as a legitimate struggle for freedom. The language below will win applause everywhere – but particularly among the Left:

WORDS THAT WORK

"The conditions of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are unbelievably difficult. It is a catastrophe. We want to change it. Israel wants to change it.

The Palestinian economy must be allowed to develop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. Palestinian legislators and officials, humanitarian and international works, must be allowed to go about the business of building a better future.

But there is little we can do until the violence stops, until those who carry bombs into Israel stop the cycle of bloodshed. We need the cooperation of the Palestinian government and the Palestinian people – not for our benefit but for their benefit. The people who pay the price for all this terrorism are not just the Israeli victims. It is the Palestinians as well. If the terrorism stops, the borders can be opened and normal life can resume. But if the Palestinian terror continues, the tragedy will continue."

But being pro-Palestinian does not mean forgiving or forgetting terrorism. On the contrary, this allows you to criticize even more strongly and credibly the actions of Iran-backed Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the other radical forces operating in Palestinian areas and the inability of the leadership to control these organizations.

Americans are beginning to differentiate between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority of Abbas, blaming Hamas rather than the PA for the suicide bombers. This is actually a very dangerous trend because it could lead them to excuse or dismiss the terrorism and culture of hate promoted by the PA itself.

If Israel is held accountable because of an extremist act by a settler, so must the Palestinian leadership and government be held accountable. But to do this effectively, an explicit endorsement of the Palestinian people will make your presentation more credible.

WORDS THAT WORK

I want to see a future where the Palestinians govern themselves. Israel does not want to govern a single Palestinian. Not one. We want them to govern themselves. We want them to have complete self-determination.

CHAPTER 4:

ISOLATING IRAN-BACKED HAMAS AS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE

All Americans – even those on the Left – and many Europeans get that Iran-backed Hamas is a terrorist organization. They realize that Hamas has a stated objective of destroying Israel, targeting Jewish civilians and hiding behind Arab civilians. However, to Americans there is a vital distinction between the Hamas leadership and the Palestinian people that you *must* appreciate and weave into all of your language about Gaza.

To them Hamas is evil and hostile. But the Palestinian people are poor, unrepresented, and therefore without hope of peace. For now, your rhetorical quarrel needs to be with Hamas, not the people of Palestine. We have dedicated a whole chapter to language regarding the Palestinian people specifically. This chapter is about how to talk about Iran-backed Hamas, but we must stress again that they are two *very different* sides of the same Gaza coin to the public– so you need to keep both language approaches in mind, and know when to use each.

The big picture approach is this: **You must isolate Hamas as:**

-- *A critical cause of the delay in achieving a two-state solution*

-- *The biggest source of harm to the Palestinian people*, and

-- *The reason why Israel must defend its people from living in terror*

(1) **Read from the Hamas Charter.** Now, here's how to attack Hamas: indict them with their own indoctrination materials. Yes, people know Hamas is a terrorist organization – but they don't know *just how terrifying* Hamas can be. The absolute best way to heighten their awareness is to read from the Hamas Charter itself.

Don't just *"quote"* from it. Read it. Out loud. Again and again. Hand it out to everyone. Stop and ask them to read it. Draw arrows to the most offensive parts (English translation is in Appendix II). Take the time to give reporters and/or anti-Israel activists time to digest the words and meaning. Even people who lean towards supporting the Palestinians are rendered silent after reading the words of Hamas.

When people hear the words of the Hamas charter, Israel goes from bully to victim – and sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians dissipates. Frame this as:

"It's time to hold Hamas accountable for its own words and its own actions."

(2) **Remind listeners that Iran-backed Hamas is an extremist organization not just in the eyes of Israel, but of free peoples around the world.** Especially with the advent of the new administration, Americans and the world are weary of unilateral, America-will-go-it-alone approaches. They are eager to be on the same team as other democratic nations again. Hamas gives you the opportunity to make Americans feel like they are going *with* the international grain for once, not against it.

(3) **Better still, cite the examples of how Hamas is out of step *even with its own people.*** Americans easily forget that the Arab world is not monolithic. They need to be reminded that Hamas is condemned even by Arab leaders in their own global neighborhood. Better still, that Hamas is condemned by other *Palestinian* leaders, such as those in Fatah.

This argument also dovetails perfectly with the case you must make about how Israel has, can, and will make peace with moderate Arab leaders who are willing to work for peace.

Find the words of Palestinians and Arabs themselves to talk about the unrepentant and radical nature of Hamas. Shimon Peres did this expertly in what should be remembered as one of the most effective (and most passionate) presentations on behalf of Israel at Davos. And again, use the following words verbatim.

WORDS THAT WORK

Look what the people, of the Palestinian people, the Secretary General of Fatah is saying about Hamas, three days ago. His name is Yasser Abdel Rabbo, a Palestinian, the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee, and I quote him:

"Hamas has turned Gaza, Gaza schools and mosques, all universities into centers of detention, interrogation and torture. Dozens have been shot in their legs, beaten savagely, and had their bones broken. Hamas plundered trucks bringing food, and distributes it only to the supporters of their movement."

They didn't give the food to the people of Fatah. They killed hundred leaders of Fatah in full daylight. They throw them from the roofs. — **President Shimon Peres**

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 (4) **"If… If… If… *Then."*** You cannot simply beat Hamas like a piñata and hope to win the overall message battle. Calling Hamas the terrorists they are doesn't build Israel's credibility; it just reduces theirs. And Israel's credibility needs work. Supporters of Israel must always ultimately offer a positive approach with a negative condemnation. That said, there is a way to do both at the same time: by using *ifs*.

WORDS THAT WORK

It was the former U.N. secretary general Kofi Anan that put four benchmarks on the table. And he said, speaking for the international community …

That if Hamas reforms itself …

If Hamas recognizes my country's right to live in freedom …

If Hamas renounces terrorism against innocent civilians …

If Hamas supports international agreements that are being signed and agreed to concerning the peace process … then the door is open.

I say if Hamas meets those four United Nations benchmarks, then the door is open. But unfortunately – tragically – Hamas has failed to meet even one of those four benchmarks. And that's why today Hamas is isolated internationally. Even the United Nations refuses to speak to Hamas. — **Mark Regev**

The key word here is **_if_** … **_if_** this … **_if_** that. As long as the "ifs" are centrist and credible, the public will agree. But what makes this language work so well, and why it should be said almost verbatim, is that it isn't you talking – it's the United Nations. Any time you can quote from the UN to make your case, do it.

(5) **<u>Demand that Hamas be held accountable for the injustices it has done to its own</u>** **<u>people.</u>** The difference between what people expect a Palestinian government to pursue and what Hamas actually does could not be greater. Call Hamas out for *using* its own people, rather than *empowering* them. Put the contrast in stark terms. Here are useful language tricks to make the contrast really stick:

- *"Buy books, not bombs,"*

- *"Invest in jobs, not jihad,"*

- *"Invest in food, not fear"*

WORDS THAT WORK

The Palestinian people have a right to a government of their own. And they also have a right to a government that will empower them, not use them as shields. They have a right to a government that will invest international aid in books, not bombs. In food, not fear.

Their children deserve the same opportunities to learn and have hope for the future that children in Israel have. And they deserve to learn in an environment that is free of hate.

Unfortunately, Hamas and their sponsor Iran will never allow any of these things to happen. Israel cannot allow the Palestinian people to be isolated from the world by the leadership of Hamas, and that is why right now a Palestinian state is not possible.

Note: The line: *"The Palestinian people have a right to a government that will empower them, not use them as shields"* is particularly effective. Also, use the phrase **"*the right to*"** as often as possible.

Also, It's *"militant Islam,"* not **"Islamo-fascism."** If you want the people in power in the American government and around the world today to listen and learn, you need language that doesn't sound like it came from George W. Bush.

(6) *"<u>We offer this appeal directly to the Palestinian people."</u>* The problem with pro-Israeli spokespeople is that they often level criticisms at the Palestinian government that sound like criticisms of the Palestinian people. It is so essential that you separate and differentiate between the illegitimate aims and the bloody hands of Hamas with the

legitimate aims and victimization of the Palestinian people. And once again, use the three-question rhetorical approach:

> -- ***"How exactly do Palestinians benefit when their Hamas leadership fires rockets into Israeli towns?"***

> -- ***"Why is Hamas building bombs when they should be buying books?"***

> -- ***"Where did the billions of dollars in international economic aid go? Don't the Palestinian people deserve more from their leaders?"***

This direct ***"human-to-human"*** appeal (say: ***"admittedly over the heads of Hamas"***) will be well received and appreciated.

Not only is it more *human* and therefore more impactful, but opinion elites *expect* you to appeal directly to the Palestinian people *because* their leadership is not a willing partner for peace. They actually place the burden on you to continue working with the Palestinian people.

(7) **Call for an end to Hamas' hijacking of the hopes of the Palestinian people.** Yes, Hamas was democratically elected, but it then staged a bloody coup in Gaza, killing hundreds of its Fatah opponents and continued to rule by tyranny. People believe that Hamas does not represent the hopes and desires of everyday Palestinians. They agree that if Hamas put down their guns, the Palestinian people would have a state of their own almost immediately; and that if Israel put down her guns, the nation would cease to exist.

Cap off your attacks on Hamas with a hopeful call for a better day for the Palestinian people.

> - *"We want all children – Palestinian and Israeli alike – to grow up in peace and without fear of attack. Let's make it impossible for extremists to throw it all away."*

> - *"The Palestinian people have the RIGHT to democratic elections that are free, fair, and truly representative of the will of the people. We must do whatever it takes to protect that sacred right."*

> - *"We must support the Palestinian people as they strive to elect a moderate government that truly represents them and is a willing partner for peace."*

(8) **Continually establish the connection between *Iran* and *"Iran-backed Hamas"* and *"Iran-backed Hezbollah."*** Doing so will help you continually remind the audience of

the threat presented by Iran – a reminder they need. And the audience will be receptive to the connection, as shown on the next page:

Voters accurately identify Iran as the main provider of support to both Hamas and Hezbollah.

In your view, which countries are the main providers of support for the military activities of Hamas?

Iran	46%
Syria	22%
Egypt	9%
Iraq	8%
Saudi Arabia	7%

In your view, which countries are the main providers of support for the military activities of Hezbollah in Lebanon?

Iran	36%
Syria	15%
Pakistan	5%
Iraq	4%
Russia	4%

1

Americans and Europeans are aware that Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is a problem, but they are largely unaware of just how *great* and *immediate* a problem it really is. Americans have a President who is conducting YouTube diplomacy with Iran, sending holiday greetings and signaling to the world that Iran can be wooed out of its weapons.

Americans agree that President Ahmadinejad is dangerous. They agree that Iran must not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon. But between their war-weariness in the Middle East and under the diplomacy-heavy approach of President Obama, Americans are operating under a hazy understanding about how near Iran is to being able to strike. **Israel is aware of the threat. Americans and Europeans are not. You need to be aware of this disconnect in how you craft your language.**

And the scariest part is that if you try to convince them, most of them won't believe you. Among the American Left and Center-left, and Europeans, the new Israeli administration's warnings about Iran sound uncomfortably too much like President Bush and his call for preemption in Iraq.

So we suggest a rhetorical approach that is likely to gain Israel some credibility in talking about Iran. This language might not reflect the urgency of the threat, but it's the only way to keep people on board in advance of Israel's action.

(1)   <u>**The best approach to Iran – *"step-by-step."***</u> Even if this rhetoric lags behind the reality of the situation, you still need to talk about Iran in terms of a methodical, step-by-step process of increasing pressure as the threat increases.

And the best phrase to achieve this objective is ***"economic diplomacy."*** It has much more appeal across the political spectrum than simple *"sanctions."* The economic component appeals to Republicans, and the diplomacy component satisfies Democrats.

(2) <u>**Appeal to the *global* interest in keeping Iran non-nuclear.**</u> An important emphasis for prevention in Iran is that *the whole world* stands to benefit from keeping Iran from obtaining the ability to strike with nuclear weapons. If the argument is *just* about protecting Israel, then the need for prevention is easily dismissed. That sounds more like Israel is just looking out for itself and its position as the most militarily powerful nation in the region.

Note also the use of *Arab nations* to marginalize Iran. Just as we recommend in the chapter about Hamas, there is immense value in isolating Iran's leadership as being out of step with Arab neighbors. Many Americans would be surprised to know that these nations are afraid of Iran, just like Israel. By surprising them, you open their minds to the rest of your message.

The following passage works because it puts a global, ecumenical, multi-cultural face on the problem.

In other words, ***"We're all in this together."***

(3) **Advocate a policy of *"prevention,"* but justify it based on past experiences across the globe.** Obviously, stay away from anything "preemption" oriented. That brings up far too many bad associations with recent American foreign policy. But "*prevention"* is a proven winner. However, you need to tie *"prevention"* in to real, memorable examples of where prevention could have made a difference. If you just say prevention and leave it in a vacuum, people will assume you're just using it as a cover for your real foreign policy objectives.

WORDS THAT WORK

When it comes to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by terrorist countries, _prevention_ must be our central principle. We simply cannot risk finding out what happens if a state that sponsors terrorism obtains a nuclear weapon – and if they will share that technology with other terrorist organizations.

If we have learned anything from the last ten years, it is that we cannot afford to be caught by surprise. America was devastated by the surprise attacks of September 11 – and America is not alone. An Iranian sponsored or assisted attack on Britain, Spain, or India would be many times more devastating.

In dealing with Iran, prevention is a better approach than acceptance. If it becomes clear that the last chance to _prevent_ a nuclear strike is to militarily target nuclear facilities, then the attack will be justified.

Notice how the military option only comes up *at the end*, and is presented *only as a last resort*. This is so essential.

Also, note the importance of describing attacks as "*militarily target nuclear facilities."* To Americans, Israel has no right or reason to attack Iran or kill Iranian civilians. But, as a last resort, there is some support for directly and precisely targeting Iran's facilities for making nuclear weapons.

(4) **Remind listeners of specific examples of Iran's aggressive behavior.** Europeans and Americans understand the fanatical nature of Iran's administration. But it doesn't hurt you one bit to remind them of it with specifics – in fact, it helps tremendously.

(5)   <u>**Personalize the problem for the American audience.**</u>   Just as the language drawing parallels between American and Israeli values, rights, and democracy is a proven winner, you should also outline an equivalency between each government's responsibility to protect its people.

This language comes from a television ad that worked very well. It helps Americans identify with the problem and paints a picture of the ties between threats facing Israel. Importantly, the final message of a peaceful resolution appeals to everyone.

(6)   <u>**Use a successful example from recent history to justify economic diplomacy.**</u>   Just as Israel needs to highlight examples of how it achieved peace in the past, Israeli spokespeople need to use examples of how sanctions (but call it "*economic diplomacy*") have worked in the past as proof that they can work now.

this proven method with Iran -- so that we can stop their terror and nuclear program without war and bloodshed.

Strategies toward dealing with Iran: by Party and Ideology

*Which TWO of the following would be the best approach toward Iran right now?*

Combined Choices	GOP (28%)	IND (31%)	DEM (40%)	Cons (38%)	Mod (36%)	Lib (22%)
Increased diplomatic pressure	59%	45%	41%	54%	49%	35%
Direct negotiations with Iran	36%	39%	51%	30%	50%	56%
Increased economic sanctions	50%	44%	27%	51%	36%	25%
Establish normalized relations with Iran	17%	22%	31%	20%	26%	30%
Easing economic and diplomatic sanctions	17%	20%	25%	19%	19%	31%

TIP – January, 2009   49

Voters' greatest fear regarding Iran is the nuclear threat to the United States.

Now, imagine for a minute that Iran acquires a nuclear bomb. Which TWO of the following would concern you the most about Iran's having nuclear weapons?

	Combined Choices	November 2008
Iran could give nuclear weapons to terrorist groups who could smuggle them into the United States	65%	60%
Iran could pose a nuclear threat to the United States	41%	41%
Iran could use its new power to create more unrest for the global economy and further the global financial crisis	29%	28%
Iran could attack Israel	27%	26%
Iran could use its new power to raise the price of oil, increasing gas prices for Americans	14%	18%
No country would stand up to Iran on its human rights abuses	8%	6%

TIP – January, 2009   51

(7) **Do NOT compare Iran to Nazi Germany.** This is important. Even though the situation is eerily similar, the world simply does not buy it. Worse yet, they feel it is over the top and undermines your credibility.

> **WORDS THAT DO NOT WORK**
>
> **What Iran is doing today is akin to what Hitler did in the years 1938 and 39. The difference however is that Hitler started a war and then tried to build nuclear weapons. Iran is working on the nuclear weapons first, but its goals are no less dangerous. Don't we wish today that people had stopped Hitler in 1939?**

(8) **Again – absolutely no absolutes allowed.** Right-leaning voters loved the passage below. Left-leaning voters hated it. Why? It's too absolute.

> **WORDS THAT DO NOT WORK**
>
> **I think we have to do everything in our power to prevent the arming of Iran with nuclear weapons. And I have to say, there is absolute unanimity in this regard. There is no opposition. There is no coalition; not only on the declaratory level, but on every other level. There are no party lines on this. And there are no party divisions on this. I cooperate with the Prime Minister, with anybody. I think this is a growing consensus.**

The first sentence is a little strong, but it is not what killed the passage. It's the portion stating "there is absolute unanimity in this regard. There is no opposition." Even if that's true in Israel, it doesn't play well anywhere else. We don't believe there is ever complete unanimity on anything, let alone important foreign policy questions and military action.

CHAPTER 6:

GAZA: ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE & DEFENSIBLE BORDERS

"Stop the rockets. Start the peace."

This chapter is divided into two sections.

- Section 1 focuses specifically on public opinion about Israel's right to defend itself from rocket attacks.

- Section 2 explores the importance of differentiating between public opinion regarding the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel's overall right to defensible borders.

SECTION 1: ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF FROM ROCKET ATTACK

You need to get this section right. There are some very good – and some very wrong – ways to talk about the recent Gaza War and Israel's response to rocket attacks. It is true that Americans understand Israel's security has been undermined by the ascent of Hamas to power. In fact, nearly three quarters of Americans agree:

Question: **In 2005, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in exchange for peace and to allow the Palestinians who lived there to democratically elect their own government. A Hamas-backed political group later won election and now governs Gaza. In your opinion, is Israel in a more or less secure situation today than when it controlled Gaza?** (Luntz National Poll, January 2009)

Nevertheless, even though Americans agree that Hamas' control of Gaza makes Israel less secure, they *still* expect Israel to act with regard for the Palestinian people. Achieving this balance is the key.

(1)   <u>**First, empathy.**</u>   You cannot let the debate over the Gaza War be framed as "who did what first?" argument. Or a discourse on the appropriateness of "proportionality." It *must* be framed as something that *must* be stopped because of the suffering it causes to both peoples.

> --   *"It is sad."*
>
> --   *"It is tragic."*
>
> --   *"It must be stopped."*

And the reason *why* is must be stopped is because *no* child – Israeli or Palestinian – should have to live in fear of a rocket attack or a military operation. It's the suffering on both sides that needs to stop. Israeli parents understand the fears Palestinian parents have for their children – because they have gone through the exact same thing. That's the textbook definition of empathy. You simply must frame this whole issue in terms of mutuality of empathy.

And we mean *frame* it. You have to <u>start</u> this argument the right way in order to maintain the credibility you need to finish it off. If you lay right into "rockets, rockets, rockets" you'll lose the entire left and more than half of the middle. But if you start with something unexpected and genuine, they'll hear you out for the rest of what you have to say.

As always, the best way to crystallize the emotion of the issue is to put it in terms of what it means for the most vulnerable people – children.

WORDS THAT WORK

"Let me also agree that the death of a Palestinian child is no less of a tragedy than the death of an Israeli child."   **- Meagan Buren**

This next portion of language may be hard for some of you to say, but every result of research confirms that an approach like this is the best way for an Israeli spokesperson to truly *be heard* and therefore *make a difference.*

(2) <u>**When it comes time to talk about rockets, the best word is "*deliberate.*"**</u> Don't say that Hamas is "randomly rocketing Israel."

Do say *"Hamas is deliberately firing rockets into Israeli towns, communities, and civilian populations."*

Some, especially on the left, have the perception that all Hamas is doing is firing glorified bottle rockets into an empty desert, just to make some noise. This is both factually wrong and rhetorically damaging to your cause. "*Deliberate*" reveals <u>intent</u> and "*into civilization populations*" proves their <u>crime</u>.

(3) <u>**Paint a vivid picture of what life is like for Israeli civilians and children under the constant threat of rocket attack.**</u> You have to humanize why Gaza happened and what Israel has faced for weeks, months, even years. Normally, we don't recognize numbers, but this time we do – only with a human component. For example:

-- Over 2,300 rockets had been fired from Gaza into Israeli **neighborhoods** hitting, living rooms, kindergartens and playgrounds -- **women and children** driving to school and the supermarket.

-- These rockets come five, ten, over 50 a day, hundreds of rockets in less than one week.

-- For two years families have slept together in bomb shelters rather than bedrooms.

Israel was not looking for war. She respected a ceasefire that Iran-backed Hamas broke, at which point Israel had no choice but to react in self-defense. People understand that Israel, just like any other sovereign country, has a right to defend its citizens.

So, use rhetorical questions to gain permission from the audience for Israel's actions. When presented with the facts and questions, Americans and many Europeans will come to the right conclusions.

Please note: the rain of rockets is something that you need to identify, humanize, and then *move on from*. Whenever we tested spokespersons whose *every answer* was that Israel had to stop the rockets, Americans went from accepting the message… to tiring of it… to turning against it. You have to take the next step.

(4) <u>**Israel has a RIGHT to defend itself against rocket attacks.**</u> When put to a choice, Americans believe by almost a three to one margin that Israel has the right to root out rockets if Hamas chooses to hide those rockets among civilian territory. However, we need to caution you against making the assumption that this excuses Israel for civilian casualties. Americans still place the burden on the Israeli military to use great care to avoid innocent deaths.

Question 1: Which of the following statements do you agree with more? (Luntz National Survey, January 2009)

Answer A: *Regardless of the circumstances or the rationale, it is always wrong for Israel to bomb Palestinian military targets that are located near civilians. The protection of innocent civilians is more important than military advantage.*

Answer B: *Israel has a right to defend itself from missile attack regardless of where the missiles are located. If Hamas puts those missiles near civilians, it is still Israel's right to remove them militarily.*

Answer C: *Don't Know/Refused*

**Question 2: Which of the following statements do you agree with more? (Luntz National Survey, January 2009)**

Answer A: *Israel should be condemned for bombing civilian targets in Gaza and destroying Palestinian communities.*

Answer B: *Hamas should be condemned for launching unprovoked rocket attacks into Israel and housing those missiles in civilian areas.*

Answer C: *Don't   Know / Refused*

(4) **<u>Renew your commitment to peace even *in spite* of continued deliberate rocket attacks.</u>** Americans recognize that rocket attacks are an impediment to peace; but they do not accept rockets as an excuse to abandon peace. It is utterly expected that Israeli spokespersons will talk about *proportionality* and *prevention* of rocket attacks. But if you take the *unexpected* approach of talking about another "p" word – the most *important* "p" word to the public -- you generate immense credibility. That word is peace:

> **--**   ***"And yet even though every day Hamas deliberately fires rockets into our civilian population centers, we will still negotiate a peace."***

(5)   **<u>Take some time to talk about Israel's efforts to prevent civilian casualties.</u>** The issue of Palestinian civilian casualties is one of the most damaging in the entire debate. Americans accept Israel's right to defend itself. They understand that Iran-backed Hamas hides behind civilians.

Nevertheless, they place the burden on the Israeli military to do everything in its power to avoid civilian casualties. They perceive Israel to have significant military superiority and to be held accountable to international standards of conduct. They will accept that some civilian casualties are inevitable, but if your *language* isn't correct about how seriously Israel takes this issue, they will refuse to accept your arguments about the vulnerability of *Israel's* civilians.

So here is the five-step approach to talking about civilian casualties in Gaza:

> --   STEP 1 – **Empathy**: *"All human life is precious. We understand that the loss of one innocent Palestinian life is every bit as tragic as the loss of an Israeli life."*

> --   STEP 2 – **Admission:** *"We admit that Israel isn't always successful at preventing civilian casualties..."*

> --   STEP 3 -- **Effort**: *"We remain committed to doing everything in our power to preventing civilian casualties."*

> --   STEP 4 – **Examples**: *"Let me tell you how our armed forces are trained, tasked, and operate to ensure that Palestinian civilians remain safe."*

> --   STEP 5 **– Turn Tables:** *"It is a great tragedy that Iran-backed Hamas shoots rockets at our civilians while hiding in their own. This causes tragic deaths on BOTH sides. What would you do if you were in this situation?"*

We need to call specific attention to Step 2. Don't pretend that Israel is without mistakes or fault. **It's not true and no one believes it.** It will only make your listeners question the veracity of

everything else you say. People do not expect Israel to be 100 percent successful in all their efforts to stop terrorism. **Admitting that Israel has and continues to make mistakes does not undermine the overall justice of Israel's goals: peace and security and a better quality of life for everyone**. Because Israel is seen as the more powerful party, you must use humility.

(6) <u>**Have you spent time where the rocket attacks occur?**</u> If you haven't, then you shouldn't be fielding questions on television about this issue. Palestinian spokespersons have been very effective by saying they have been to the locations of the attacks and therefore can more accurately report on what's really going on.

You simply must be prepared to respond to this question with *"Yes, I have been there, and let me tell you how terrifying it is…"*

(7) <u>**If you get bogged down in justifying proportionality, again, use rhetorical questions.**</u> The truth is that there is no good definition of a proportional response in a situation where your civilians are being attacked by rockets that are hidden in schools and hospitals. This is why Hamas puts the rockets in these sensitive locations. They know that it undermines your ability to tell the world that you're only doing what is necessary to protect your own people.

Rather than affirmatively stating the exact measure of force that should be used in these situations, use the rhetorical question to compel your debate partner (or the audience) to reach the answer that is obviously favorable to you:

> **"*Every day Hamas deliberately fires rockets into Israeli communities...*
>
> -- *"What do you think is a justified response?"*
>
> -- *"How do you propose Israel can stop these rocket missile attacks?"*
>
> -- *"What is a legitimate response?"*

This chapter has provided a step-by-step approach to the very difficult to communicate issue of Gaza and Israel's right to self defense. To sum it all up, here are the perfect three paragraphs:

WORDS THAT WORK

Is Israel perfect? No. Does Israel make mistakes? Yes. No country is perfect.

Israel wants a better future and they are working towards it. The Palestinians must have a better future as well. They need to have a place where they can have hope and a place of their own. They deserve a government that will eliminate the terror not only because it will make Israeli children safer—but because it will mean a better future for Palestinian children too. I know that in trying to defend its own children and citizens from terrorists that Israel has accidentally hurt innocent people.

But I ask you, what can Israel do to defend itself when it has a government positioned across a border with rockets that it fires indiscriminately almost every single day?

I ask you, if more than 4000 rockets had been fired into *your* community, into *your* neighborhood, across *your* borders, what would you ask from *your* government? What would you expect *your* government to do? No government would allow their civilian population to be the victim of indiscriminate attacks day after day.

SECTION 2: ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO DEFENSIBLE BORDERS

With more than three years of violent history since Israel's agreement to withdraw from Gaza and portions of the West Bank, Americans have had time to take stock of the situation and form opinions.

The big picture: they believe that Hamas' leadership of Gaza has made Israel and the region less safe, while some are more receptive to what they perceive as a moderate approach in the West Bank by Mahmoud Abbas. Based on these experiences, they are willing to grant Israel more leeway in resisting calls to give more land for more peace.

(1) **First, recognize and embrace the differing American perceptions between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.** There is a HUGE credibility gap between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Nearly 6 in 10 Americans say that Hamas is *not at all interested* in peace, while only a third thinks the same of the Palestinian Authority. Nearly half (49%) think the Palestinian Authority is at least somewhat interest in peace, while only 36% think the same of Hamas. *(see graph on next page)*

Into this gap, your language must voyage. You can and should use the more moderate approach of those in the West Bank as the standard to which Gaza's leadership should aspire:

"We hope for a day when the Palestinian people in Gaza will have leadership that is truly willing to work for peace, like the more moderate leadership in the West Bank."

How committed do you think the **Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, and is led by President Mahmoud Abbas,** is to reaching a peace agreement with Israel. Are they…

Question B (red bar)

How committed do you think the **Palestinian leadership in Gaza, led by Hamas,** is to reaching a peace agreement with Israel? Are they…

(2) **Americans agree that Israel "has a right to defensible borders."** But it does you no good to define exactly what those borders should be. Avoid talking about borders in terms of pre- or post-1967, because it only serves to remind Americans of Israel's military history. Particularly on the left, this does you harm.

For instance, support for Israel's right to defensible boarders drops from a heady 89% to under 60% when you talk about it in terms of 1967.

Does Israel have a fundamental right to "defensible borders?"

Question B (red bar)

Does Israel have a right to "defensible borders" if it meant retaining control over some minimal territory captured in 1967?


(3) **In fact, when you talk about land in terms of 1967, you can completely *flip* public sentiment *against* you.** But if you call into question the danger of terrorists shooting down planes, you shore up support.

Israel should return ALL of the land captured in 1967 regardless of security implications.

Question B (red bar) Israel should keep the hills around its airport so that terrorists can't shoot rockets at its
airplanes.

A strong majority of Americans (58%) agree with the simple statement that Israel should give back the land it captured in 1967. And yet a similar majority (52%) would agree that Israel should keep some of that land in order to protect planes. ***Words matter.***

> And here are some of your best words of all, as fully 71% of the American public agree with them (52% strongly so):

WORDS THAT WORK

Israel should not give any more land for peace, because every time it does, it just gets more war.

Question A (blue bar)

Israel cannot under any circumstances offer to give up land that would put its international airport directly at risk of rocket attack from Palestinian terrorist groups that have already attacked Israel from other border positions.

Question B (red bar)

Israel should not give any more land for peace, because every time it does, it just gets more war.

(4) **Overall, Americans believe that Israel's strength was undermined by withdrawing from Gaza.**

Question A (blue bar) **(Luntz National Survey, January 2009)**

Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Territory in 2005 made Israel's military stronger.

Question B (red bar)

Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Territory was a strategic disaster.

Peace is the word.

The world wants and needs to hear that the terror can be stopped. They have to believe that at some point, the sides can come together and find common ground. You may not want to hear this but *the side that seems to want peace more will win the support of the non-aligned public.* This is exactly why the Palestinian spokespeople are repeating the word "peace" again and again. Unless this explicit desire for peace is conveyed in Israeli communication efforts, Israeli support will erode.

But it is perfectly acceptable and even desirable to use peace and security in the same sentence. Americans fundamentally believe that any democracy has a right to defend itself, and they do believe that Israel is exercising that right when it responds to these homicide bombers. Arabs terrorists are getting away with homicidal bombings because they "condemn" them and then call for "peace." Why? Americans are responding to the intension rather than the action. Israel must use the same strategy. Every Israeli message should be about peace and security.

Let's get into some of the specifics about how to talk about peace.

(1) <u>**The best way to make the case for peace in the future is to prove how peace was made in the past.**</u> Israel (unfairly) has a credibility problem among Europeans and left-of-center Americans when it comes to its intentions for peace. Two reasons. First, thanks to the media, all they see is Israeli force. They rarely see the instigation by Iran-backed Hamas and other terrorists. And second, people forget that Israel has a record of diplomatic success in achieving peace. It falls on you to explain the former and remind them of the latter. Highlight how Israel has made real, lasting peace with *moderate* Arab leaders and nations who shared the same vision of peace. This will help you make the necessary case for isolating Hamas as an extremist, militant, irreconcilable organization.

Just remember not to dwell on the past without pivoting to a more hopeful future. Connect the success of the past with the possibilities for the future. We recommend:

> *"A new peaceful reality that will be good for both Israelis and Arabs."*

This is so important. Don't just hold up your past laurels and expect to win public approval. It helps, but it is not enough. The public wants to know that you remain equally committed to the future.

WORDS THAT WORK

> **Today Israel has peace with two of our neighbors—with the Kingdom of Jordan to our east and with Egypt to the south. We'd like to see peace with Lebanon, with Syria, with more countries in the Arab world. And there's no logical reason that we can't.**
>
> **I say here today, I invite the leaders of all the Arab countries to come to Jerusalem. Renounce terrorism. End the Culture of Hate. Let's create a new reality, a new peaceful reality—one that will be good for both Jews and Arabs—that we can give a better Middle East to our children and our grandchildren so that they won't have to live in the fear of war, terrorism and violence.**
>
> **We are determined to continue our quest to reach peace with those of the Palestinian side who are equally committed. We are eager to explore opportunities for peace with those who have decided to renounce terror and violence and truly represent a national aspiration and not an agenda of hatred.**

Words to remember:

-- *__"Committed."__* It says that you will do everything possible to make it happen. It is much more powerful word than a pledge or promise.

-- *__"Come to Jerusalem."__* The visual symbolism isn't lost on American ears. It says you're serious in our outreach.

Notice how, after harkening back to the peace Israel made in the past, this spokesperson pivoted to focus on the future.

Here is how this message is best developed:

ACKNOWLEDGING THE PAST, BOTH GOOD *AND* BAD

(1) **We know that the history of our conflict has been marked by frustration and mistrust by both Israelis and Palestinians, and Israel is willing to accept some of the blame for what has happened in the past.**

(2) **However, throughout our history we have demonstrated that we value peace above all else. In our hope for peace we overcame differences and found agreement with our Arab neighbors Egypt and Jordan.**

(3) **We remain committed to peace. We offered the Palestinian people a state of their own that included all of Gaza and almost all of the West Bank. In Gaza, their Hamas leadership has rejected progress for peace and launched rocket attacks into Israeli communities. In the West Bank, their leadership has made more earnest efforts for peace – proving that peace is possible. It's time for a change – not just for us but for our Palestinian cousins as well.**

CHAPTER 8:

SETTLEMENTS

> *"If we are to have real peace, then Israelis and Palestinians will have to live side by side. The idea that anywhere that you have Palestinians there can't be any Jews, that some areas have to be Jew-free, is a racist idea. We don't say that we have to cleanse out Arabs from Israel. They are citizen of Israel. They enjoy equal rights. We cannot see why it is that peace requires that any Palestinian area would require a kind of ethnic cleansing to remove all Jews. We don't accept it. Cleansing by either side against either side is unacceptable."*

-- The Best Settlement Argument

The settlements are the single toughest issue for Israel and the hostility towards them and towards Israeli policy that appears to encourage settlement activity is clearly evident. Unless and until Israeli government policy changes, here's the best communication approach:

1) ***Talk about "a willingness to negotiate" and "Camp David" in the same sentence.*** Without taking sides, Europeans, Americans in general nor American Jews in particular support the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. On the contrary, both non-Jews and Jews would support the removal of "some" of the settlements if it led to or was a component of a peace agreement – as was offered at Camp David.

2) ***Provide specific examples of how Israel has already sacrificed in the name of peace.*** Over 9,000 Israelis, including 1,700 families, were moved out of Gaza and the Northern West Bank in 2005 – all in an effort for peace. What did Israel get in return? Rockets from Iran-backed terrorists. There are more statistics available on this issue in Appendix III.

3) ***Three previous Israeli leaders have demonstrated a willingness to address the settlement issue.*** The fact that three Prime Ministers have been willing to dismantle some settlements proves Israel's credibility on the issue. Name them. While most people will not recognize them, and while some Likud leaders may find this uncomfortable, it does make your case stronger. Indeed, during Prime Minister Netanyahu's first Administration, he did not create any new settlements and at the Wye Accords he ceded control of Holy Jewish sites in Hebron. When there is a real partner for peace, Israel is there. But how many more rockets must Israel take?

4) ***The settlements are necessary for the security of Israel.*** Tell audiences that the settlements weren't created randomly. They were put on the tops of mountains and in important militarily sensitive areas to provide a security buffer between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Then remind audiences that Israel has faced a full-scale multi-national invasion four times in the past 55 years and that the settlements provide an effective early warning system. Cite the onset of rocket attacks from Gaza after the 2005 pullout as an example of what happens when Israel leaves these areas. Remind them that Israel needs defensible borders and that it would be dangerous to let Iran-backed terrorists control the hills around Israel's international airport – enabling them to shoot down airplanes with rockets.

SPECIFIC WORDS THAT WORK ON SETTLEMENTS

(1) <u>**Where possible, make the settlement issue about the *larger* challenge of achieving a peaceful solution where Arabs and Israelis live peacefully side by side.**</u> Public opinion is hostile to the settlements – even among supporters of Israel. But if you make the issue part of the larger conversation about finding a way for two peoples to live side by side with equal respect and equal rights, then you move the debate to more favorable territory (so to speak). This passage works as a useful way to turn the issue away from settlements and towards peace.

WORDS THAT WORK

Peace is not just about settlements. It's about jobs, prosperity, and hope for all sides of the conflict – for Palestinians and Israelis alike. Every Palestinian child deserves a better future, and so does every Israeli child.   If we can agree on that, and stop doing those things that hurt our children, we can start on the road to mutual understanding and mutual respect.

We have to look at the larger picture. We have to think about the future, not live in the past or complain about the present. This is not about territory. It is about terrorism. If – and when – we end the terrorism, we can sit down and resolve the issue of territory.

---

(2) <u>**Emphasize *solutions wherein nobody has to leave their own homes*.**</u> Americans are far more favorable towards solutions that are *"just a redrawing of borders on the map"* and do not require anyone – Israeli or Palestinian alike – to leave their own homes, businesses, and communities. Again – mutuality and the right to live in your home are the key themes to weave in.

WORDS THAT WORK

Why should all the Jews have to leave a future Palestinian state? There are 1.2 million Arab citizens of Israel who will stay Israeli citizens in a future two-state solution. Why then should all Jewish people have to leave what will become Palestine? What does that say about the character of the future state? Shouldn't we expect a Palestinian state that is a true democracy to respect all religions and allows citizens to keep their homes and communities?

We especially recommend rhetorical questions, as above, for an issue that is as challenging as settlements. But here is an effective approach using statements:

WORDS THAT WORK

> **Israel does not talk about dismantling Arab settlements within Israel. In a democratic society, Jews and Arabs should be able to live side-by-side in peace. Nobody ever says Israeli territory has to be free from Arabs. One should ask the Palestinian leadership why they always demand land that is free from Jews.**

(3)   **Stress mutuality in the issue of settlements and refugees.** Americans need to be reminded of how Israelis, too, understand the difficulties associated with being refugees. Be careful – this isn't leave for an Israel pity party. It just creates an opportunity to stress how *both* people deserve equal rights to remain in their homes.

HOW *NOT* TO TALK ABOUT SETTLEMENTS

Whoever came up with the phrase "settlements" set in motion a lexicon that was doomed from the start. Nothing is tougher to articulate effectively to neutral Americans than a message in favor of the settlements. Let me be clear about this conclusion. Plenty of Israeli and American Jewish leaders have tried, but American and European audiences rejected almost everything we tested. There is no magic language to unify public support.

That being said, there are language components that definitely work more effectively and several that do not. In particular, there are three arguments involving settlements that you should not make:

1)   **The religious argument.** Quoting from the bible in defense of the current settlements will have absolutely the opposite impact. Even your Jewish audiences will recoil at an attempt to use biblical passages to justify the settlements.

2)   **The ownership argument.** Some of those reading this document will reject this advice ideologically but to claim that Israel "owns" the land that the settlements are on will cause most listeners to reject everything else you say. Semantics does matter, but if we correct Palestinians using the words *"disputed territory"* when they say "occupied territory," we have to accept that the settlements are disputed territory as well.

3)   **The scapegoat argument.** Claiming that Palestinians and other Arab groups are using the settlement issue to gain political advantage may be correct but it does nothing to legitimize Israeli policy.

And, finally, a reminder to never speak in terms of absolutes – *especially* on an issue so controversial and full of shades of gray as settlements are to the public.

> **WORDS THAT DO NOT WORK**
>
> **Those who think that the conflict is driven by an Israeli desire to hold onto territories are totally wrong. This may be a perception that some seek to promote, but it's not our reality. It's not our policy.**

The toughest issue to communicate will be the final resolution of Jerusalem. Americans overwhelmingly want Israel to be in charge of the religious holy sites and are frankly afraid of the consequences should Israel turn over control to the Palestinians. Consider:

- 71% of Americans trust Israel most to protect the holy sites in Jerusalem, compared to 6.1% who trust the Palestinian authority most. 8.5% percent trust neither.

- 54% of Americans believe that "Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty" while just 23.9% believe that "Jerusalem should be divided into Israeli controlled and Palestinian controlled areas."

Given the choice between the two, Americans of all political and demographic stripes trust Israel to protect and have sovereignty over Jerusalem. That said, the *hope* around the world is for both sides to share the responsibilities for control, access and security. Americans and Europeans also believe that Arabs and Muslims have valid claims to the importance of Jerusalem, just the same as Jews and Christians. Just because they trust Israel to protect Jerusalem doesn't mean they want Israel to monopolize it.

(1) <u>**A final solution for Jerusalem is probably the hardest issue of all to negotiate. Let's save it for last, in order to keep the rest of the peace process moving.**</u> Americans agree with this approach. They are sensitive to the sensitivity of the Jerusalem issue and recognize that, if focused on now, it would derail all chance of progress for peace. You need to remind them of these facts. Here's how.

WORDS THAT WORK

Jerusalem is a holy city for us as Jews but we know it's a holy city for Christians and for Muslims and we respect that. Israel is committed to deal with the question of Jerusalem, but if we put it on the front burner, we're not going to get anything else done. We've got to deal with tangible issues to make life better today for Palestinians and for Israelis. The Israeli government has committed itself that Jerusalem is one of the issues for final status talks. But let's first start a positive momentum.

---

(2) <u>**They key to talking about Jerusalem is *mutual commonality.***</u> Americans believe that a final, lasting peace cannot be achieved unless there is a pluralistic approach to Jerusalem. That's because they believe there are legitimate cultural, ethnic, and religious claims to

the city from all parties that must be addressed. So the language below is the best approach.

WORDS THAT WORK

My commitment to serve people is irrelevant to what they believe in. I have to serve all citizens of Jerusalem. Secular religious, Jews, Christians, Arabs. We have them all and the role as mayor of Jerusalem is to look for the common denominator. And the residents whether Arab or Jews, my role as public servant is to improve their quality of life their education their ability to work in a better job.

– Mayor of Jerusalem Nir Barkat

Note: The arguments about demolishing Palestinian homes because they are not within the Jerusalem building code tested SO badly that we are not even going to dignify them with a Word's That Don't Work box. Americans hate their own local planning boards for telling them where they can and can't put swimming pools or build fences. You don't need to import that animosity into your own credibility issues.

Worse yet, talking about "violations of building codes" when a TV station is showing the removal of a house that looks older than the modern state of Israel is simply catastrophic.

CHAPTER 10:

LOAN GUARANTEES & MILITARY AID

Without being repetitive, Americans fundamentally believe that a democracy has a right to protect its people and its borders. And while Americans don't want to increase foreign aid in a time of significant budgetary deficits and painful spending cuts, there is one and only one argument that will work for Israel (in four easy steps):

1) *As a democracy, Israel has the right and the responsibility to defend its borders and protect its people.*

2) *Terrorist groups, including Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas, continue to pose a direct threat to Israeli security and have repeatedly taken innocent Israeli lives.*

3) *Israel is America's one and only true ally in the region. In these particularly unstable and dangerous times, Israel should not be forced to go it alone.*

4) *With America's financial assistance, Israel can defend its borders, protect its people, and provide invaluable assistance to the American effort against the war against terrorism.*

This is important. All the arguments about Israel being a democracy, letting Arabs vote and serve in government, protecting religious freedom, etc., won't deliver the public support to secure the loan guarantees and the military aid Israel needs – not when it comes to U.S. tax dollars. There must be a **national security** angle – one that clearly links the interests of both Israel and America:

> **WORDS THAT WORK: SELLING ISRAELI AID**
>
> **"It was Israel who risked their pilots and planes in taking out Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactors and thus thwarted his quest for nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It was Israel who provided much of the intelligence that helped America defeat Iraq back in 1991. Israel has been a key regional asset and military ally of the United States for more than 50 years. That relationship must continue, even and especially in the post-9-11 era. It is a partnership of democracies devoted to the war against terrorism and the fight for freedom."**

Americans have been thinking and talking about the war on terror for years now. The fact that Iran backed terrorist groups are a *direct* threat to Israel is especially important. Remind audiences that Israel and America have common values, but then stress that we also share a common enemy. The language below does exactly that.

But deterrence is only half the message. You really do need to emphasize Israel's historic willingness to compromise and sacrifice on behalf of America. This may not play well among some Israeli politicians but it will certainly play extremely well in the States. What follows is a speech that highlights the most effective language for loan guarantees and Israeli aid…

MILITARY AID SPEECH

As we all well know, Israel lives in the most dangerous region of the world. Every day we face a military threat to our people. The people who trained to kill Americans trained thousands of miles from American shores. The people who train to kill Israelis train in terrorist camps that sit not more than 10 miles from Israeli borders.

Israel, like no other American ally, understands self-defense. Israel, like no other American ally, understands the importance of fighting terror across the world. And we all know the importance of bringing genuine democracy and human rights to all nations so that the cycle of terrorist violence will cease to turn.

It's a huge undertaking. No one nation should bear the entire burden. The task of ridding the world of terror is so monumental that even the United States cannot meet the challenge all on its own. That is why Israel has appealed to the U.S. to partner in the effort to rid the world of terror.

Israel makes the request for military assistance out of self-defense. As a democracy, they have the right and the responsibility to protect our borders. As a democracy, they have the right and the responsibility to protect their citizens.

Israel does not ask for U.S. troops to protect itself. It does not ask for a single American soldier to protect its borders. It only asks for the funds for them to protect themselves. They need the equipment so that their own troops can ensure the safety of their civilian population through this gathering conflict with the enemies of democracy.

They didn't ask to have our nation built in range of Iranian missiles. They didn't ask that their nation be a focal point for religious extremists who have declared war on the West and on democracy. But they are, and they need your help.

61 years ago, America helped Israel build a nation out of sand. For sixty-one years Israel has paid its debts, followed American initiatives, and they are probably our best ally. They have always been there for us and will always be the one ally that we can count on.As allies, they are now asking for some modest support, for some assistance in a real hour of need. Yes, their military is strong, but they are still a very small nation and they are still in a very vulnerable place.

Let's help them to help themselves. By keeping Israel secure, we are keeping in place a nation that will be there to help build and grow other democracies in the Middle East. And remember, even in tragedy, Israel and America mourn together.

CHAPTER 11:

THE SECURITY FENCE & CHECKPOINTS

Helping the public understand the need for a security fence and checkpoints will be one of your most important tasks. As Palestinian leaders continue to call the security fence an "apartheid wall" or "separation wall", our telling the public that "good fences make good neighbors" would only pour salt on views of what our citizens have already seen in the media as an obstacle to peace. Keep in mind that the messages for the security fence and the checkpoints are almost identical and Americans and Europeans alike will understand that. As with all of our communications, we need to tell the truth. We need to show humility. We need to show empathy for the Palestinians.

In no other issue is it more important to use rhetorical questions. We need to recognize that Palestinian people have hopes and dreams too.

Opinion elites support actions Israel takes to protect itself from terrorism, including building the security fence. Given the importance American opinion elites place on protecting their own people from terrorism, it is not surprising that many see the fence as a way to ensure Israeli security. But it is also a way for Israel to have secure borders, just like any other nation.

We tested several different arguments in support of the fence. The first three arguments were the most effective; the highest percentage of people found them "Very Convincing." Here the eight most successful ways to talk about the Security Fence, ranked in descending order:

WORDS THAT WORK –

THE TOP 8 WAYS TO TALK ABOUT THE SECURITY

1. **When Palestinian leaders disarm and arrest terrorists and dismantle their organizations, then a fence won't be needed.** Until that time, Israel has a right to protect its citizens from attacks. And one way to protect them is with this **temporary** security fence. The idea that the fence is not the end—but rather a means to an end—is a point worth making and repeating. If the fence exists today so that future generations can live in peace, perhaps with open borders, then it is easier to accept and defend.

2. **After more than 250 different attacks—month after month of bloodshed for three solid years—what was Israel to do to protect itself?** The security fence is a necessary evil. Even the government of Israel was against it for years. But relentless terrorism has forced Israel to protect its citizens and until the terrorism stops, they do not have a better option.

3. **Israel wants peace.** Israelis want BOTH sides to live free of violence and fear. Indeed, Israelis understand that the lives of average Palestinians are very tough. But after years and years of suicide bombing after suicide bombing, if I were a Palestinian, I would ask myself, "*What have I gotten for all this violence? What have I gotten for all the billions of dollars in international aid that went to Arafat and led to him being listed in Forbes as one of the richest people on the planet while I lived in suffering and genuine need? Why, when Arafat met with Barak and Clinton, didn't Arafat accept generous offers for a Palestinian state? Why did Arafat not make a concerted effort to live by the Road Map? And why has today's Hamas leadership in Gaza not done more to address the needs of the Palestinians who have suffered as a result of these actions? Why do Hamas leaders keep using a strategy of violence that gets people nowhere?*" The sad fact is that the fence is just the most recent tragedy caused by Palestinian leaders who allow terrorism instead of negotiations to be the primary method of dealing with their neighbor. The entire war in Gaza would not have happened if Hamas not sent rockets into Israel year after year. Peace remains the only real solution and it is within the reach of Israelis and Palestinians if both sides are willing to grab it.

4. **Already there is a fence between Israel and Gaza**. And not one suicide bomber has come from Gaza to kill Israeli children. Not one. But more than 250 suicide bombers have come through the West Bank and killed Israeli children, women, and civilians. Israel now longs for a time when it will have a rocket-shield that will be able to protect from rockets in Gaza so Israel no longer needs to go to war there to stop the rockets.

5. **Today Hamas continues to send rockets from Gaza** – aiming them at civilians. This causes the need for checkpoints so that Hamas cannot get advanced rockets from Iran. Do they checkpoints stop all the flow of weapons? Sadly, because of tunnels and smuggling by water, it does not stop all the flow of rockets. But at least Hamas has fewer advanced rockets than Hezbollah had during its war against Israel just three summers ago.

6. **What would America do if we had suicide bombers attacking our people at pizza parlors, weddings, and on our buses?** What would we in America do if our neighbors shot rockets at us? What would we do? What is Israel to do?

7. **The suicide strategy. If it is allowed to succeed anywhere, it will succeed everywhere.** The 9/11 hijackers were suicide bombers who killed thousands of Americans. And now, we Americans are protecting ourselves. At airports we have extra screeners. We take off our shoes. It takes time. It invades our privacy. But it saves lives. But imagine if here, in America, suicide bombers came into our cities and blew up children and mothers. Imagine if they went on buses and killed innocent people. What would we do to protect ourselves? And then, what would we do if the suicide bombers kept coming—250 times—from the same area time after time? What would we do to protect ourselves?

8. **Israelis value life**. Israel is a democracy that celebrates diversity—including 1.2 million Arabs who are citizens of Israel with freedom of speech, religion, and a right to vote. But what about the Palestinians' leaders? We know that their people deserve the freedom to ask their leaders, *"Why have you not stopped the violence and accepted a state? Why have you created a situation where Israel has no choice but to build an ugly security fence to protect its citizens? When will you renounce using official Palestinian television to encourage a culture of hatred, violence, and death? When will you stop the suicide strategy and adopt a strategy of peace? When will you begin to work for hope and opportunity for all the Palestinian people?"*

9. **Tell real stories of real victims.** Time and again innocent people have been killed because a security fence did not protect them. Put a human face on the crisis. Tell these stories one innocent victim at a time.

When polled, nearly two-thirds of opinion elites support any action that Israel takes to protect itself from terrorism, including building the security fence.

Israel's Security Fence

(Percent Responding)

July 2004	February 2005	October 2005

Net +18

Net +16

Net +38

63

53

49

41

37

34

33

31

26

25

24

16

Justified   Removed   Justified   Removed   Justified   Removed

* Graph shows data taken from surveys of either registered voters or opinion elites

"As you may know, Israel is building a security fence between itself and the Palestinian territories. Do you believe that Israel is justified in building this security fence, or should it be removed?

Israel's security fence (Luntz 10/05 poll)

(1) <u>**Emphasize that the purpose of the fence is to save lives, NOT to add land.**</u> You can say this because it is completely true, and yet many don't know it. The fence was designed to (and has) saved lives. It does not annex territory nor does it establish any borders. Knowing this will change perceptions of the fence.

Words That Work

The fence is a temporary security tool. It's already been moved a couple of times when our Supreme Court has said we have to move it. When we reach peace with the Palestinians, and I hope that day isn't far away, the fence can come down, the fence can be moved.

But, in the meantime, the fence is saving lives, and the fence is providing a stability that allows this peace process to work. By preventing the need for Israel to respond to terrorist attacks because the terrorists aren't able to come into Israel, the fence is helping provide a quiet period which allows for political dialogue, which is so important.

A few other things to pull out of this paragraph:

- Explain how the fence has been moved in some places in order to conform to land requirements and the needs of the Palestinians, ***according to Israel's rule of law and under its Supreme Court.*** This

is not your strongest argument, so never lead with it or let it stand alone. But it does build credibility into the larger argument that this is not a land grab.

- Emphasize how the fence is a ***temporary*** tool being used to achieve safety and peace for everyone in the region.

(2)   **The *placement* of the fence is a more controversial issue than its simple *existence.***
Research reveals that the idea of the fence isn't abhorrent to Americans; it's the placement of the fence that offends. For most Americans, the fence isn't a pleasant concept but it's one that is completely acceptable when explained. At first blush the fence reminds them of the Berlin Wall, a lack of freedom, and stringent, physical restrictions placed on law-abiding citizens.

However, if you make the case for the dangerous reality of living in Israel, the existence of the fence becomes acceptable – especially because it is working. What is not acceptable is the fact that some of the fence sits on "Palestinian land." Remind people that Israel has done everything possible to try to limit the fence's impact on local residents, including the Palestinians. It has attempted to avoid using private lands, and when this was impossible, offered the owners full compensation. Additionally, Israel has offered to relocate olive and fruit trees growing within the security fence area—so far over 40,000 olive trees have been moved at Israel's expense.

> **Words That Work**
> **The fence is being built because the fence works. The fence keeps suicide bombers out of Israel. In 2002 and 2003, we were having an almost daily suicide bombing in Israel because there was no barrier to keep suicide bombers from coming from the West Bank into Israel proper and that was a problem. We had a situation in Israel where people were scared. People were afraid to send their kids to school on a bus, people were afraid to go to shopping malls, people didn't want to go to restaurants. The fence is a nonviolent way to deal very effectively with that terrorist threat. In the areas where the fence is being built, there has been a clear and dramatic reduction in infiltration by suicide bombings, down some 90-95%.**

Here is an example of how NOT to talk about the fence. Even the mere *mention* of an encroachment on Palestinian lands, even if that encroachment is relatively minor, completely turns the audience against you:

CHAPTER 12:

THE RIGHT OF RETURN = RIGHT OF CONFISCATION

First and foremost, we cannot accept this phrase. We cannot allow it enter the opinion leader lexicon. Whenever *"right of return is raised,"* we must immediately respond with *"No, you are talking about the right of confiscation. This is not about returning, it is about taking away and we will not accept it."* Nothing less will do.

(1) <u>**Call for a refusal to turn back the clock on confiscating private property.**</u> There are two components to the turn back the clock argument. First, that is simply not *practical* to carry out the policy. And second, that Jews, as well, have had their property taken (see chart below). The fact is that most people DO NOT KNOW that close to a million Jews were pushed out of places like Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Iraq, and Iran since Israel was founded. You must make this case. The strongest argument *by far* in talking about the claim of confiscation is exactly this:


WORDS THAT WORK

While Palestinians complain that they lost homes and property when they left Israel in 1948, just as many Jews were pushed out of Arab states since that time, also losing their homes and property. We cannot simply turn back the clock for either side and must look towards the future.


The top two messages deal with the practicality of such a move and with the need to look toward the future, not the past.

Now, I'd like to read you some reasons why some people oppose allowing the Palestinians to return to their homes and property in Israel, and please tell me how convincing you find each argument to be, whether it is very convincing, somewhat convincing, not too convincing or not at all convincing.

It is simply not practical to move hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into Israel. Since Israel was created, new homes, offices and families have moved into the places inside Israel vacated by the Palestinians and it is simply not practical 60 years later to ask them to move or share that space with Palestinians.	36% 74%
While many Palestinians lost their homes and property when they left Israel in 1948, just as many Jews have been forced out of Arab countries since that time, also leaving their homes and property behind. We cannot turn back the clock on either side and must look toward the future.	32% 71%

■Very Convincing ■Somewhat Convincing

(2) **Cite the lack of leadership by other Arab nations in providing a better life for Palestinians.** Americans cannot understand why the Palestinians live in such poverty when some Arab backers have such incredible wealth. While it does not directly address the right of return issue, explaining why the Palestinians continue to live as refugees is effective in undercutting Arab credibility. There is one line that works particularly well:

Similarly, focusing on the mismanagement and theft of billions of dollars in international aid is another approach that effectively undercuts Palestinian credibility.

A TOUGH COMMUNICATIONS ISSUE

The right of return is a tough issue for Israelis to communicate effectively because much of Israeli language sounds like the *"separate but equal"* words of the 1950s segregationists and

the 1980s advocates of Apartheid. The fact is, Americans don't like, don't believe and don't accept the concept of *"separate but equal."* even when told that Palestinians and Israelis advocate the same agenda. The language is simply too loaded to American ears.

This linguistic problem did not develop overnight. As with the term *"occupation,"* Israel allowed the Palestinians to create and then redefine both language and history. But since we can't go back and fix the mistakes, it is important to get the terminology right as we move forward.

Before demonstrating effective right of return language, there are several *"rules"* to the *"right of return"* debate.

(1)   **Call it a "demand."** Americans don't like it when either side makes "demands" on the other. It sounds too strident and uncompromising. Then say *"Palestinians aren't content with their own state. Now they are demanding territory inside Israel."*

(2)   **This involves people who NEVER lived within the borders of Israel.** A case could be made that those who actually had homes within Israeli boundaries *might* be entitled to some compensation, but Americans will reject the notion that the children and grandchildren who were born elsewhere have any rights or claims to anything.

(3)   **Emphasize *"at some point in the future…"*** The right of return is already an ill-defined concept with questionable justification. Pointing out that there is no start date, no end date, no ultimate conclusion, no final settlement, etc. will effectively undermine the Palestinian argument.

(4)   **Emphasize that this is not about the territories. This is about the State of Israel.** Americans will assume that since this is an issue about "land," it must be wrapped up in the Palestinian effort to create a country, which they support. You have to be clear that this is about Israel itself, from Tel Aviv to Haifa – a demand for land **INSIDE** internationally accepted Israeli borders.

(5)   ***"Mass Palestinian immigration."*** Thanks to 9/11 and the continuing threat of terrorism, Americans are particularly afraid of mass immigration of anyone right now. Comparing the challenges facing Americans in dealing with unrestricted immigration and Israel's situation will be well received.

(6)   ***"Undermining the peace process."*** This is the ultimate argument because Americans believe no demand is so important that it should be allowed to derail the effort to achieve peace.

A TOUGH QUESTION AND AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE

Q: Could you explain for those who may not understand the right of return means for the Palestinians?

A: It is basically the Palestinian demand that all Palestinians, not just Palestinians who have lived here historically but their children and grandchildren, should be able at some point in the future to flood what is currently Israel with mass Palestinian immigration.

For us it's a tremendously worrisome statement by the Palestinians that they're not willing to give up this demand. Because at the time when we are trying to achieve a peace based on the notion of two states for two peoples, it suggests that the Palestinians are not going to be content with one state. The Palestinians are saying at the outset that they want a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people, which we accept, but they are also making demands for land inside what everyone recognizes as Israel – and that is unacceptable.

A TOUGH FOLLOW-UP QUESTION AND RESPONSE

Q: And yet you believe that Jews, even converts, have the right to return, even Jews who may have never set foot in Israel in a thousand years have a right to come. And yet Palestinians who actually lived in Tel Aviv don't have the same right to go back to their homes? Isn't that hypocrisy?

A: Anybody who looks at the history of the century will recognize that Jews over the world have been brutally persecuted and hounded because of their Jewish identity, wherever they've lived. Unfortunately some sixty years ago, we were witness to the atrocities perpetrated against six million because they had no place to go. The notion there should be a place no matter what where Jews can go for refuge was one of the reasons for the establishment of the State of Israel.

That is a very different than the Palestinians saying *'we want to have a state for our people, but we also want land in yours.'* We accept the former. We cannot accept the latter.

A TRULY AWFUL RIGHT OF RETURN RESPONSE

Q: **And what about Palestinians who actually lived in Israel, who personally grew up in Tel Aviv or Haifa? They themselves lived in the homes, went to the schools, they grew up in what is now the state of Israel. Shouldn't they have a right to return?**

A: **They have a right to live in a state of their own people. Yes they do. They have a right to live in the State of Palestine. They have a right to live with their own society, with their own culture, with their own mentality. The idea is to have a Jewish state for Jewish people and a Palestinian state for Palestinian people. But the influx of hundreds of thousands into Israel, into the Jewish state, is totally unacceptable.**

Most of all, Americans want a better future. They don't want to dwell on the past problems with Palestinian refugees anymore than they think America should give New York back to the American Indians. Talk about how sometimes you can't turn back the clock – you need to move forward.

CHAPTER 13:

THE UNITED NATIONS

"We believe the UN has an important role to play. We're in favor of working with UN authorities on humanitarian aid, helping people on the ground, whether refugees or others, in education, in economic support, and the World Health Organization…

But as far as the working out a peace agreement, we need an honest broker between the Palestinians and us, and the UN has never played that essential role. They have consistently taken a one-sided, anti-Israel, anti-American position. Until they find a way to take the politics out of the UN, they should focus on their economic role."

-- Perfect Language

Given the UN's "Durban 2" conference, it is especially timely to look to how Americans see the UN overall. The only people in America who want a major role for the United Nations in world affairs are those on the political Left – and many of them aren't sure anymore. The fact is, the UN is suffering from the greatest credibility gap since its founding, and about half of Americans are happy to see the organization wither away on the vine.

However, as your communication challenge in America is on the political Left, it is wise to offer at least some praise of some UN effort so not to look intransigent. That said, we also discovered that ridicule is a good devise here. ***Even when praising the UN, remind the listener that Cuba, Iran, and Libya all headed up various human rights committees.*** If that's not laughable, nothing is.

Which brings up a good point: If you criticize the UN, do so with humor. Since the Left still harbors a strong affinity toward the United Nations, if you must criticize, laughter is the best approach. *"The UN is a rather unique organization. Only at the UN could Libya chair the Commission on Human Rights ... and Syria chair the Security Council."*

WORDS THAT WORK

"By definition, you cannot have peace without security. It is part of the UN Charter – that sovereign nations have the right to security.

And so we say to the United Nations, if the Palestinian leadership is unable to guarantee our security, if Abbas is unable, unwilling or incapable of controlling Hamas, then, by definition, they are incapable of delivering peace. And if they are incapable of delivering peace, then, by definition, Israel must look for another partner to negotiate with.

And if the United Nations is truly committed to a lasting peace, they will put as much pressure on the Palestinians to stop the senseless violence against Israeli citizens as they put on Israel for simply existing."

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CHAPTER 14

TALKING ABOUT ARAB-ISRAELIS

The language in this section is essential to using largely unknown facts to educate the public in order to soften anti-Israeli impressions and win converts. The fact is, few know anything whatsoever about the rights of Arabs within Israel. Most Europeans and Americans, even on the intellectual Left, have no idea that Arabs can vote, sit in the Knesset, and are active participants in the Israeli economy. They need to be told. Once they learn the **<u>FACTS</u>** – and that's exactly the word you should emphasize – those openly hostile to Israel become silent, those silently hostile become neutral, and those neutral offer conditional support for Israel.

So tick off each of the following facts, one-by-one, and emphasize each time that each assertion isn't rhetoric – they're facts:

WORDS THAT WORK

"Israeli Arabs have more rights and a higher standard of living than in any other Middle Eastern country.

Fact: Israeli Arabs have been able to vote for Prime Minister and Parliament since 1948. No other Arab nation has such a long record of democracy.

Fact: Arab-Israelis serve in Parliament, on the Supreme Court and in leadership positions in every area of Israeli government, business and law.

Fact: the average Israeli Arab has a higher income and higher standard of living than in any other Middle Eastern country. Fact: An Arab Israeli has the freedom to criticize the government and its leadership openly and publicly. In any other Middle Eastern country, a public criticism of the government will lead to jail time – and worse.

Fact: Israeli-Arab women have exactly the same rights as men in every way. No other Arab society can make that claim.

The fact is, Israeli Arabs have more rights, more privileges, more opportunities, and more freedom in Israel than they have in any other Middle Eastern country.

This isn't rhetoric. This isn't spin. This is fact."

CHAPTER 15:

TALKING ABOUT CHILDREN AND THE CULTURE OF HATE

*"What makes a country so desperate that they would send their own
children to die? And what choice do they have?"*

*The children are where the next great language battle for the hearts of the world will be
fought.* The above quote aside, nothing quiets the Israeli-haters faster than the visuals of Palestinian
children being taught how to load a machine gun, snap a person's neck, and sing songs about the
destruction of Israel. Nothing.

While it is impossible to bring the tape the IDF compiled of the various Arab news programs and
other footage to every speech, it is essential that you refer to this tape whenever possible and show it to as
many journalists as possible. The fact that it appeared on Arabic television makes the material credible,
and the visuals are so strong that they don't need any voiceover. Most importantly, no one believes that
the horrible things these Arab and Palestinian children are doing and saying occurs in Israel – and it
therefore destroys the moral equivalency argument and sympathy for the Palestinians at the same time.

But explicit appeals to the heart using the victims of terror simply will not work if they are seen
as calculating. If people perceive a deliberate attempt to generate sympathy, you will get none.

WORDS THAT <u>DO NOT</u> WORK

**In a few hours, Israel will wake up to a new morning of funerals,
funerals of babies, of innocent mothers and fathers. And this is what
we face right now.**

And why did the words above not work? To the public, it sounded like Israelis believed that their
babies were worth more than the Palestinian babies they had killed for whatever reason throughout their
occupation. That's why you need to appeal to all mothers and fathers on behalf of all children in the
Middle East. It also seemed forced and fake.

Now, since you can't bring the IDF tape with you to every meeting, the following language will
best evoke similar emotions:

WORDS THAT WORK

**Let me talk about the children of the Middle East for they are our
future. It is so important that our educational institutions that teach
our children should be violence-free and hate-free. The key to a true
lasting peace in the Middle East is in the education of the next
generation of Israeli and Palestinian leaders.**

**"There is no reason whatsoever why Palestinian children sitting in schools today should
STILL be exposed to the same vicious indoctrination against Jews and Israelis, the same
hero worship for suicide bombings.**

It doesn't take force to counter Hamas. It simply takes the will of the Palestinian leadership to stop this incitement on a daily basis. And stop the vicious propaganda from the religious leaders in the mosques encouraging more people to become suicide bombers. That's what we need to get us on the path to peace."

-- **Successful pro-Israeli sound-bite**

We have just briefly addressed *The Culture of Hate* in connection with the indoctrination of Palestinian children but it deserves a renewed focus because it is the strongest theme you have going for you right now. It's accurate. It's fair. It's believable. It's credible. It stands in the way of a lasting peace. It needs to become a core message right now. Use The Culture of Hate response whenever asked about the desire for peace among the Palestinian people.

A TOUGH QUESTION AND THE PERFECT ANSWER

Q: What percentage of Palestinians do you think support groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad and think terrorism will actually help get them to a Palestinian state?

A: I still believe that the great majority of the Palestinian population is in favor of peace and supports peace.

But remember, we're talking about a society which to a very great extent is governed by fear. We're talking about a totalitarian society -- no freedom of expression, no freedom of the press. [Add where appropriate: **It is ironic that the freest Arab press, not just in the region but in the world, is in Israel.]**

I do believe that the lack of freedom combined with the Culture of Hate and the campaign of incitement within the population instigated and led by Hamas will undermine the advocates of peace. As long as the Culture of Hate and incitement continues, the larger the support for terrorist organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. End the Culture of Hatred and replace it with democracy and understanding and peace can be achieved.

ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR

We have talked in the past about the difference between 100% effort and 100% result in fighting terrorism. But what we haven't addressed, and what the American people would fully understand, is the importance of accountability in fighting terrorism. The acknowledgement that it is impossible to eradicate terrorism completely builds credibility. The demand for a full, comprehensive and ongoing effort generates a positive reaction. But you need to go one step further. The key line in this response: Palestinians and Israelis *"working shoulder to shoulder to prevent acts of terror."*

The key to making the case that the Palestinian terrorism is more than just isolated incidents is via *"The Culture of Hate."* The video described earlier wasn't created in some Hollywood studio. It all aired on Arab television and it glorified martyrdom, exalted those who called for the death of Israelis, and had pre-teens singing songs with the worst sort of anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli lyrics while their teachers

applauded. This was sick stuff, but it explains in living color why so many young people blow themselves up in the name of whatever … and take as many Israelis as possible with them. And until the Palestinians end this Culture of Hate, there will be no chance for a truly effective, permanent peace.

MORE WORDS THAT WORK

In Israeli schools, children are taught to respect Palestinians and empathize with their plight. Tragically, there are fewer teachers today in Israeli schools than in past years because of the need to hire so many security guards, add metal detectors and replace the windows with bullet-proof glass. It shouldn't be this way. And yet our Israeli children are still taught that the pursuit of peace is the highest calling.

But in Palestinian schools, rather than using schools to promote peace with their Jewish neighbors, Palestinians have persistently indoctrinated their children with anti-Semitic stereotypes, anti-Israel propaganda, and material that is designed more to promote hostility and intolerance than co-existence and understanding.

Worse yet, the Palestinian authority has also tried to convince Palestinian children that Israel is out to kill them. For example, the Palestinian daily newspaper actually claimed Israeli aircraft were dropping poison candy in the Gaza Strip. It's dishonest, destructive, and shameful. And previously, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate banned journalists from photographing Palestinian children carrying weapons or taking part in activities by militant groups, saying that the pictures harm the Palestinian cause.

Instead of teaching their children to put down their guns, they are telling foreign journalists to put down their cameras.

CHAPTER 16:

LESSONS TO LEARN FROM PRESIDENT OBAMA'S LANGUAGE

"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I am going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same." -- President Barack Obama.

We present our first-ever analysis of a specific American politician's language in the history of our work for you because President Obama is completely reshaping the American public discussion on issues in the Middle East. And he's doing it with the same language we've been recommending you use for years. The effectiveness with which his words have resonated with the American people should serve as a useful reminder of the importance of language.

The administration's language marks a sharp departure from the previous administration. In particular, his words bear close inspection on the issue of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians and on the issue of Iran.

OBAMA ON THE PEACE PROCSS

(1)   **President Obama's language is so similar to what we have recommended you say for years that he could easily be stealing straight from our playbook.** Have a look for yourself, and see if this rings any bells.

> **WORDS THAT WORK FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA (AND CAN WORK FOR YOU, TOO)**
>
> **I think anybody who has studied the region recognizes that the situation for the ordinary Palestinian in many cases has not improved. And the bottom line in all these talks and all these conversations is this: Is a child in the Palestinian territories going to be better off? Do they have a future for themselves? And is the child in Israel going to feel confident about his or her safety and security?**
>
> **And if we can keep our focus on making their lives better and look forward, and not simply think about all the conflicts and tragedies of the past, then I think that we have an opportunity to make real progress.**
>
> **– President Barack Obama**

WORDS THAT WORK FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA (AND CAN WORK FOR YOU, TOO)

If we are looking at the region as a whole and communicating a message to the Arab world and the Muslim world, that we are ready to initiate a new partnership based on mutual respect and mutual interest, then I think that we can make significant progress.   – President Barack Obama

Let's run down the list of reasons why this language scored through the roof:

- Overall theme of mutuality? Check.

- Appealing to the well-being and safety of *children* on both sides? Check.

- Humanizing the issue? Check.

- Acknowledging the errors of the past but focusing on the future? Check.

- Emphasizing the need to improve living conditions for the Palestinians and security for Israelis? Check.

- Finishing with a call for "*progress"?* Check.

In three short paragraphs, he hit all the right and important notes.   President Obama is saying exactly what you should be saying – and he's getting rewarded for it. During this era of his immense popularity, you would be *extremely* well served to be on the same communications plane as he is – wherever it is consistent with Israeli policy.

PRESIDENT OBAMA ON IRAN

You might say that President Obama is bringing "discussion and diplomacy" back in style among the American people. After 8 years of the unilateral, never negotiate with the Axis of Evil approach of the Bush Administration, Americans are receptive to his approach.   And it is essentially this:

"We must never be afraid to talk to our enemies."

This approach scores very well with Americans and through the roof with Europeans. By saying "we must never be afraid" it actually appeals to American's sense of the need for courage in foreign affairs, while avoiding the trap of seeming weak by negotiating with terrorists.

In each of the examples below, we can apply what works for President Obama among Americans to what will work for *you* among Americans.

(2)   President Obama has humanized the relationship with Iran by drawing connects between the *people* of Iran and America. We can learn lessons from this. Israeli spokespersons can and should use the same approach in talking about the Palestinian

people, as we have advocated elsewhere in this document. You can simultaneously marginalize the extremist leadership (in your case Hamas, in Obama's case Ahmadinejad) while building credibility for your humanity. It's a proven winner.

WORDS THAT WORK

For nearly three decades relations between our nations (America and Iran) have been strained. But at this holiday we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together. Indeed, you will be celebrating your New Year in much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays -- by gathering with friends and family, exchanging gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.

Within these celebrations lies the promise of a new day, the promise of opportunity for our children, security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations. Those are shared hopes, those are common dreams. — **President Barack Obama**

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(3) **Call for the people to hold their extremist leaders accountable.** Again, just as you can and should appeal directly to the Palestinian people to elect moderate leaders reject terror, truly represent them, and will work for peace, President Obama is calling on the people of Iran to do the same.

WORDS THAT WORK

You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.

The aim of this entire document is to help you reach persuadable minds, especially those on the left, where you have the greatest communication challenge. However, this chapter is much more focused on unearthing the *underlying* sentiments of the left so you can understand them, and then address them head on. After all, Democrats control the White House, Congress and Senate – so you need to understand how they think. You also need to be very sensitive to the fact that while the Democratic leaders in public office have been to Israel and know the facts, vast numbers of their key voters don't know the basic facts about the Middle East.

To begin with, here is the partisan split with which you are faced:

Your most favorable audience is white, male voters:

And, is higher among men and white voters.

Thinking about the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East, please tell me whether, in general, you consider yourself to be...

a strong supporter of Israel, a supporter of Israel,
a supporter of the Palestinians ...or... a strong supporter of the Palestinians

By Gender   **By Ethnicity**

By Gender		By Ethnicity	
Men (48%)	Women (52%)	White (76%)	African American (12%)

64%
29% Strng
7%
Israel | Palest.

52%
22% Strng
10%
Israel | Palest.

61%
28% Strng
5%
Israel | Palest.

47%
16% Strng
19%
10% Strng
Israel | Palest.

TIP – January, 2009   6

Here are the best arguments you can make, segmented by political ideology. As you can see, the Left is far less receptive to the kinds of arguments you'd like to make:

Most Effective Strategies: by Party

Next, I'd like to read you a series of short statements. After I read each one, please tell me whether it is extremely important, very important, somewhat important or not that important in helping to bring peace in the Middle East.

% "Extremely/Very Important"	GOP (28%)	IND (31%)	DEM (40%)
Stopping Iran from arming, funding and training terrorists.	94%	88%	82%
Getting Palestinians to stop teaching hate.	92%	92%	88%
Getting Palestinians to stop shooting rockets into Israel.	93%	88%	91%
Getting Iran to stop its nuclear program.	83%	75%	73%
Getting Israel to open all the borders to Gaza so that goods and services can flow freely to Palestinians.	27%	40%	52%
Getting Israel to stop its military incursions into Gaza.	27%	38%	54%
Getting Israel to stop expanding its settlements and give up land to the Palestinians.	24%	43%	44%

TIP – January, 2009   40

For many on the left who are not elites – especially African Americans, women and young Americans -- data show that they know far less about Israel and Israel's enemies than other Americans. That is largely because they are so focused on domestic issues such as jobs and healthcare that they are completely unaware of critical facts. Many simply don't know that Israel gave up all of Gaza in 2005 with hopes of peace and that Israel got only rockets in return. When you can educate them about the facts it is clear that many are persuaded of Israel's just cause.

The following charts show that *aware* voters are you best allies, and therefore demonstrates the need to make Women and African-Americans *more* aware.

"Aware" voters tended to support Israel at a higher rate...

Thinking about the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East, please tell me whether, in general, you consider yourself to be... a strong supporter of Israel, a supporter of Israel, a supporter of the Palestinians...or... a strong supporter of the Palestinians

Among "Aware" Voters   **Among "Unaware" Voters**

68% (35% Strng) Israel / 5% Palest.	66% (33% Strng) Israel / 10% Palest.	40% (10% Strng) Israel / 10% Palest.	38% (10% Strng) Israel / 10% Palest.
Aware of Rockets (65%)	Aware of Withdrawal (64%)	Unaware of Rockets (33%)	Unaware of Withdrawal (34%)

TIP – February, 2009   8

Women tended to be less aware…

And, prior to the conflict over the past two weeks, were you aware that Palestinian terrorists have regularly been shooting rockets into Israel for years?

By Gender

81%
52% 47%
18%

Yes	No	Yes	No
Men (46%)		**Women** (54%)	

And, are you aware that Israel withdrew its troops and settlers out of Gaza three years ago and turned Gaza over to the Palestinians?

By Gender

75%
54% 44%
24%

Yes	No	Yes	No
Men (50%)		**Women** (50%)	

With female voters and African-Americans believing so less strongly.

Thinking about the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East, please tell me whether, in general, do you think America should be…

a strong supporter of Israel, a supporter of Israel, a supporter of the Palestinians …or… a strong supporter of the Palestinians

By Gender

64%
33% Strng
8%
52%
25% Strng
10%

Israel	Palest.	Israel	Palest.
Men (48%)		**Women** (52%)	

By Ethnicity

63%
31% Strng
7%
49%
20% Strng
15%

Israel	Palest.	Israel	Palest.
White (76%)		**African American** (12%)	

Israel may represent the only democratic country in a region dominated by brutal, extremist nations that are entrenched in non-Western religious doctrine, but the elites on the American Left see Israeli militarism and shows of force as extreme and unjustified. Unlike more mainstream Americans who are fervent in their wish to protect and foster democratic principles, the Left have a decidedly *"live and let live"* philosophy. There is a desire to give everyone what they want so that whatever conflict exists will just go away. And for them, that means ending the occupation and giving the Palestinians land and statehood, even if it would be rewarding terror.

As stated in our first chapter, world view is especially important to the Left as they see a world where basically all people are good and one in which, with education and communication we can all get along. This is in stark contrast to most conservatives who believe that there are good people (i.e. Israel) and bad people (i.e. Iran) and that good people need to be protected from the bad people.

"World view" attitudes differ dramatically by both partisanship and ideology.

Please tell me which of the following two descriptions better fits your view of the world....
If different people and cultures spent more time getting to know one another and communicating about our problems, we could all get along?
...or is your view of the world that...
The world is a place where some people's values just aren't the same as ours and we need to protect ourselves from terrorists and extremists who would destroy our way of life?

By Party

	GOP (32%)	IND (28%)	DEM (39%)
Get along	23%	51%	66%
Protect ourselves	69%	39%	29%

By Ideology

	Conservative (39%)	Moderate (36%)	Liberal (23%)
Get along	28%	57%	67%
Protect ourselves	64%	35%	28%

■ Get along ■ Protect ourselves

Here's what you need to know:

The most effective way to build support for Israel is to talk about *"working toward a lasting peace"* that *"respects the rights of everyone in the region."* Notice there is no explicit mention of either Israel or the Palestinians. To the Left, both sides are equally at fault, and because the Israelis are more powerful, sophisticated and Western, it is they who should compromise first.

Let me be clear about this. ***Blunt, unequivocal language will be poorly received because, to the liberal ear, it is much too confrontational.*** The Left are inherently doves, advocates for peace, and they place their own peaceful existence above any involvement in any worldwide conflict.

Unlike mainstream Americans, the majority of the liberal elite believe the Israelis TOOK Palestinian land. You need to teach them otherwise. But also unlike mainstream audiences, the Left does appreciate the arguments of history and will respond more favorably if historic references and analogies are used. But be explicit. Give dates, numbers, facts – and don't dwell. A good history lesson lasts less than one minute.

With these observations in mind, what follows is a thematic guide to communicating to the American Left:

1) ***<u>With their heads, most liberals still support Israel. But their hearts go out to whomever looks like the biggest underdog. Right now they feel that is the Palestinians.</u>*** It explains why liberals have become so openly hostile since the start of the Gaza war and why life for pro-Israeli communicators will only get more difficult in the future. There is far too little sympathy for the plight of Israelis from America's left, and incredible emotional support for the plight of the Palestinians. *It is critical to make sure that Liberals understand this is a fight between Israel and Iran and its proxies, not just a territorial dispute between Israel and Palestinians. In Israel's short 61 years they have faced 7 wars and two intifadas. Almost no Israeli family has escaped the tragedies of war unscathed.*

2) ***<u>The suicide bombings and rocket attacks have become a fact of life, but stories and pictures of Palestinian children hurt or killed by an Israeli soldier evoke significant anti-Israeli emotion.</u>*** I blame some of this on key media outlets that wrongfully published as truth false allegations by UNWRA and others against Israel during the Gaza War. But, the fact is, the pictures coming into people's homes on a daily basis do a great deal to undermine Israel's cause. If you don't do something about both news sources, the communication problem will only get worse. *(And you need to spend as much time focused on the visual component of the story as the language you use.)*

3) ***The wealth, power and success of Israel actually hurts you in the eyes of the Left, while the poverty and failure of the Palestinians work to their benefit.*** The feeling among the liberal elite is that Israel uses all of its advancements and advantages *"unfairly"* or *"immorally"* against the Palestinians. Israel is so rich and so strong that they fail to see why it is necessary for armored tanks to shoot at unarmed kids or why Israel needs to level homes or attack villages or, most importantly, why a Palestinian state is a threat to Israel's existence. Making the argument that Israel is a small country with a tiny land mass with hostile neighbors all around you won't win either the hearts of the minds of liberal Americans. They think Israel can survive anything.

4) ***The nation and those who speak on their behalf that are perceived as being most for peace will win more hearts and minds.*** Period.

5) ***Because they believe "all people are basically good" and hate war, liberals think diplomacy can and should solve almost every conflict.*** Don't make the mistake of thinking you will win friends in the liberal community or from Europeans by publicly opposing opportunities for America or Israel to speak to Iran or their proxies. They believe in engagement. Thus, your job is to remind liberals that engagement is an important process but it is not an outcome. The outcome we want is security and peace for both sides.

6) ***Liberals will NOT support a targeted military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities if significant diplomacy to stop Iran was not tried first.*** It just won't happen. Don't think that just because rockets are hitting Israel from Iran-backed Hamas that it means liberals don't think Israel should negotiate with them. This is also true for many Europeans who think diplomacy is THE answer.

7) ***Many on the left see an "Israel v. Palestinian" crisis where Israel is Goliath and the Palestinians are David.*** It is critical that they understand that this is an Arab-Israeli crisis and that the force undermining peace is Iran and their proxies Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. You must not call Hamas just Hamas. Call them what they are: Iran-backed Hamas. Indeed, when they know that Iran is behind Hamas and Hezbollah, they are much more supportive of Israel.

8) ***"Defensive" and preventative" are the words that best describe Israeli military action.*** Understand that most military activities will be opposed by the Left but some will accept what Israel does if described this way. But it will only work if you actually put them in Israel's shoes. Remember the words from President Obama:

> ***"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I am going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same." -- President Barack Obama.***

Just like mainstream America, the Left wants and needs to hear that the terror can be stopped. Security is paramount. But more than the rest of America, liberals are against almost any use of military force.

It is perfectly acceptable and even desirable to use peace and security in the same sentence. All Americans fundamentally believe that any democracy has a right to defend itself, and while many do not regard Israel as a democracy in the American sense, *they will tolerate Israel's right to respond to these suicide bombers – as long as it is done in a "defensive" and "preventative" fashion and in the name of peace and security.*

9) ***The immigration/melting pot argument doesn't work.*** Today immigration is a dirty word. Some advocates like to make the case for Israel by emphasizing how it takes in the distressed peoples of the world. This is simply not a strong argument with most Americans right now.

WORDS THAT <u>DO NOT</u> WORK

No nation in the Middle East …in fact, no nation in the world … has more immigrants from more countries than Israel. No nation is more willing to open its arms to people suffering from political oppression or economic hardship. It is a true melting pot of nations and cultures from Europe, Asia and Africa.

A SPEECH FOR THE LEFT

There is no doubt in my mind that there are good people on both sides of this conflict that are tired of violence and want to live securely in peace with their neighbors. I hope and pray that that day will come soon. Today people on both sides are living in very difficult circumstances because of the actions of terrorists that seek anything but peace and want to destroy our hopes and dreams.

Israel regrets the actions it is forced to take to defend its citizens, Israeli civilians – civilians – have faced thousands of organized, violent and life-threatening attacks by terrorists like Iran backed Hamas and Hezbollah that have specifically and deliberately targeted women and children. Suicide bombers, car bombs, roadside ambushes, mortar barrages, rocket attacks, machine-gun fire in crowded shopping areas, bus stops and even places of worship….all deliberate….all indiscriminant….all designed to inflict as many casualties as possible.

There was a suicide bomber who killed nine people on an Israeli passenger bus – do you know where his explosives were hid? In a Palestinian nursery school. What kind of people would hide explosives in a nursery school? This isn't just an attack on Israel, this puts Palestinian children in harms way as well. Where is the care for their future? Nowhere else in the world, and certainly not in America, is the murder of innocent civilians considered a "legitimate form of resistance." These are not freedom fighters. These are terrorists.

I ask you, what possible explanation could defend the deliberate attack against teenagers at an Italian fast food restaurant, a disco, a wedding reception, a hotel lobby, an out-door café? What is the justification for targeting women and children where they live and play? There is an absolute moral difference between deliberate, random acts of terror against women and children and Israeli efforts to prevent this violence from occurring.

Is it legitimate for Israel to strike at a terrorist even if innocent bystanders could be hurt? Against a man who has already admitted committing multiple acts of vicious brutality and death and has said publicly that he is planning more acts of meg-terror, the answer is yes.

There is no moral equivalency between suicide bombers who knowingly target innocent women and children and the Israeli forces who specifically target terrorists. The Israeli goal is to minimize casualties. The terrorists goal is to maximize casualties. And that's the difference.

CHAPTER 18:

ISRAEL ON CAMPUS COMMUNICATIONS

The pictures of Israeli troops firing on Palestinian children and Israeli tanks bulldozing Palestinian villages have created a deep and unfortunately lasting impression of Israel as the aggressor in the current conflict. Make no mistake: all Americans have seen those pictures and even those who label themselves pro-Israel are uncomfortable with the visuals coming out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Those on the left of the political spectrum are particularly outspoken in their opposition to what they deem as an affront to human rights.

The situation at America's colleges and universities is even worse. The core mood on America's campuses is friendly to the enemies of Israel and hostile to Israel's supporters. When Israeli spokespeople come out and attack radical or fundamentalist Islam, many college kids rebel or, worse yet, openly criticize Israel for its so-called intolerance. Yes, adults do see an Islamic threat, but their kids don't.

It is therefore no surprise that some college campuses have erupted in anti-Israeli rhetoric in general and a pro-divestment campaign in particular. Using the same words and strategy that brought pressure on South Africa in the 1980s, those opposed to Israel have latched onto the business relationship between American and Israeli companies as a way to attack two entities, two Goliaths they dislike – Big Business and Israel – at one time.

To non-Jewish college students, all the speeches and all the debates and all the rhetoric and all the violence is, as it is with liberals, are about one thing: ***land.*** Israel has it and doesn't want to give it up. The Palestinians deserve it but don't have the ability to take it. Hence, conflict. There is no sense of right and wrong – everyone's wrong. There is no sense of history – the Holocaust doesn't even register on their radar screen. You have a lot to teach and a skeptical audience to convince.

What follows is a step-by-step approach to build credibility and support. Your task will not be easy, but this document was created to give you the tools to make a real difference. This is only the beginning. As Rabbi Tarfon said, "*The day is short, the task is great...You are not expected to finish the work but neither are you excused from it.*"

College students and young people in general can smell propaganda from a mile away. If you don't immediately position yourself as a credible, moderate with compassion and empathy for both sides, your audience will not listen to you.

1) ***Above all, talk about peace.*** The word, principle and concept of peace is the single highest priority among college students. If you want to regain the public relations advantage, peace should be at the core of whatever message you convey. ***The side that appears to be advocating peace more strongly is the side that will win student support.***

2) ***Personalize the conflict.*** This is something the Palestinians have done quite effectively and where the pro-Israeli spokespeople have failed miserably. Until we start using language that allows Americans to understand and feel the pain of the average Israeli, Americans just won't understand and feel the pain of the average Israeli.

3) **Stress the American-Israeli relationship.** Unfortunately, this cuts both ways. While students do recognize that Israel and America share the same political and economic systems and values, non-Jewish students use this as an excuse to demand more from Israel. The fact that Israel is a democracy means it has an extra requirement to respect the wishes and will of the Palestinian people. The fact that Israel has a free market economy means that it is required to help the Palestinians and their economy. Still the core values of freedom of religion, speech and the right to vote for all citizens are critical to explain to your audience.

4) ***You can empathize with the Palestinians even if you oppose their leadership, their tactics and their political goals.*** We must understand and accept the fact that American youths have sympathy for the plight of Palestinian youths and see their efforts as a struggle for freedom. While they might not support their tactics (and clearly some do), they do support their aims. The more supportive we are of the average Palestinian, the more likely we are to earn the support of students Jewish and non-Jewish alike. Differentiate between Hamas and the Palestinian people – and even between the more moderate approach by the leadership in the West Bank. College students must be made aware these distinctions.

5) ***Emphasize the rights of Israeli Arabs.*** Here is a very positive story that Israel has failed to emphasize and does have the potential to change college opinions. Let students know that Israeli Arabs have more rights and a higher stand of living than in any other Middle Eastern country. Let students know that Israeli Arabs are able to vote for Prime Minister and the Knesset and that no other Arab nation has such a long record of democracy.

6) ***Don't argue. Discuss.*** While Jews make up a bigger percentage of the campus population, the Palestinian students are better informed, more knowledgeable and, most importantly, better able to communicate their beliefs. Worse yet, the pro-Israeli tone is often loud and emotional, while the Palestinian reaction was calm and rational. If you are faced with an overly aggressive foe, use a rhetorical approach.

To ignore what is happening on campuses from Boston to San Diego would be a tragedy for Jews and non-Jews alike. At a meeting of 250 Jewish student activists, several questions were asked, and the answers were quite alarming:

* More than 85% say anti-Semitism is on the rise on college campuses, and virtually everyone has personally seen an example of anti-Semitism.

* Virtually everyone says pro-Palestinian activities and sentiment is on the rise at virtually every college and university.

* Jewish students have still not personalized the tragedy in Israel. The reason why so many campus Jews have remained so silent is because they still don't see themselves in the faces of their Israeli brethren or how the challenges facing Israel affect them personally.

The lack of political participation and historic knowledge among the American people has been well documented. However, the knowledge and awareness among college students about what is happening in the post 9/11 world today is nothing short of shocking. Consider this: only **23%** of all U.S college kids … our so-called best and our brightest, our so-labeled future leaders of government and industry … would pass a simple current affairs test by successfully answering more than half (five) of the following eight questions (see below)

WHO IS …	**% students who answered correctly**
The Leader of the Palestinian National Authority	55%
The U.S. Secretary of State	49%
The Prime Minister of Israel	35%
The U.S. Secretary of Defense	32%
National Security Advisor	19%
The UN Secretary General	19%

The President of Pakistan	14%

The three countries that comprise the Axis of Evil   25%

-- Luntz '04

APPENDIX I:

THE TOUGHEST QUESTIONS

Q: **Will Israel ever talk to Hamas?**

A: It's not just Israel who refuses to speak to Hamas. It's the whole international community, the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, Australia. Most of the democratic world refuses to have a relationship with Hamas because Hamas has refused to meet the most minimal benchmarks of international behavior.

It was the former U.N. secretary general Kofi Anan that put four benchmarks on the table. And he said, speaking for the international community …

That if Hamas reforms itself …

If Hamas recognizes my country's right to live in freedom …

If Hamas renounces terrorism against innocent civilians …

If Hamas supports international agreements that are being signed and agreed to concerning the peace process … then the door is open.

I say if Hamas meets those four United Nations benchmarks, then the door is open. But unfortunately – tragically – Hamas has failed to meet even one of those four benchmarks. And that's why today Hamas is isolated internationally. Even the United Nations refuses to speak to Hamas.

Their charter still reads- The Prophet, Allah's prayer and peace be upon him, says: "The hour of judgment shall not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them, so that the Jews hide behind trees and stones, and each tree and stone will say: 'Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him,' except for the Gharqad tree, for it is the tree of the Jews."

Q: Why did Israel use disproportionate force in Gaza?

A: The devastation in Gaza is heartbreaking. So much suffering that was so unnecessary. And none of it had to happen.

Israel left Gaza – uprooting 9,000 *Israeli* families, and turned it over, peacefully, to the Palestinians. They had every opportunity to succeed: support from the international community, financial aid from across the globe, and the aspirations of the people.

Israel gave up Gaza with every hope that this was the first step towards peace with the Palestinians, and all they got was rockets in return. Not dozens. Not hundreds. Thousands of rockets. Not monthly. Not weekly. Literally daily. Even since the fighting in Gaza stopped, more than 160 rockets been fired from Gaza towards Israel since Israel stopped fighting.

What would you have done -- or wanted your government to do -- if you and your family were under rocket attack every day? When will the terrorists in Gaza stop shooting rockets at Israeli civilians?

Q: Will Israel bomb Iran?

A: As President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have said on multiple occasions, a nuclear Iran is an unacceptable threat to the safety, security and stability of the world. Israel supports America's efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis as well as to stop Iran's support of terror.

This effort cannot be done alone. The entire world community needs to be involved. Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, funding Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, as well as Shiite insurgent groups. Iran is even recruiting its youth and students across the Middle East for suicide operations against Western targets. Iran's President has called for Israel to be wiped off the map and denies the Holocaust.

So let me ask you … do we want this regime to have nuclear materials? Do we want these sponsors of terror to have nuclear know-how and materials that they have said they will share with others?

Time is running out to peacefully stop Iran. It is up to world leaders to act *now* with both economic and political diplomacy. But as President Obama and Secretary Clinton have said, the largest state sponsor of terror must not be allowed to have nuclear weapons.

Q: Do you support the Saudi Peace Plan?

A: As a matter of principle, Israel advocates any serious proposal for peace. Israel supports wholeheartedly a better future for Israeli and Palestinian children, one in which all our children

can grow up and aspire to be doctors, lawyers and teachers – a future where neither Palestinian mothers or Israeli mothers have to fear when their children leave for school that they won't return safely.

The Saudi Plan has positive components, in that Israel would be finally recognized by her Arab neighbors. Missing from the Saudi plan, however, is the recognition that Israel needs defensible borders and that Palestinian refugees should be settled in Palestinian lands just as Jewish refugees have been settled in Israel.

It is also essential that the Middle Eastern nations do more – a lot more – for the economic well-being of the Palestinian people. Frankly, they haven't done enough. They call themselves Arab brethren, but they don't act that way. Instead of funding terrorism, they should be funding schools, hospitals, and new roads.

There is so much wealth among Arab populations … so why do they ignore the financial plight of the Palestinians? Why are countries like Saudi Arabia so rich … and the Palestinians so poor?

Q: Are you willing to divide Jerusalem?

A: Under Israel's control, Jerusalem is open and free to Christians, Muslims, Jews and all others who come to pray and visit in security and peace. Every religion is welcome. Every religion is free to worship as they please.

This was not the case before 1967. When Jerusalem was controlled by Arab leaders, Jews were not allowed to visit their holly sites – and they are not welcomed in Palestinian controlled areas today. Christians are also persecuted in many areas of the West Bank. But as long as Israel controls Jerusalem, all will be welcomed.

Q: Do you support the Palestinian right of return?

A: Living side by side in true sustainable peace, we must accept and embrace minority rights within each population. But we can't turn back the clock for either side. We must look towards the future. Just as Jewish exiles and refugees have found a place in Israel, so must Palestinians have the right to return to the land of their own, Palestine. And just as Arab Israelis have remained and flourished in Israel, so must Jews be allowed to remain and flourish in Palestine.

Q: Will Israel dismantle settlements?

A: Peace is about more than land or borders. It is about jobs, prosperity and opportunity for all. I wish that by moving some lines on a map that peace would magically come to the region. Sure, it worked with Egypt, because their leadership was committed to an end to war. But it has not worked with the Palestinians or Lebanese because they have not made such a commitment.

Let me be clear about this. Every Palestinian child deserves a better future, and so does every Israeli child. If we can agree on that, and stop doing those things that hurt our children, we can start on the road to mutual understanding and mutual respect.

We have to look at the larger picture. We have to think about the future, not live in the past or complain about the present. This is more than just territory. This is about terrorism. If – and when – we end the terrorism, we can sit down and resolve the issue of territory. It can be done – and will be done – when Palestinian children are taught in their schools and television to look for jobs and not jihad, to search for hope and not hate.

Q: **With so many votes for Lieberman's party, and him now serving as Israel's foreign minister, has Israel become a racist nation?**

A: Foreign Minister Lieberman has said publicly that he backs the Road Map for Peace which includes *"performance measurements"* - a step by step approach - to Palestinian self government. Lieberman's party is diverse and indeed, they even elected a Druze member of Parliament. One of the key platforms of Lieberman's party was to open up civil marriages – a more progressive position than many politicians here in America.

Q: **Will the new Israeli government clash with the Obama Administration?**

A: Israel looks forward to working with their American friends including President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Sen. George Mitchell as well as with other members of the Administration and Congress.

Israel and America are close allies because of the values, ideals and hopes that we share. President Obama has said *"Our alliance is based on shared interests and shared values."* He has said that he *"will bring to the White House an unshakeable commitment to Israel's security"* and that he will *"ensure that Israel can defend itself from any threat — from Gaza to Tehran"*. Israeli leaders and citizens hope that Israel and America can work for peaceful solutions to all the issues in the Middle East -- including for a better life for Palestinians who want peace.

"Although the continuity of jihad was interrupted by obstacles placed in the path of the jihad fighters by those who circle in the orbit of Zionism, the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to realize the promise of Allah, no matter how long it takes.

The Prophet, Allah's prayer and peace be upon him, says: "The hour of judgment shall not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them, so that the Jews hide behind trees and stones, and each tree and stone will say: 'Oh Muslim, oh servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him,' except for the Gharqad tree, for it is the tree of the Jews." (Recorded in the Hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim).

From time to time there are calls to hold an international conference in order to seek a solution for the [Palestinian] problem. Some accept this [proposal] and some reject it, for one reason or another, demanding the fulfillment of some condition or conditions before they agree to hold the conference and participate in it. However, the Islamic Resistance Movement - since it is familiar with the parties participating in the conference and with their past and current positions on the issues of the Muslims - does not believe that these conferences can meet the demands or restore the rights [of the Palestinians], or bring equity to the oppressed.

These conferences are nothing but a way to give the infidels power of arbitration over Muslim land, and when have the infidels ever been equitable towards the believers?

The day the enemies conquer some part of the Muslim land, jihad becomes a personal duty of every Muslim. In the face of the Jewish occupation of Palestine, it is necessary to raise the banner of jihad. This requires the propagation of Islamic consciousness among the masses, locally [in Palestine], in the Arab world and in the Islamic world. It is necessary to instill the spirit of jihad in the nation, engage the enemies and join the ranks of the jihad fighters.

The indoctrination campaign must involve *ulama*, educators, teachers and information and media experts, as well as all intellectuals, especially the young people and the sheikhs of Islamic movements. "

APPENDIX III:

IMPORTANT FACTS

"If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing."

President Barack Obama

Over 160 rockets and mortars have been fired from Gaza into Israel since the 1/18/09 ceasefire…

It has been over 1028 Days since Gilad Shalit was kidnapped from Israeli soil and held hostage…

And here is the conflict by the numbers…

Israel's Humanitarian Aid to Gaza

508	truckloads of humanitarian aid that have been delivered through Israeli crossings into Gaza since the beginning of Operation Cast Lead, including basic food commodities, medication, medical supplies, blood units and donations by various governments and blood units. [3]
80	truckloads of humanitarian aid expected to arrive in Gaza on Jan. 5 [4]
20	Palestinians evacuated to Israel for medical treatment (including two children) [5]
800,000+	Leaflets disseminated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to Gaza civilians instructing them to stay away from terrorist and weapons storage sites [6]
70+	times the IDF warned populated areas before conducting airstrikes [7]
10,000	tons of aid transported into Gaza at the request of international organizations, the Palestinian Authority and various governments since the beginning of Operation Cast Lead. The World Food Program informed Israel last week that that it would cease shipment of food to Gaza because warehouses are at full capacity, with enough food to last two weeks. [8]
0	wounded Palestinians allowed by Hamas to cross from Gaza into Egypt for treatment. [9]

Iran-backed Hamas Rocket, Mortar Attacks and Nuclear Developments

10,000+	Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza since 2001. [10]
3,200+	Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza in 2008 alone. [11]
6,500+	Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza since Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. [12]
538+	Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza into Israeli territory during the ceasefire from June 19 to Dec. 19, 2008. [13]
480	Rockets and mortars fired from Gaza into Israel since Operation Cast Lead began Dec. 27. [14]
28	Deaths caused by rockets and mortars fired from Gaza into Israel since 2001. The dead include Israelis, Palestinians and foreign workers. Since the ceasefire ended, Iran-backed Palestinian groups in Gaza fired rockets and mortars that killed an Israeli-Arab construction worker and a mother of four who was seeking shelter in a bus station as a rocket warning siren sounded. [15]
1,000+	People in Israel injured from rockets and mortars fired from Gaza since 2001, including Israelis, Palestinians and foreign workers. Since the start of Israel's defensive operation in Gaza Dec. 27, 90 Israelis have been injured and at least 244 have been treated for shock. [16]
20,000	Hamas terrorists Israel is targeting as part of its defensive operations [17]
1,000,000	Israeli civilians Hamas is targeting and can reach. [18]
15	seconds Israelis have to get to a bomb shelter once a warning siren has sounded. [19]
8	years Israel has endured rockets and mortar fire from Gaza [20]
3	mosques in Gaza used as weapons, ammunitions and explosives depots that were struck by the Israel Defense Forces during the operation in Gaza. [21] The strikes occurred only at night and never during prayer times, to avoid civilian casualties.
4	UN Security Council resolutions passed since 2006 to try to stop Iran from enriching uranium. [22]
5,000+	number of centrifuges operating in Iran to enrich uranium, the material used to produce a nuclear weapon. [23]

What Israel Gave Up in Hopes of Peace - Gaza Withdrawal Aug. 2005

100%	proportion of the Gaza Strip evacuated and handed over to the Palestinians. [24]
300	square miles of the West Bank evacuated. [25]
21	Israeli settlements uprooted in the Gaza Strip. [26]
4	Israeli settlements uprooted in the West Bank. [27]
48	Graves uprooted in Gaza's former Gush Katif Cemetery, including six graves of area residents murdered by terrorists. [28]
9,000	approximate number of Israelis, including 1,700 families, who lived in Gaza and the northern West Bank. All of them were moved out as part of the withdrawal. [29]
38	synagogues dismantled in the Gaza Strip. [30]
5,000	School-age children who had to find new schools. [31]
42	Day care centers that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [32]
36	kindergartens that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [33]
7	elementary schools that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [34]
3	High schools that were closed in the Gaza Strip. [35]
320	Mobile homes, ordered by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, to serve as temporary housing for settlers. [36]
45,000	Israeli soldiers and policemen who participated in the Gaza withdrawal. [37]
$1.7 billion	the approximate cost to the Israeli government for the withdrawal initiative. [38]
166	Israeli farmers who were moved out of Gaza. [39]
10,000	People who were employed in agriculture and related industries in Gush Katif, including 5,000 Palestinians. [43]
3.5 million	Square meters (almost 1,000 acres) of greenhouses abandoned in Gaza. [45]
15	percentage of Israel agricultural exports that originated in Gaza – exports lost following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza. [48]
$360,000	expected average compensation amount Israel expected to pay to relocate each family. [49]
$870 million	approximate cost for Israel to facilitate the resettlement of former West Bank and Gaza residents elsewhere in the country. [50]
$500 million	amount of money Israel's security establishment spent to relocate Israel Defense Forces bases outside the Gaza Strip and build new border crossing facilities. [51]

After Israel's evacuation from Gaza…

430,000	West Bank Palestinians able to move freely within and between Palestinian-controlled areas. [52]
1	Israeli remaining in Gaza. Staff Sgt. Gilad Shalit was abducted from Israel on June 25, 2006 by Hamas in a bloody cross-border raid in which the terrorists also killed two IDF soldiers and wounded four others. [53]
1.2 million	Arabs who remained full and legal citizens of Israel. All Israeli citizens – Christians, Muslims, and Jews – have freedom of speech, religion, press, and the right to vote. [54]
1.3 million	Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip many of them in Palestinian Authority-controlled refugee camps, who live under their own leaders. [55]
820,000	Jewish refugees forced to flee without their belongings from Arab countries between 1947 and 1949, and who have never been compensated by Arab governments for their losses. [58]
650,000	Arab refugees who left Israel from 1947-1949 and still need Palestinian leaders who will end terrorism and the culture of hate. [57]

In addition, Israel's withdrawal from four northern West Bank settlements created an area more than twice the size of Gaza's 140 square miles under Palestinian control and devoid of any Israeli presence. [58]

APPENDIX IV:

POSTERS THAT WORK

Posters that were *factually based* as seen above were far more effective than those that were *"shocking"* or were seen as *"extreme",* including pictures of babies strapped in bombs or featuring Ahamdenijad as Hitler.

These findings are consistent with our general language findings. Just as the best rhetorical justification for the security fence is saving lives, the best poster emphasized the lives lost before the fence and the lives saved after it. And just as the best arguments for isolating Hamas are to show how it is a terrorist organization and how it is unaccountable it is to its own people, the "jobs not bombs" message ties it all together.

POSTERS THAT WORK

"Peace. Tolerance. Respect."

By TC² for The Israel Project

Peace. Tolerance. Respect.

Where in the Middle East do children learn these values?

A peaceful future in the Middle East is only possible if children are taught to value and embrace their neighbors. Israel wants the next generation to have a better and safer future. That is why peace is formally taught in Israeli schools beginning in kindergarten.

**Israel teaches children the values of peace.**

These are the three words and principles that the young elites value the most. Everything in the young elite's perspective begins with peace and focuses on the next generation. This ad evokes a feel-good reminder that children are the future; this is in stark contrast to the idea of adults being filled with hate. The idealism communicated speaks directly to an overly idealistic group.

"The child drawing smiley faces is a nice touch. The message is clear and powerful."

When you want to appeal to young elites, focus on the future. The message is enhanced with the classroom setting visual.

Only underline or bold when you think the reader needs extra focus. It's not needed here.

"Shows Israeli initiative to instill and teach peace to a younger generation."

This ad works because it represents a call to action and projects a message of progress and hope. The overtly positive tone erodes any suspicion of propaganda. The historic context and reminder that progress begins with individual steps of courage resonates well among elite graduate students. Israel's image as a pursuer of peace is enhanced, and it invites the other side to engage in the peace process. (Note: When Israel underscores the benefits peace can bring to the Palestinians, both sides win.)

Exactly what readers want to hear. This explicitly rejects the cycle of violence that the young elites themselves reject.

Articulates hope and shows ongoing commitment. Also, "*it doesn't attack the other side.*"

Words like "*voluntarily*" make an important point in a non-confrontational manner.

"*They're saying what is actually being done. It's so simple and factual.*"

"*It's focused on NOW, not the past.*"

"*It's very simple, very positive and reminiscent of the parable about the man walking through life and leaving footprints.*"

The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

Israel is taking a historic first step.

By removing Jewish citizens and businesses from the Gaza strip, Israel is beginning the journey toward a lasting peace. Israel's disengagement plan voluntarily closes settlements to give Palestinians land, control and hope. It is a powerful and dramatic symbol that Israel is willing to make painful sacrifices for peace.

Let the Journey Begin.

Israel. Working today for tomorrow's peace.